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Professor Mohammed Arkoun
(1928–2010)
Professor Mohammed Arkoun was a prominent and influential figure in
Islamic Studies. In a career of more than thirty years, he was an outstanding
research scholar, a searching critic of the theoretical tensions embedded in
the field of Islamic Studies, and a courageous public intellectual who carried
the banner of an often embattled Islamic modernism and humanism.
Arkoun was born into a traditional extended family in Taourirt-Mimoun,
a small town in the Great Kabylia, in February 1928. As a Berber in colonial
Algeria, he initially spoke neither the language of the colonial rulers nor
that of the Qur’an, and as a result he found himself marginalised from an
early age. He attended a college run by the White Fathers and completed
his schooling in Oran, and in Algiers. He began degrees in Arabic literature,
law, philosophy and geography. He established his scholarly reputation
with his early studies (1969, 1970) of the Persian historian and philosopher
Miskawayh. As he began to consider how one might rethink Islam in the
contemporary world, his sophisticated questioning provided a welcome
counterpoint to the highly ideological interpretations that had dominated
debate in both the Muslim world and the non-Muslim West.
As Professor of the History of Arab Thought at Vincennes University,
Arkoun accepted a chair at the Sorbonne Nouvelle in 1980. There, he was
the director of the department of the history of Arab and Islamic thought
and editor of the magazine Arabica. He not only maintained Arabica’s
very high standard of scholarship; he considerably broadened its scope and
urged it to play a significant role in shaping Western-language scholarship
on Islam.
Arkoun is the author of numerous books in French, English and Arabic,
including Rethinking Islam (Westview Press, 1994), L’immigration, défis et
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richesses (Centurion, 1998) and The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic
Thought (Saqi Books, 2002). His shorter studies appeared in many academic
journals and his works have been translated into several languages. In 2001,
Arkoun was asked to deliver the Gifford Lectures, which enable a notable
scholar to contribute to the advancement of theological and philosophical
thought; there he was announced as the recipient of the Seventeenth
Georgio Levi Della Vida Award for his lifelong contribution to the field
of Islamic Studies. As a visiting Professor, he taught at the University of
California, Princeton University, Temple University, the University of
Louvain-la-Neuve, the Pontifical Institute of Arabic Studies in Rome and
the University of Amsterdam. He also served as a jury member for the Aga
Khan Award for Architecture. At his passing, he was Emeritus Professor at
La Sorbonne as well as Senior Research Fellow and member of the Board of
Governors of The Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS) in London. In October
2009, the IIS organised a symposium in honour of Arkoun’s efforts to renew
the study of Islam.
Professor Arkoun died in September, 2010.
In an obituary, one of the contributors to this volume, Ursula Günther,
wrote of Arkoun’s humanism and his approach to teaching. “Mohammed
Arkoun was not only a sharp-witted intellectual and humanist from the
depth of his heart, with a subtle sense of humour,” she observed. “He was
also a passionate, charismatic speaker and a dedicated teacher. He felt a part
of all that is capable of opening up new links to intelligence, as he put it, and
saw himself as ‘an intellectual in revolt’. May his idea that thoughts develop
a life of their own prove right, continuing to take effect beyond the walls of
cognitive demarcations and dominant ideologies.”1

Notes
1.

Ursula Günther, “Obituary for Mohammed Arkoun: A Pioneer of Modern Critical
Islam Studies”, Quantara.de, 21 September 2010, Web 7 March 2011 <http://www.
qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-1104/i.html>

Preface: Situating Arkoun
Abdou Filali-Ansary

In an article that was a tribute to Claude Cahen, Mohammed Arkoun
begins by quoting a sentence from the late Professor, written when he in
turn was paying tribute to another distinguished colleague. The sentence
reads as follows:
Respect for the memory of a deceased man implies, in the first place,
respect for science and for the readers he (Maurice Lombard) had. It is
thus that I would like to be treated if the same thing happened to me.1
This volume was conceived, planned and realised as a tribute, and, as befalls
a festschrift volume, with the blessings and active participation of the late
Professor Arkoun. The idea of respecting science first and foremost was
in fact the only possible option in an endeavour that seeks to pay tribute
to Mohammed Arkoun, regardless of the feelings and attitudes of those
present. The main “struggle” (the French word “combat” was prominent in
titles chosen by Arkoun for his interventions) was to make science prevail
over myth and belief. The chosen topic The Construction of Belief, for
which credit must be rendered to my friend and colleague Dr Aziz Esmail,
alludes to the “Copernican Revolution” that has engulfed the humanities
and social sciences in recent decades, through which belief is not seen as a
given that overwhelms individuals and communities, thereby defining their
symbolic world – but rather, as a complex set of views and attitudes that
emerge through historical and social processes liable to observation, analysis
and scrutiny. The chapters of this volume all illustrate ways in which the
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Copernican Revolution has prevailed in academia, as the only objective
way to approach the discussion of belief, now seen as a human artefact –
regardless of the claims implied by that belief. Such an objective approach to
the study of faith becomes particularly significant in the case of Mohammed
Arkoun, given his impassioned stance on and contribution to prevailing
scholarly approaches to “Islam” and all things “Islamic”.
In a way, every scholar and every thinker is unique. However, we
are tempted to say that some may be more unique than others, and that
Mohammed Arkoun is one of these. The obvious argument for this is his
general style, which combines, in his writing and his lectures, (which he
understood as interventions) a strict scholarly rigour with a great display
of vehemence. Concern for exactitude coupled with intense emotion are
not often seen together, however they are what marks the “uniqueness”
of Professor Arkoun. This is witnessed in the language he chose for his
speech and his writing, and by the image he had of himself and his role in
the context of academia and well beyond. There are however other reasons,
which make it important and at the same time difficult, to situate him in the
contemporary landscape of discourse about things “Islamic”.
If we look at the intellectual ferment in Muslim contexts during the
twentieth century, we can identify with relative ease a number of salient
currents, although categorisations and classifications are abundant and differ
sometimes quite substantially. One of the main trends to emerge during the
twentieth century was the legacy of nineteenth-century reformism. This
influenced above all the “modernists”, who believed that Muslims had a
unique cultural offering – a vision laid down in the sources of their faith –
and who felt that this vision and the dynamic it entails had been obscured by
literalist traditions. Once polished and brought back to its original purity,
this vision would provide the impetus for a collective return to rationality,
discipline, morality and strength. This conciliatory and self-assuring
message, while still resisted by staunch traditionalists early in the twentieth
century, was challenged by a turn that proved to be deeply disruptive.
Following the quick collapse of traditional institutions in the Muslim
world, including the disintegration of political centres of power, new
questions were raised from within the ranks of future reformists. Ali Abder
Razek was to fire the first shot by raising bold questions about what had
been considered to be core or essential beliefs, such as the political message
of religion. The questions were most disturbing as they came from a religious
scholar and cleric, formally trained in the strictest traditions and, more
importantly, not exposed to ideas or views from modern philosophy or
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political thought. A new seed of dissent was sown, reviving an atmosphere
of heated controversy that had been forgotten for centuries.
We now know that other Muslim thinkers had raised elsewhere, more or
less at the same time, similar questions that had been set aside or repressed
by a heavy-handed tradition. The book by Ma’ruf al-Rusafi was written in
1934 but could not be published until 2002. There were other intellectuals
with a comparable profile to al-Rusafi and Abder Razek, who felt strongly
about the limitations imposed by a frozen tradition and expressed their
need to break free by daring to pose bold questions, but without reference
to or use of the methods and concepts derived from modern thought and
scholarship. These include Mahmud Mohamed Taha and Ahmad Kasravi.
At a later stage came a generation of thinkers who had been exposed
to modern ideas about religion, politics and their conflicting relationships
in European contexts, especially since the Enlightenment. They were also
exposed to modern approaches to questions of religious and cultural heritage,
especially historical-critical scholarship, and came to discover endeavours
that aimed to apply these methods to the heritage of Muslims. Mohammed
Arkoun is definitely of this later generation. He emerges as someone who
has assimilated and mastered concepts and theories of contemporary social
science and philosophy, particularly in the forms and terminology that were
worked out within French-speaking academia. However, he does not seek to
advocate some kind of religious reform by redress or to correct traditional
views through a scholarly re-examination, as was attempted by a number of
Muslim scholars of his generation, for example, Fazlur Rahman, Abdelmajid
Charfi, Abdolkarim Sorouch. Rather, he stresses that we need to subvert,
not to reform. He fully adopts the scholarly agenda, but with a substantial
reservation. In short, his principal aim was to broaden the impact of the
“Copernican revolution” accomplished by historical-critical approaches, to
question one specific type of categorisation still in use not only in public
debate and discussion but also within an academia that had embraced
historical-critical methodologies. Indeed, it was the categorisation that
singles out Islam and Muslims as one, broad, enduring and efficient reality in
the past as well as in the present, that Arkoun spent his lifetime passionately
questioning.
Arkoun’s aim was to scrutinise and dissolve notions which were derived
from ideologies and that had shaped the perceptions of realities in the past
and still remained in use today. The “Copernican revolution” was not, in his
view, complete and effective until it dissolved the remnants of ideologies that
had prevailed in various historical contexts, including those inherited from
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the “rational” Enlightenment. Many have consequently situated Arkoun
within the wave of postmodernism, but there is a need for caution here. He
does not reject the ideal of truth, or the ambition to reach some degree of
reliable, well-supported forms of representation. All discourses are definitely
not equal in their claims to truth and it is important to dispel the illusions
and distortions that have accumulated through, and can be fully explained
by, various historical processes. In a few paragraphs in a paper bearing a title
which could be considered to be his “manifesto”, “Transgresser, déplacer,
dépasser” (Transgress, displace, overcome), Arkoun formulates his most
formal statement about history:
The philosophical substance of modern historical thought can
be made explicit in the following epistemic and epistemological
propositions:
• All human social units, whatever may be their size, are subject
to mechanisms of transformation, change, evolution either in
the direction of integration, complexification, heading towards
hegemony, or, to the contrary, in the direction of disintegration and
weakening that may lead the unit to effacement, dissolution, demise;
• All that happens in the life of social units is the consequence of
the continuous play of external and internal forces which determine
the wills, initiatives and perceptions of social actors, thus labelled
precisely in order to highlight the theatrical setup of power behaviour
in particular;
• Spheres of the supernatural, of divine or metaphysical
transcendence, of active and omnipresent gods or of one, living but
distant god, of magical, popular, legendary, religious beliefs, all linked
to the imaginary, are equally products of social actors. As such, they
must be submitted to the same analytical and critical investigation as
conducted by social sciences in order to assess their pertinence and
their effect in the historical shaping of societies;
• The historical argumentation which underlies all modern
historical writing aims at progressively absorbing the sociological
reasoning as defined by Jean-Claude Passeron,2 with the clearly stated
ambition to objectify the actors’ subjectivities.3
The frustration, short temper and lack of patience Arkoun showed are
clearly due to the fact that his campaigning did not yield the desired effect.
He felt that he was completely misunderstood, as he was often faced by a
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polite but coldly dismissive silence. There was, no doubt, something that
created embarrassment among his audiences. An assessment made by Ira
Lapidus of one of Arkoun’s works is perhaps not untypical:
In a series of recent works he [Arkoun] has become the leading
French-language spokesman calling for a rethinking of Islam in a
modern mode. Unfortunately, his book is full of French academic
jargon, scholarly polemics and allusions to subjects that will not be
familiar to ordinary readers. […] it is also a frustrating work to read
because Mr. Arkoun raises important questions, announces that
further research is necessary and leaves them unresolved.4
Arkoun was perceptive in calling for an outright adoption of historicalcritical approaches. It is the case that in most Muslim contexts education
in religious matters, and the prevailing perceptions in general, are
overwhelmingly dogmatic and built upon assumptions that are often
unacceptable to the modern mind. Religious instruction is given in ways
which were widespread during pre-modern times, shaping the minds of
people for a lifetime. At the same time, in order to achieve consistency,
Arkoun was also right in insisting that the historical-critical attitude be
taken seriously, and therefore be applied to the concepts and terminology
used to represent history and culture where they come to define collective
identities and common aspirations.
Pushing the “Copernican revolution” achieved by modern social
sciences to its ultimate consequences, ensuring that it is comprehensive and
consistent in Muslim as well as in “Western” contexts, seems well overdue;
particularly, if we take into consideration the pernicious effects of the uses
and misuse of categories such as “civilisation”, “culture” and “religion”.
The vast accumulation of literature intended to dispel the idea of a clash of
civilisations gives us a very good reason for a systematic reconsideration of
categories that we take to be elementary building blocks for public discussion.
Without a thorough comprehensiveness and consistency, without a
methodical critique of such categories or concepts, it becomes impossible to
destroy the false idols that populate our imaginations. Misunderstandings
created by the uncritical use of these categories weigh heavily on perceptions
in the public opinion, and create deep gaps between the understanding
brought about by scholarship and by perceptions that are firmly rooted in
societies. All this, Arkoun was well placed to perceive, understand and feel
the need to fight. Having found himself on the margins of two societies with
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different historical heritages and a history of intense confrontation, he was
able to perceive acutely the devastating effects of categories, concepts and
terms that are understood to be markers of elementary realities.
There remains a gap between the ideal Arkoun called for and the social
and anthropological realities on the ground. It is striking to call for subversion
against, rather than reform of, deeply entrenched but grossly inappropriate
views. Attempting reforms that may amount to simple face-lifting, while
leaving fundamental attitudes unaffected, will not bring about the change
that Arkoun (and many contemporary scholars of Muslim background) felt
to be overdue. But this does not take into consideration the religious needs
(‘spiritual aspirations’, if we wish to follow the established terminology) in
societies at large. In this way Arkoun was a utopian intellectual, not in terms
of what he insistently requested from fellow scholars, but rather in regard
to what he hoped to achieve in the public sphere. He simply seemed to be
insensitive to the fact that societies do need myths and allegories, that no
established religion can be subverted through rational argument (otherwise,
which popular religion would have survived?), that religious attitudes
evolve not because people are convinced to adopt change, but rather when
they are ‘seduced’ by rival alternatives. Preaching a form of enlightenment
that is not accessible to the multitude, he seemed to be insensitive to the
Rushdian (or Averroist) principle, following which the social order needs to
be built on foundations derived from supernatural perceptions, at least until
secular worldviews can and do prevail. At moments, his thought seemed to
be frozen in sophisticated phrases that he derived from scholarly works little
known to those whom he addressed. He also became increasingly reluctant
to listen to the world around him, to interact with other thinkers who were
voicing concerns similar to his own, which may explain the little influence
his thought has had in predominantly Muslim contexts.
Ultimately, Arkounian views, utopian as they may be, may not have
caught the interest or understanding of the multitude during his lifetime,
but they do call upon ideals that are universal and of all times. They may
inspire and motivate scholars in the future, as there should be individuals
who are prepared to brave the hurdles of his terminology and make their
way to the numerous gems that his message contains. He may, with time,
find his place next to great and fecund utopians like Rousseau or Proudhon
who, long after their demise, continue to inspire, at least within circles of
committed devotees.
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Notes
1. Mohammed Arkoun. “Transgresser, déplacer, dépasser”, in Arabica; T. 43, Fasc. 1,
L’œuvre de Claude Cahen : Lectures Critiques, pp. 28–70.
2. Le raisonnement sociologique: un espace non poppérien de l'argumentation (éditions
refondue et augmentée), (Paris : Albin Michel, 2005).
3. “Transgresser, déplacer, dépasser”, pp. 57–8 (my translation).
4. “Islam without Militance”, in The New York Times, 21 August 1994.

Mohammed Arkoun:
A Personal Tribute and an Intellectual
Assessment
Aziz Esmail

I (i)
I first met Mohammed Arkoun in the late 1980s in the United States. The
occasion was formal. It was a small seminar on an Islamic issue (a “workshop”
– a word academics do not mind using nowadays, borrowing factory idiom).
Arkoun spoke with the force, the vehemence which – as I was to discover
– was characteristic of him. He made a strong, immediate impression on
me. The vehemence was striking, if only because it is unusual in learned
seminars, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world. But this impression could have
faded, and his passion might as easily have been something to deplore as to
admire (for passion in the absence of intellect is always deplorable, and of
Arkoun’s intellect I was able to take true measure only afterwards). What
caught my attention were a few telling remarks of a serious kind. They left
me intrigued.
The remarks impressed me less for themselves than that they came from
a professor of Islamic Studies. This, in turn, made an impact because my
own experience of Islamic Studies had been a great disappointment. For this
reason, Arkoun’s approach struck me as a rare intellectual treat.
In a piece on Arkoun I must check a temptation to digress to myself. But
to convey why I found in Arkoun a person rare of a kind I must say a word
about why I had found academic Islamic Studies unsatisfactory. For it was
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this common perception which fed the intellectual friendship that was to
flourish between us.

(ii)
Graduate Islamic Studies had never been an aim of mine. It was a product of
pure chance. On the other hand, religion represented a very powerful force
in my life, and it was this, perhaps, more than an intellectual attraction to
the field, that impelled me towards Islamic Studies.
I had been born and brought up in the Ismaili faith in its Indian
subcontinental form. In culture – language, custom, food and entertainment
– my world was Indian. (In cultural matters we were unconcerned to sift
supposedly ‘‘Islamic’’ elements from supposedly others. In this respect
we enjoyed the blessings of unselfconsciousness, denied to more recent
generations in similar contexts.) The land – East Africa – was ruled
by the British, and so our schooling was in the British mode, in modern
subjects, with supreme importance given to English, a necessary means of
advancement in the world.
Our religious ideas and practices belonged to a remote past. They carried
a sense of the timeless and the transcendental, of pleasure and passions not
of this world. Carried in our Indian vernacular, they were at once intimate
and untouched by ways of modern thought. But the teaching of our faith
at the time (as now) advocated a harmony of the ancient and the modern.
It lauded the spiritual, but also embraced the modern world. So, someone
like me, participating in at least two worlds, did so not only without conflict
but with a sense of fulfilling a mandate. Yet it is hard to over-emphasise how
distinct the two worlds then were. At school the teachers of all secular subjects
(in my time) were of other faiths. This was never an issue. The religion was
not allowed to encroach unduly on our time at school, and certainly not on
what we studied. So, although one had no way of realising this, the school
– or more accurately, what we learned there – was a microcosm of England,
itself a microcosm of the modern West; while our religious and cultural
pursuits were a microcosm of the Indo-Islamic world, in an African setting.
This simple experience (common to so many people in so many lands
in so much of modern time) was for me to become in later, more selfconscious years an object of analysis and wonder and a wish for integration.
At school my mind was long excited by science rather than the arts (though,
happily, we did not think of them yet as alternatives). At the same time my
knowledge of our sacred Indo-Islamic poetry (even this hyphenated word
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belies its freedom from duality) fostered an early sensitivity to language.
Later, this sensitivity was carried over to my studies in English at university.
The realism of English literature offered me a counterpoint to mysticism,
and although I never objected to the literature as “foreign”, and though it
was to open to me the new world of European thought and culture, it took
me back to my own setting and background in a wish to understand it anew
with the discipline, largely self-taught, of thinking about literature.
In due course, seeking more than means of cultivation, seeking means
of rigorous and methodical analysis, I turned to other subjects. Philosophy,
which I was later to teach, became an enduring interest. So did psychoanalysis;
and later, sociology and anthropology.
This was the intellectual make-up that had come to be mine. I do not
call it inter-disciplinary (though that would not be altogether incorrect).
Having had an “inter-disciplinary” background, I have grown to realise the
folly of pursuing it as a deliberate, artificial end. The ideal form of interdisciplinariness is where it is inherent in the way a subject is understood;
when, in other words, it is organically present – unsought, unnamed – and
has the properties, so to speak, of a compound rather than a mixture.
If, then, I turned to Islam as a subject of study, I was less after knowledge
understood as facts than knowledge understood as perspective. I hoped to be
able to use the ideas in the various disciplines I was interested in to this end.
Ultimately, I suspect, I was also concerned to bridge the two worlds I had
mentally lived in. It is very likely that every motivated student of humanistic
topics is at bottom a seeker. What he or she seeks is inevitably personal. This
becomes a liability if the search becomes romantic or self-indulgent instead
of self-transcending. It is not the business of universities to serve personal
odysseys. But if a subject like philosophy or religion or art or literature is
conceived in a way which a student cannot use for personal as much as for
professional development, it is safe to say that it must be badly conceived.
I have allowed myself these personal observations to qualify rather than
inflate my claims about the field. I do not present these claims as objective.
But neither are they capriciously personal. The personal factor in one’s
estimation of things can be a means to more general, impersonal truth.
Whether this is so or not in the present case is, of course, a matter for debate
and discussion.
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(iii)
Let me highlight, then, some of what I see as serious drawbacks of Islamic
Studies in Western universities, especially at graduate level. To anyone
sensitised to them they were too obvious to be missed. I have the past decades
in mind, but I suspect the deficiencies have not entirely disappeared.
To begin with, the subject itself is anomalous. By definition Islamic
Studies is the study of Islam. But what is Islam? The obvious answer is:
the religion of that name. But, as it happens, Islamic Studies turns out to
be a historical study of societies called “Islamic”. The field spans politics,
economics, cultures, jurisprudence, intellectual and literary traditions, and
of course, religious ideas and practices. To do justice to these would require
the skills of what at present are the separate disciplines of philosophy,
literary criticism and the social sciences, together with knowledge of sources
and texts in primary languages.
The point is not that this is too tall an order for anyone (though this is
so). It is, rather, that the field, has rarely, if ever, appreciated it as a tall order.
It has failed to perceive, for example, that “Islamic” philosophy cannot
be properly understood without a training in the history and methods
of philosophy; that “Islamic” political and social institutions cannot be
grasped, beyond superficial judgements, without appropriate conceptions
of social and political order; that cultures, like languages, are systems rather
than elements, and require, for their understanding, tools equivalent to (if
not indeed overlapping with) those of linguistics; that, in short, none of
these yield full or systematic meaning through history understood solely as
narration.
Islamic Studies makes sense only as a field built jointly out of contributions
of perspectives such as those of history, sociology, psychology, linguistics
and philosophy. This is precisely what in its traditional form it has never
been.
To reiterate, however, the problem is of a different order than one
that can be corrected by an injection, from outside as it were, of an interdisciplinary cocktail.
The two principal disciplines in the tradition of Islamic Studies are
philology and history. Philology is a demanding and rigorous discipline
dedicated to the study of texts. But texts are only part of a society’s
expression, and in pre-modern times this part was but a tiny sliver. This was
an obvious consequence of the highly limited literacy (by the standards
of even a century ago, let alone today) as well as the absence of print.
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Consequently, although the classical Islamic world abounded in texts, many
of them bearing witness to great learning and sophistication of mind in their
authors, it is easy to forget that their content does not represent the mental
outlook (itself pluriform), the beliefs and practices we call “Islam”, of people
at large. This is true even of a non-scholarly text like the Qur’an, whose study
and exegesis in colleges (madrasas) was a pursuit of legists and theologians,
while in society at large its presence was liturgical and ceremonial, with little
(if any) role for intellectual or analytic endeavour.
History, the other discipline which has shaped traditional Islamic history,
is obviously an important subject of relevance to this field. At its best it too
is a solid and demanding enterprise. But, being mostly an art rather than
a science, it is apt to vary greatly in how it understands its subject matter.
The superficiality or otherwise of its understanding will directly reflect
the superficiality or otherwise of the author’s mind and life-experience,
or of the tradition in which that mind has been schooled. A tradition of
due complexity is carried forward by good minds in its service. But it will
withstand, at least for some time, the absence of good minds to carry it
forward. On the other hand, a tradition of study which is devoid of a rich
vision of life will not benefit from the availability of good minds. These are
likely to be infected with the mediocrity of the tradition, and so forfeit their
potential. Or they will turn to other pastures of intellectual sustenance.
In this respect history is at one with the other arts. A novel or a play, a
work of paint or music, will be only as shallow or profound as the vision of
life of its author. And we can all, in our different ways and with our different
tastes, tell the difference between a glib and a rich specimen in any of these
fields though we may differ in our choices and the criteria for our choices.
There have been good minds at work in modern historical studies of
Islam, just as there are bound to be good (and bad) minds at work in any
field of knowledge. But the tradition of knowledge-gathering in which a
good mind is schooled may do either justice or injustice to that mind. It may
give it a wide scope to exercise and grow its talents. Or it may direct it into
a tunnel. And by doing so it may shrink the possibilities of what may be an
originally fine intellect and imagination. It would do so by failing to afford
the scope a good mind needs in order to flower. At bottom this is the fault of
the tradition of scholarship in question. But in the end it is both the scholar
and the scholarship which, depending on the degree of their identification
with the tradition, come to suffer from its faults.
Islamic Studies has long been hamstrung, in its domain of historical
research (so I would argue), by a remarkably restricted understanding of
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what history can and should be. It looks upon history as a narration of
events, people and dynasties, along with their (“Islamic”) principles and
practices. But the history of a people must take account of the broadest
complexities of human nature, both as they are reflected in people, and
when people become “a people”. In short, the best insights of the better part
of psychology and anthropology, of history analysis, and even of philosophy
in so far as it alone raises questions about the relation of mind to world,
are essential at the core, and not merely at the margins of history. But such
humane breadth – essential to the idea of humanities – is seldom to be
encountered in works of Islamic history.
In Europe, history went through a process of self-consciousness,
thanks to a long tradition of thinkers – Vico, Hegel, Benedetto Croce,
R. G. Collingwood, E. H. Carr, Fernand Braudel (the list can be long).
However, very little of this reflexivity ever percolated into Islamic Studies.
Its boundaries, it would seem, have long been the boundaries of a ghetto.
The first question any historian must ask is what one is to take as the unit
of their study. For their “subject” is not quite out there waiting to be studied.
But this question has rarely been asked of “Islam”. Marshall Hodgson was
an exception.1 He took an informed decision to pick not “Islam” as his unit
of study but rather the civilisation associated with Islam. This begged the
question as to what kind of an entity a “civilisation” was; what justification
there might be in treating the “Islamic” (or, in Hodgson’s proposed
terminology, “Islamicate”) civilisation as an entity in its own right; and
what role Islam may be seen to have had in the life of this entity, seen as a
civilisation.
It will be apparent from this that Hodgson was, in a word, a “reflexive”
historian, consciously defining and postulating the object of his study rather
than taking it for granted. One may disagree with his postulates; but one
cannot criticise him for unawareness of their necessity.
The need to define adjectival uses of the term “Islamic”, whether to
define the societies concerned, or sections of it, is a need that may be shirked
only at the price of intellectual confusion. It was one of the merits of Oleg
Grabar’s work on Islamic art, quite apart from whatever may be judged by
a specialist to be the merits of his scholarship that he asked, and attempted
uncively to define, in what sense one might possibly think of Islamic art as
Islamic.2 One can only wonder whether his readiness to probe this question
owed itself to his background not in Islamic Studies but in the history of
art, and of Islamic art as an area within it. It is reasonable to believe that
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it was this better chartered territory and a better defined discipline which
accounts for this conceptual self-awareness in his work.
In general, we find an important difference in the work of those scholars
in Islamic Studies who bother and try to illuminate their object of study
through resort to theoretical concepts and of those who do not do so.
The career of Prophet Muhammad acquires a more than factual interest
in Montgomery Watt’s hands because of his attempt to understand it as
a composite of socio-economic circumstances as well as religious vision.3
Similarly, his treatment of early Islam has the potential to interest students of
history more generally because of the concepts he borrows from Durkheim
and Weber. Again, his attempt to understand religion as such in theoretical
terms, however rudimentary, gives the subject an interest beyond that of a
believer. Watt’s scholarship may look inadequate in the light of up-to-date
knowledge. (Not being a specialist, I cannot comment.) His forays into
sociology and psychology certainly have something of a fragmentary, even
amateurish flavour. But none of this detracts from the pioneering quality
of his endeavour in its time, and hence, its historically exemplary character.
Examples such as these show that Islamic Studies cannot be written off
wholesale. They show that there have been exceptions to the rule under
criticism here. But what this says, and what I hold, is that they are indeed
exceptions to the rule.
Let us address a category of intrinsic importance to the study of Islam:
the category, namely, of religion. Few scholars in not only Islamic Studies
but so-called religious studies appear to realise or admit that “religion”
is indeed a category; that as such, it is posited or constructed rather than
found; and that it therefore requires assessment, at any given moment, of its
usefulness or suitability in the light of our knowledge and outlook.
This does not mean that it is an empty category, or that to question it
intellectually is to deny the role of faith or spiritual insight in the dimension
of life associated with it. In any case, I see no necessary conflict between
spiritual sensitivity and intellectual scepticism, and would even assert that
the former is deep and honest only when in companionship with the latter.
At any rate, in scholarly study, category analysis is indispensable.
When it is lacking, the least of the results is the lack of a typology – that
is, a failure to distinguish between types of religious thought and experience.
How, for instance, might we distinguish the kind of experience present in
the Qur’an from the kind of speculation characteristic of theology (kalâm)?
What, again, is meant by “mysticism” or “esotericism”?
There is a tradition of scholarship in modern Islamic Studies devoted to
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Sufism, “esoteric philosophy”, “theosophy” and the like. The subject-matter
covered by these (to my mind vague) labels is, as it happens, remarkably rich.
But the manner in which it is treated in this tradition is not by way of inquiry
but with a view to celebration and exaltation. One would look in vain, in
this tradition, for philosophical critique or argumentation, psychological
analysis, or attempts to locate the phenomena concerned in a more general
anthropology. The scholars who write in this vein are apt to look upon such
options with indifference if not disdain.
I regularly encountered indifference to the idea of such inquiry in
personal conversations with Annemarie Schimmel, who loved Sufism, knew
enormous swathes of its poetic texts by heart, and had less than zero interest
in what she would summarily dismiss as “philosophical” or “intellectual”
intrusions into a domain to which “love”, and “love” alone, held the key.
This reflects a very different kind of investment in the subject from (say)
that of Reynold Nicholson – whose attitude to mysticism is better described
as an intellectual (literary) interest rather than investment in it.
In this outlook there is no room for sceptical evaluation or even critical
appreciation where the term “critical” is taken seriously. There is no means,
therefore, for suspending judgement about metaphysical claims and
abstaining without a priori acceptance or rejection, from taking the claims
of ancient masters at their face value. There is room aplenty for questions,
but scarcely for questioning the texts. What is thus possible is not inquiry
but learning – learning of a certain sort, designed to foster appreciation
and nurture allegiance. As a result the preferred student is the one inclined
towards discipleship rather than independent judgement; one who is
engaged on a quest rather than cultivation of the mind.
I should add that I have little tolerance for the opposite kind of mind
to that of an acolyte – a mind bent on scepticism as a sport, taking delight
in debunking. Critical inquiry belongs to a very different kind of outlook
from that associated with the kind of criticism which takes pride in its
aggressiveness. Criticism in this sense (the word is ambiguous) is a sign
not of intellectual cultivation but of intellectual vandalism. The two are
as apart as chalk and cheese. Moreover, I believe that love for a subject, a
wish to be inspired by it, and to pursue learning with passion, are qualities
not only valuable but essential to true intellectual accomplishment. One is
a dubious student of music who is deaf to its pleasures. Likewise, I doubt
whether the study of religion, not only by a student whose mind is closed to
seeing anything good in it but also by one who is religiously unmusical (to
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use an expression from Max Weber) is likely to eventuate in a contribution
to human knowledge in this field.
It does not take much of an argument, however, to apply the same idea to
the mind closed in an opposite direction. But there is more to it than that, of
a specific sort, in the area we are considering here.
There are three activities of the mind here which it is useful to
distinguish. There is first of all the doctrine and symbolism, for example,
running from Yahya al-Suhrawardi, through Ibn-al-Arabi, to Mulla Sadra.
To link these names like this is to see at once both what united them and
what distinguished them, so that if we speak of them as constituting a
“tradition” we must do so by understanding “tradition” in a looser and more
historically contextualising sense than those scholars nowadays who think
of it as a harmonious whole given for all from times immemorial.
The point I wish to make here is that such a tradition can only legitimately
continue as it is, without the injection of meta-level philosophical or
theoretical considerations I have mentioned above, as long as the cultural
or intellectual ethos in which it is excluded remains essentially unaltered.
The fact is, however, that with the altered paradigm of the modern
sciences, both natural and human – a reflection, in turn of a profoundly
changed world – the old paradigm, with its assumptions about being
and knowledge, cannot be maintained, except at the price of intellectual
ghettoisation, without a fresh inquiry, at a meta-level, by means of categories
from the combined domains of modern philosophy, psychology and
anthropology. It may well be that we might find some of these categories
inadequate when confronted with this subject-matter. If so, it would be a
stroke of good luck, contributing as it might to new horizons both in the
tradition and within the sphere of modern knowledge.
The approach to mysticism or esotericism by scholars in modern
universities which I have outlined above differs from both these phenomena.
It eschews modern categories. But it is also at a great remove from the very
subject-matter it eulogises. It is far more inspiring as well as instructive to
read from Jalal-al-din Rumi’s mathnawi, even in translation, than to read
Schimmel on Rumi’s “symbolism”. Modern studies of mysticism in the
style I have characterised above are hybrid phenomena. It is not intellectual
enough, yet it is informed by genuine scholarship. It is not of a piece – being
situated in a very different time and place – with the mystical or gnostic
doctrine and practice of historical times, yet pays allegiance to it. It is a kind
of academic neo-mysticism.
How might such a curious hybrid, coy of intellectual challenge, yet
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learned, come about in religious studies? Part of the answer is unintentionally
apparent in the name “religious studies”. Designed to study religion, it has
a tendency to be religious. Both aspects fall short of their ideal prototypes.
Genuine religious participation is unaware, or only notionally aware of itself
as religious. And religious enthusiasm, whatever form or name it takes, acts
as a brake on objective inquiry.
The half-way house that religious studies tends to be in cases such as
the one we have just considered is reflected, among other things, in the
lack of theoretical self-awareness in the field. The only major “theory” it
has adopted is phenomenology. In the pioneering work of Micae Eliade,
phenomenology takes the form of the so-called “history of religions”. One
of the criteria for a successful history of a subject is that the subject must be
a sufficiently coherent and comprehensive unit. Religion is an inseparable
facet of social existence. To abstract it from social and psychological realities
is to substitute something unreal for these realities. That is precisely what we
find in the accounts of religious phenomena in Eliade or his associates, like
Henri Corbin. Louis Massignon was different. He was a religious visionary
with feet planted firmly in history. His subject, appropriately, was a single
life (Mansûr al-Hallâj). In Massignon’s pages Hallâj lives as a real historical
figure. His demographic and sociological milieu is painstakingly recorded.
Unlike Corbin’s figures, he is a flesh and blood character. His spirituality
is nowhere compromised or underplayed. Quite the contrary: it breathes
through the entire work. Massignon’s study, then, is a work of genuine
scholarship. Its animating spirit is that of a spiritual humanism. Once again,
the exception draws our attention to the rule.
Phenomenology, founded by Husserl, is a philosophy, hence subject to
philosophical critique and assessment. In religious studies its philosophical
status is hardly ever inspected – for graduates in religious studies are not
required to have philosophical training, and professional philosophers
like to keep to themselves. (Matters are different in theology.) In practice,
phenomenology in religious studies serves as a code name for something
like non-judgemental descriptivism. But what is the point of describing?
A re-statement of religious phenomena in (say) Marxist or Freudian terms,
whether valid or not, has a self-evident significance. But if the idea is to
avoid such trans-location, deplored as a way of explaining away the object
while professing to explain it, why re-state at all? Why not simply stop at
editing and publishing the texts concerned?
These are methodological and epistemological questions which remain,
in this field, infrequently and insufficiently explored.
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If, then, we were to jettison religious studies and re-allocate its subject
matter – epistemologically and methodologically – by linking it to the
conceptual frameworks, we may well serve to re-invent it into a more
comprehensive human narrative. The effort is worth making.
For lack of this, our Judaeo-Christian-Islamic heritage remains effectively
dissociated from the Greco-Roman as well as modern scientific heritages.
The world of secular scholarship today has yet to take due measure of the
phenomenon of prophecy in Hebraic and Arabic history. The insufficient
attention hitherto given to this major influence in the history of culture
is due to the twofold dissociation in modern culture, hence also academic
culture, of the religious from the humanistic, and of Islamic Studies from
Judaeo-Christian Studies.
One cannot do justice to prophecy in Islam without reference to Hebrew
prophecy, Christian messianism and other related phenomena as parts of
a single phenomenon. This underlines another major problem in Islamic
Studies as a field: the artificial isolation of its field from other Mediterranean
and Near Eastern cultures and faiths. It can be said that Islamic Studies is at
once too disparate and too narrow a field, in terms of both time and space.
Take, for instance, philosophy. It goes without saying that knowledge of
an Avicenna or Averroes is deficient without due knowledge of Aristotle and
late Hellenistic philosophies. But it is less often realised that our perspectives
on these great Muslim thinkers are also the poorer without knowledge of
Kant and those who came after him, down to Nietzsche, Heidegger and
their successors. After Kant’s repudiation of metaphysics, and subsequent
elaborations on this “Copernican revolution”, metaphysics, once the “queen
of the sciences”, ceases to be business as usual. One may choose to discard it
or to re-assess it (and perhaps, more valiantly, attempt to re-instate it). But
what one may not do, if one cares for intellectual integrity, is to resume today
from the day before yesterday as though there had never been a yesterday.
An ancient world-view cannot be resumed in a later age as though there had
not been an intervening age, an age which did not simply follow the earlier
era, but owed its being to its confrontation with the latter.
Yet we have scholars of gnostic Islam who proceed as if metaphysics were
as epistemologically secure today as it was before the advent of intellectual
modernity. Or, similarly, to ignore its extra-philosophical roots. It is, in
fact, hard to imagine an Avicenna or Averroes returning to the world of
today and not taking the keenest interest in modern physics, biology,
philosophy and the human sciences. Knowing what we do about them, the
comprehensiveness of their interest in all things human, and their credo,
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expressed by their intellectual forebear al-Kindi, that knowledge should
be welcome no matter from where it comes, it is hard to think of them as
discounting these modern sciences in their understanding of being.
Arabic or Persian philosophers stand a better chance, then, of being
understood by historians of philosophy than by historians of Islam. The
history of Islam may be better understood if the history of mentalities is
joined to the history of events and ideas in Islamic contexts. The origins of
Islam are still insufficiently understood. It is safe to say that whatever further
research may be needed for this purpose, research alone will not suffice; that
prophecy, revelation or book, crucial to belief as well as in history, demand
attention. Moreover, these are best addressed in a comparative (JudaeoChristian-Islamic) light.
What is true of the classical age of Islam is also true of its modern age.
The only adequate basis for understanding modernity is a comparative one.
Just as the problems of the developing world may be properly understood
only in a global perspective, so too do the nature of modernity, its effects
on conditions of life and the shape of the human mind, its impact on old
traditions and religious views of the world, call for a comparative perspective
in which alone the specificities of the Muslim world may be understood
without artificial isolation from world history.
These perceptions and a growing sense of intellectual isolation drove me
away from Islamic Studies and to other fields of the humanities and sciences
in the decades which followed my higher education.
Towards the end of the 1980s I took up a position as the Dean of the
Institute of Ismaili Studies in London. With this position came a privileged
opportunity to relate my intellectual background to the practical imperatives
of cultural and educational development in a community with a strong
attachment to its faith balanced by a philosophy of productive adaptation
to the modern world. With this position my questions about the nature of
Islamic Studies took on a more practical, urgent and outwardly responsible
aspect.
Intellectual life, however, requires the tonic of shared ideas and
conversation. To Mohammed Arkoun, who lamented the state of Islamic
Studies as much as I did, and for overlapping reasons, I owe the conversations
which nourished my renewed interest and endeavour. And although my
intellectual formation and temperament were different from his, and
although my personal background, unlike his, was shaped by strong spiritual
commitments, on the intellectual front he remained a constant interlocutor.
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This was especially so when we became colleagues on the Board of Governors
of this organisation.
In the following section I offer a summary sketch of Arkoun’s thought as
I understand it. I do so neutrally, without interjecting my own opinions or
reactions. In the last section I offer the rudiments of an evaluation.

II (i)
In our day it is no longer possible to speak of Islam except by enclosing it in
quotation marks. This remark of Arkoun’s can be taken as an indication of his
entire approach to Islam.4 It signals what he himself was often to call a need
for problematisation. Where most people who speak of Islam assume that
“Islam” represents something definite – for example, a set of usul (principles)
and arkân (rites); or “submission to the will of God” – Arkoun, relying on
the ear rather than on definition, had it trained on usage. Individuals and
groups employ the word “Islam” variably, depending on their interests and
their passions. The connection is, by nature, un-conscious. (I hyphenate this
word both to imply active barricading of consciousness and to distinguish it
from the Freudian unconscious.) Arkoun thought it the duty of a scholar of
Islam, confronted by a specific instance of “Islam”, whether in a political or
religious connection, to probe the subsoil of interests, passions or longings
which fuel its appeal. Needless to say, the same rule would apply to any other
terminology functioning as social rhetoric.

(ii)
Arkoun’s approach thus involves a rejection of taking Muslim rhetoric
about Islam at face value. To this extent his approach belongs to what the
philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. But so do
Marxist and Freudian styles of interpretation. Arkoun’s approach differs
from these. For this reason, this broad category defined by Ricoeur must be
narrowed to enable his method to be characterised more specifically.
In a nutshell, Arkoun’s approach is that of critical deconstruction. The
cradle for this idea is postmodernism. Key terminology from postmodern
jargon pervades Arkoun’s writing. Examples include l’imaginaire (translated
unattractively in English as “imaginary”, as a noun); “deconstruction”;
“logocentrism”; “archaeology” of knowledge; and “mimetic rivalry”.
A principal/formative influence on postmodern thought is Nietzsche.
Nietzsche’s repudiation of metaphysics was more total than Kant’s.
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While Kant retains notions of reality and truth, though with significant
philosophical caveats, Nietzsche actively eschews them. It is only after
Nietzsche that it becomes possible to speak of knowledge as “produced”
rather than obtained. Though it would be simplistic to equate Nietzsche’s
position with those of postmodernism, its focus on the uses rather than
references of discourse can easily be traced to him. Famously, or infamously,
to Nietzsche we owe the idea of a claim to truth as a bid for power. In the
Nietzschean way of thinking, knowledge, truth and the other constants
of traditional metaphysics are seen as, ultimately, tools or masquerades of
power.
This whole picture of the world – too tendentious to be called a theory,
and too unsystematic to be called a philosophy – informs Arkoun’s work.
His theoretical framework was not original. Where he stood out was in his
application of it to the study of Islam, in which there was (and remains) a
dearth of theoretical perspectives.
The two pillars of Arkoun’s analysis are history and anthropology. History
is all-determining. This follows naturally from the rejection of metaphysics,
which also opens the door to anthropology. The two methods should ideally
coalesce into an anthropological history, or historical anthropology. Such a
project would differ profoundly from “positivist” scholarship of traditional
Orientalists. I believe it is an accurate statement of Arkoun’s view of the
prevailing tradition of Islamic history to say that it subscribes to the cult of
facts. Obsessed by chronology, fastidiously philological, it offers no light on
the forces at work in the contemporary Muslim world because, halting at the
surface of the texts, it fails to penetrate to the historical forces contemporary
to the texts. The result is what Arkoun frequently called “dead” history.
It would be wrong to conclude that Arkoun thought little of Orientalist
scholarship. On the contrary he considered its achievements both impressive
and indispensable. He was never unsure of his identity as a scholar of
Islam. He thought and wrote as a scholar. His historical ideas were, just
like Orientalist scholarship, textually based. But to this he joined a keen
curiosity and natural flair for anthropology, in whose theories he was deeply
interested.
Historians and anthropologists are traditionally dispassionate,
maintaining a principled adherence to detailed observation and inquiry.
But Arkoun thought and wrote with passion, a passion which frequently
boiled over in vehemence. His was the passion of a campaigner, albeit an
intellectual campaigner who disdained conventional politics as much as he
disdained the edifice of the modern state.
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In this, his campaigning zeal, he stood in the old tradition of the
“committed” intellectual who is concerned to expose the mask of reason
which legitimises vested interests. Although he detested Marxism, he was
at home with the concept of ideology first promulgated, in its modern
form, in Hegelian and Marxian thought, and elaborated in the sociology of
knowledge.
In the postmodern climate of thought the old notion of ideology took a
new turn under the influence of men like Nietzsche and Heidegger. Arkoun
was not concerned with defining or evaluating the notion. This was probably
for the best, as his strength lay not in philosophical revision or analysis, but
in applying this and other such concepts to the hitherto untouched field of
Islamic history. Doing so brought additional issues to light, necessitating
other theoretical concepts, to some of which Arkoun was to give his own
twist or spin so as to help illuminate the history of Islam. In the process he
touched on important issues still deserving continued attention.
The critique of ideology is an unmasking enterprise. It attacks
mystification. An especially interesting analysis in Arkoun’s work is to be
found in the argument that religion theologises mundane events. In the
process it turns social actors into theological categories. Thus, Arkoun
was known to speak of Muhammad bin Abdullah in distinction from
Muhammad the Prophet – not in any way to belittle the latter, but to
emphasise that prophecy was an interpretation, drawn from the universe of
symbols already present in the Hebrew bible and more generally in the NearEastern milieu, of the strivings and ideals of a social actor. Similarly, the men
around the Prophet, whose interests led them to support or opposition, or
into hedging their bets, are to be encountered in a theologised form in the
discourse of the Qur’an, as mû’minûn (the faithful), mûshriqûn (polytheists)
and mûnâfiqûn (hypocrites, with guile in their hearts).
This is one of the most interesting and original ideas to emerge from
Arkoun’s theoretical interest, applied to the materials of Islam. Just as Marx
is said to have stood Hegel on his head, so Arkoun makes theology stand on
its head. When theology, which takes itself to be foundational, is made to
stand on its head, it shows up its real foundation which, in Arkoun’s view, is
society: the sphere where men organise themselves to pursue their interests
and ideals, and in the process form alliances, wage warfare, and not least,
manufacture and uphold ideologies.
There is, in fact, a double movement involved. In the first instance, social
realities are transmuted into theological imaginaire. Deconstructive analysis
seeks to return theology’s celestial escapades to its earthly roots. It is, in
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other words, the re-tracing of a process from its end-point to its origin. It is,
we might say, like the return of evaporated water, condensing as rain, to the
earth where it rose.
Whatever we might say in defence or criticism of this scheme, it is
quite evident, when one thinks about it, that religious discourse frequently
mystifies the facts of history. Its claim to unveil a higher reality appears all
too often to go hand in hand with an apparent determination to veil naked
human interests, whether for power, status or possession. If one were to look
for a core in deconstructive analysis which would remain persuasive when
the rest of its principles were rejected, whether as being reductive or on some
other such grounds, it would be an appeal to the humanity of the figures and
motivations which are reflected (and disguised) in religious ideologies.
It is in this sense that the prophet of Islam (like other prophets, messiahs,
saints or whatever) is to be regarded primarily as a social actor, and only
secondarily (though not, as we shall see, reductively) in the light of a
religious interpretation, as a prophet.

(iii)
The above, I believe, is an accurate distillation of Arkoun’s position in this
regard. To distil it in these terms pushes to the fore a question which may
otherwise be lost from view. Put simply, it is: can a believer, wishing to
continue to believe, accept Arkoun’s approach? Put differently: are belief
and deconstruction compatible? We may join this to a further question:
can a believer make use of – that is to say, profit from – Arkoun’s ideas?
However, since this second question presupposes an affirmative answer to
the first, we may coalesce the two and deal with them as one.
Broadly, a reflective believer has two options in the face of what Paul
Ricoeur calls “hermeneutics of suspicion”. He may hold that faith can well
survive and even gain from such a confrontation. Or he may assert that it
has value for an intellectual, but that it is imperative that ordinary men and
women be shielded from it.
Both these expedients have in fact been proposed. The first has been
argued, in another context, by Paul Ricoeur.5 The second was the characteristic
position of classical philosophers, living in Muslim communities, Jewish
communities or Christian communities – men like Ibn Rushd (Averroes)
and Ibn Maimûn (Maimonides).
I include classical philosophers like al-Fârâbî or Ibn Rushd even though,
quite clearly, they have nothing to do with modern critics of ideology,
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because their position on matters such as God’s knowledge or the eternity
of the world was at strong variance with that of religious orthodoxy.
Their position, however, which was essentially that of Platonic political
philosophy, was founded on an emphatic distinction between knowledge
due to an elite (al-khâṣṣ) and to the rank and file (al-‘amm). Neither could
be practical or acceptable today. In parenthesis, it is also worth noting that
Arkoun, with his strong distaste for the notion of an elite, was nothing if
not hostile to Platonic political philosophy or the metaphysics allegedly
connected to it.
As for the first of the options stated above, it is doubtful whether it
can be upheld, beyond the private conscience of a solitary philosopher in a
community of faith, by the community at large.
One may, of course, reject all deconstructive analysis altogether. But
a theologian who does so would need to reckon with the prima facie
credibility of the insights from historical sociology. He would also need to
show why an alternative view, appealing, say, to a “beyond” (however this is
understood), is rationally more satisfactory.
If it can be shown that Arkoun’s argument misses something essential, it
would, in a word, be reductive. Is it so? What place, if any, does the outlook
of faith have in his thinking?
The question of the reality (or otherwise) of religious belief is a question
of utmost importance in human self-understanding. Modern systems of
thought do not always seem to grant this importance. Arkoun is among
those who do. The following remarks make this clear:
It is necessary to accept as objects of history, psychological analysis
and historical anthropology what the ‘believing’ reading calls God,
prophetic function, the revealed and revealing Word, the sacred,
retribution, prayer, trust in God and so on. Historians have already
used all this religious vocabulary; but they have presented it in a
scientific culture based on a prejudice in favour of rationality which
has long been that of Aristotelian categorization continued [in] the
Enlightenment whose strategies, argumentation and themes aimed
precisely at the substitution of its ‘scientific’ sovereignty to that of
religious reason ...6
The criticism of the Enlightenment here is not incidental. It was a
cornerstone of Arkoun’s thought. Like many postmodern authors, he saw
the philosophy of the Enlightenment as an ideology. To his mind it deserves
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the same deconstructive treatment as religious ideologies. In common with
other postmodern authors, Arkoun did not accept the existence of any such
thing as objective reason. There were only “reasons”: discourses of one kind
or another.
Adjectival qualifications of reason, which are a commonplace today,
occur in Arkoun’s writing. Examples are allusion to “religious reason” or
“Islamic reason”. Needless to say, before postmodernism, such expressions
would have been rejected as linguistic errors or barbarisms.
The title of one of his books, Pour une critique de la raison Islamique,
illustrates this usage. The Kantian echo in the title is however ironic, for
Kant, although he took reason to be humanely anchored, would have
recoiled at any suggestion that it was socially constructed. But for Arkoun
that is precisely what reason is. Hence, the Enlightenment’s appeal to Reason
as a universal ideal is, in his view, deceptive. The ideal is but an ideological
extension of modern Europe’s belief in its entitlement to world mastery.
The Enlightenment is not what it saw itself as: the summit of human
rationality. What it saw as objective reason was in fact a particular projection
of reason, which effectively flattered the self-image of an ascendant Europe.
Its pretension to universal rationality was a fraud.
It would follow that a rejection of religion in the name of reason is a
suspect position. This was one of Arkoun’s emphatic themes. Teaching and
writing in the French context, he was aware of the militant face that modern
secularism can take. To Arkoun militant secularism is a mirror image of
religious militancy. It is a war of dogma with dogma. Both the contemporary
so-called revival of religion and the attack on it by secular reason are, in his
view, positions fit only to be combated and overcome.
The task of scholarship cannot stop here, however, for, the evenhandedness implied in this position requires acknowledgement of the
believer’s outlook and sensibilities. But if such an acknowledgement were
to be combined with a critique of religion as ideology, what is needed is a
conception of religious faith as somehow distinct from the ideological use
of religious symbols.
Since Arkoun’s theoretical positions are a part of his reflections on Islam,
it is best to look at these for clues to his perspective on faith. The most
convenient for this purpose are his reflections on the Qur’an.

(iv)
The Qur’an is a book. Its being – or rather, having become – a book is
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for Arkoun the first epistemological obstacle to a true appreciation of
the phenomenon called “revelation”. For the book, or rather the corpus
(muṣḥaf) is a kind of packaging, a fixation, of an oral discourse which by its
nature was open-ended and spontaneous. The passage from the primary to
the secondary, from the spoken to the written, was for Arkoun a problematic
development. Speech is open-ended. A corpus is bounded. The Qur’an as
speech or recitation is one thing; as a muṣḥaf it became, in Arkoun’s telling
words, an “official closed corpus”.
The collection authorised by the Caliph Uthman bin Affan (644–
656) had far-reaching effects. It led, in succeeding decades and centuries,
to the rise of a “functional solidarity” between state, jurist-theologians,
state bureaucracy and the written word.7 Even so, the Qur’an was not
one-dimensional. Its content became a prolific source for exegesis and
commentary, theological doctrine and, not least, religious jurisprudence
and law (fiqh and shari‘a).
At the same time the “mythical” idea of the Qur’an, present in the original
discourse, remained the living source of a rich imaginaire. The mythical
aspect visualised a descent of the divine word from a heavenly archetype,
the umm-al-kitâb (“Mother of the Book”), relayed to humanity through
an inspired messenger. But this imaginaire was exploited to legitimise
true belief (literally, orthodoxy). Given the numerous groups competing
for material and spiritual supremacy, the imaginaire crystallised into
competing orthodoxies, such as Sunni, Shi‘i or Khariji, each subdivided into
groups with competing and exclusive claims to truth. By their very nature,
these standardised orthodoxies could not accommodate the practically
infinite diversity, unavoidable in a complex civilisation, of temperaments,
intellectual styles, literary traditions and lifestyles. There was thus a standing
employment open to “managers of the sacred” whose task was to define true
belief and hunt down heresies.
It is obvious that this description also applies (with suitable adaptations)
to the other “Societies of the Book” (Jews and Christians). Each group (or
sub-group) defined itself through “mimetic rivalry” with the other. One
of the implications of this view is the need for a common approach to the
socio-religious milieu of the Mediterranean world in which the “Societies
of the Book” were shaped. Their impact on the modern world and the
consequences of the impact on them by the conditions of the modern world
likewise deserve a common approach.
In this scheme, the history of Islam might be viewed as a passage from
the “Qur’anic Fact” to the “Islamic Fact”.8 This implies a departure from a
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discourse which nourishes faith to a discourse which feeds ideology. The
former is to be found in the rich reservoir of myth, metaphor and symbol
in Qur’anic and Biblical texts. These literary modes, namely symbolic
evocations of God, the heavens, the heavenly book, angels, the Last Day,
and so on, ensure an open space of meaning, potentially internalised by the
believer. Transcendence understood in these terms is to be contrasted with
transcendentalisation, or sacralisation, of ideas and institutions meant to
immunise them from questioning or challenge. Whereas the “Qur’anic fact”,
like all mytho-poetic discourse, opens a space for thought and imagination,
its codification into the “Islamic fact” tends to abolish this openness.
The distinction between the phenomenon of the Qur’an and the
phenomenon of Islam is part of Arkoun’s general view of the revelation.
It calls to mind the approach of modern Muslim reformers (like Fazlur
Rahman and Mohammad Iqbal) who were inclined to see Islamic history
in many ways as a falling away from the Qur’an – a loss, over the centuries,
of the dynamism of the original revelation. But Arkoun thought little of
reformists. In any case, his “Qur’an” is not the muṣḥaf or book. And unlike
authors who take the idea of God’s word as a given, Arkoun (who was partial
to epistemology rather than ontology) focussed on the linguistic features of
the revelation, insisting that the idea of the “word of God” be problematised
rather than assumed.

(v)
Over time, however, Arkoun’s reading of the Qur’an became more critical
– we might even say, more ambivalent. Although he retained his view of
Qur’anic discourse as meaningful for a believer as opposed to an ideologue
he was more inclined, in the latest phase of his scholarly work, to find in it the
seeds of what would amount, in stark terms, to ideology. This development
in Arkoun’s thought coincided with an interest in a section of the Qur’an,
namely Sura 9, which poses a great challenge to modern Muslims who are
eager to dissociate Islam from the barbaric acts of violence which are carried
out in its name nowadays. Sura 9 contains a call to arms against the “enemies
of God” (labelled as polytheists) combined with a promise of mercy and
reconciliation to those who relent.
Although it would be far-fetched to find sanction for contemporary acts
of violence or terror in the so-called “verses of the sword” in this section of
the Qur’an (or others like it) – all one needs to appreciate this is a sense of
historical context – they can hardly be passed over in silence. However, to
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do otherwise takes courage in the current climate. It is to Arkoun’s credit
that he showed courage by tackling these issues head-on.
Arkoun’s analysis went further than simply declaring that context
determines meaning. If this is all that mattered, the idea of asbâb al-nuzl,
“occasions for the revelation”, standard in the writings of classical exegetes,
would be sufficient for modern enlightened approaches to scripture. But,
can anyone honestly hold that after the profound changes and advances
in our understanding of human knowledge ushered in with the rise of the
modern world and the modern mind, these few rule-of-thumb platitudes –
platitudes like taking account of context; interpreting anew with the times;
symbolic interpretation – are the only harvest at hand? If so, it is a pretty
meagre harvest. Anyone who is acquainted with modern philosophy and
the human and natural sciences – indeed, anyone acquainted with the way
Christian theology has attempted, sometimes with superficial enthusiasm,
at other times with more discrimination, to deepen its thinking in the light
of modern knowledge – cannot but be struck by the slender intellectuality
of these maxims. Islamic theology today needs to go far, far beyond these
easy incantations.
It cannot be said that Arkoun went far in his anthropological investigation
of these issues (theology was not his chosen field) but he did make a start.
Shunning apologetics, Arkoun defines the context of the verses in
question as the decisive victory of a party (here, the prophet and his
immediate supporters) over its erstwhile opponents. A decisive victory
empowers the victor to demand surrender of its enemies on the victor’s
terms. This is the concrete context which must be seen, to begin with, in full
clarity (so Arkoun argues) without letting theological sentiments mystify it
into something intangible or sublime. It is the “immanent” (socio-politicalhistorical) dimension of revelatory discourse.9 The tone, themes and length
of the sura indicate a process of “institutionalisation” of the “word of God
in human concrete history” after the final re-conquest of Mecca.10 The
terms in which this is understood are inextricably religious and worldly. The
theme of tauba (“repentance”) from which Sura 9 takes its name is “religious
in principle, but political in fact”.11 It is part of a “mythical-historical
consciousness” guiding socio-political action while elevating it to the plane
of religious meaning.
So far, Arkoun’s exegesis would seem reductive, with religion being
seen essentially as a mystification of down-to-earth events. But he does not
stop here. What needs to be recognised is a certain “disproportionality
between the initial contingency” of the socio-military-political events and
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the “inexhaustible dynamism of the mythical-historical consciousness that
draws nourishment of it”.12 While it is hard now to be sure whether Arkoun
would have agreed with our use here of Paul Ricoeur’s excellent words from
another context, we could say, in Ricoeur’s terms, that the language of the
text carries a “surplus of meaning”. A certain similarity to this notion is to
be seen in the kind of time Arkoun sees at work in the Qur’an. With its
emphatic concern with the history of salvation, Qur’anic time is basically
“existential”. “Every instant is filled with the presence of God”, a presence
“reactivated in the ‘heart’ of every believer as he performs his daily religious
practices, meditation, rememorisation (dhikr) of the History of Salvation
and liturgical recitation of the revealed Word”.13
This existential meaningfulness is precisely what is lacking in political
invocations of the Qur’an by contemporary Islamists. In Arkoun’s words:
“Today, Qur’anic time is pulverised into a mass of social and ideological
times whose common characteristic is that they empty historicity of the truth
gained from experience of the divine.”14 It follows that a true restoration of
the existential dimension of the revelation requires not a “re-interpretation”
of verses, nor research into the “occasions of revelation” (asbâb al-nuzûl),
but a reconstitution of the categories in which we might understand the
very phenomenon of revelation. Such a reconstitution may well provide
a new, humanist basis for a foundation for Muslim thought and practice
today.

III
It is time now for an assessment. Given the constraints in the length of
this article, I must content myself with very brief – perhaps even laconic
– observations. Besides the circumstantial need for brevity, this may also
be excused by the fact that like the work of some scholars but unlike many
others that one could think of, Arkoun’s work at his death was in process,
and hence remains unfinished, preventing rounded assessment.
Still a few things can be said. His work was an intellectual campaign. It
has all the merits and drawbacks of an intellectual campaign. We misjudge
it if we see it in any other terms.
His campaign, moreover, was by the nature of the case essentially
adversarial. It was deconstructionist, not constructionist. It should be noted
that I don’t say that it was not constructive, for, in the right circumstances,
destruction can be constructive. Arkoun was intensely troubled by what
he saw as the intellectually retrograde and mendacious potential in both
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religious and secular ideologies. He saw the former having a stranglehold on
Muslim minds today. Of the latter he saw recurring evidence in the attitudes
to the Muslim world in Western media and politics. Yet in attacking the
Western attitudes he was never defensive. Stubbornly, he refused to hail the
achievements of Islam in the past, because he viewed the habit of Muslim
modernists – who acclaim the Islamic past as the pinnacle of human
achievement, and lament the present condition of Muslims as being due to a
failure to follow true Islam – as part of the same mendacity and self-delusion
which were responsible for failings in Muslim society.
He did not deny the genuine achievements in learning, invention and
thought in classical Muslim history. But he saw them as existing alongside
failures, like the disappearance there of independent philosophy after Ibn
Rushd, in contrast to its blossoming, after the scientific revolution, in
Europe. He acknowledged the more mythopoetic tradition of thought
commonly called “esoteric philosophy” as worthy of interest, but insisted
that before anything else it should be rigorously named and defined rather
than merely celebrated.
By the same token he was forthright in his praise of the achievements
of Western modernity. He had no sympathy whatsoever for wholesale
comparison or contrast between “Islam” and the “West”, no matter which of
this pair of ultimately fictitious wholes was glorified and which was vilified.
And even as he paid due tribute to the attainments of the historical Muslim
world, he was careful not to call them “Muslim” or “Islamic”, knowing that
it is a form of special pleading to attribute them to religion; that not a few
of the contributions came from Jews, Christians, “heretics” and humanists
(like Miskwayhi, the subject of his doctoral thesis); and that the very notion
of the Muslim or Islamic world, even in history, was problematic. With this
last point in mind, he often advocated a more circumspect expression, like
the “Islamic context” in place of (say) “Muslim” or “Islamic” civilisation.
In all this he was properly a historian who, in the best tradition of
modern scholarship, sees his role as one of adjudicating rather than taking
sides. Perhaps paradoxically, he was unlike a modern liberal historian in
inveighing against what he took to be false, manipulative, cynical or selfaggrandising in Islamic discourse. This made him a polemicist. It remains
open to question whether his work would have had a superior quality if he
had been less strident or didactic – if, that is, he had been more of the scholar
he had been and less of the controversialist he increasingly became. Perhaps,
in the end, a writer who takes pains not to raise his voice even when he
holds very strong judgements on what he writes about is more likely to earn
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a hearing than one who, raising his voice, proclaims them in every statement
he makes.
It hardly needs saying that Arkoun belonged to the second category of
scholars. As time went on, one noticed a disproportionate time spent, in his
addresses or writings, in bewailing what scholars of Islam were failing to do,
than on doing himself, in content or detail, what they were leaving undone.
But then again, to take issue with his partisan fervour may be moot.
Indeed, it may beg the question, for he rejected the very principle, central to
the doctrine of liberal scholarship, of neutral objectivity. He defined the role
of a scholar differently from that in the liberal tradition. And although one
may oppose his definition, it cannot be shown to be false by simply opposing
it. In any case, one need not go along wholly with Arkoun to agree that socalled “disinterested” knowledge is, even as an ideal, an imperfectly realised
thing. This may not be a conclusive argument. But once the debate is raised
it becomes, by liberal doctrine’s own commitments, inescapable.
In any case, the criticisms of traditional Islamic Studies I have made in
the first section of this paper do not presuppose acceptance of Arkoun’s
particular position. What the criticisms do is to put traditional Islamic
Studies into question. Arkoun came to these questions in his own way.
He answered them in his own terms. To a scholar unsympathetic to either
Arkoun’s questions or to the questions more generally, one can only say: the
questions have been raised. Once they have been raised, to pass over them
in silence is wrong.
Not least of Arkoun’s contribution, then, is that he asked questions – big,
important, urgent questions. He had his own answers to them. Whether
they come to be accepted and, if so, how widely, is another matter.
Less question-begging were two other, perhaps inter-connected flaws
(to my mind) in his work. I have already mentioned one of these by
referring to the influence of postmodernism in his work. This influence is
in fact exclusive enough to amount to affiliation to the school of thought
in question. Postmodern thinking takes certain ideas so much for granted
that they are effectively taken to be facts. I have in mind the idea that truth
is a synonym for socially constructed claims and beliefs; that these represent
the interests, in particular the will to power, of the social agents concerned;
that as the will to power leads to conflicts and inequalities, truth-claims are
a “site for contestation”; and that the essential task of critical scholarship is
to deconstruct all this.
On these doctrines all I can say here, without offering reasons (for
this would take us too far afield), is that I personally find these doctrines
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repugnant. I find them dogmatic; and when seen in the long perspective of
Western philosophy from the Ancient Greeks to today (not to mention the
philosophies of other continents), I find them parochial, in terms of both
time and place.
Linked to postmodernism – perhaps, in fact, warp and woof with it – is its
barbarous idiom. The postmodern mind worships theory; the domination
of theory in academic humanities and social sciences today is a phenomenon
deserving of analysis in its own right. It is, again, a highly parochial affair, the
self-vindicating code of a coterie of scholars and commentators who talk to
themselves rather than to the broad history of letters.
Even a cursory glance at Arkoun’s writing shows its well-nigh
impenetrable character. Yet there is genuine illumination to be found, at
least at points where his theoretical concerns are in contact with the data of
Islamic history. It is a paradox that Arkoun, who believed passionately in the
intellectual’s social mission, wrote in a manner inaccessible to all but scholars
acquainted with a specific kind of scholarship. In any event, he remained a
professional scholar, rarely straying (at least in his books) from his chosen
specialism. He wrote for a specialist audience. His interlocutors, in print and
formal exchanges, were from the specialist academic world. But he remained
dissatisfied with their evident lack of understanding or appreciation (there
were exceptions, though in his view, they were few and far between). While
being faithful to the canons of academic scholarship, and while continuing
to write in terms which spoke to a minority of scholars of Islam, those with a
taste or capacity for theory, he yearned for a wider influence of his work. He
was always pleased when his work struck a chord with individuals, especially
in the Muslim world, some of whom became his eager admirers.
It is reasonable to hold that Arkoun’s thought has a potentially far greater
scope than what is visible in his writing thanks to the straitjacket of theory
and idiom by which it is bound. Perhaps it is a task well worth attempting,
by existing or future students of his work, to emancipate his insights from
the cradle in which they were formed, and develop them in new directions.
Development is what Arkoun’s work deserves. He left many ideas
nascent or undefined. This was less due to lack of time or opportunity –
he had a long career – than due to two other factors. He was continually
building on his ideas, though the basic themes remained steady. And he was
not a systematic thinker. He did not develop his ideas in a logical step-bystep way. His intelligence worked by way of flashes of insight and theoretical
conceptualisations. It will take someone familiar with the actualities of
Islamic history to see how and to what degree his concepts endure the test
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of data; and someone with philosophical or logical acumen to evaluate the
logic of his theories.
One aspect of his work which requires careful thought is the one
mentioned in the foregoing pages: the degree of its suitability or otherwise
for an intellectually grounded understanding of the nature of faith.
Although I have mentioned Arkoun’s positive stand on the place of belief in
human societies, it remains an embryonic idea. He did not develop it to any
degree comparable to that of his other ideas. This was probably due, in part,
to his not being a philosopher of religion. His partial contemporary, Paul
Ricoeur, who had a philosophically developed view of religion (within the
framework of hermeneutic phenomenology), is in this respect a contrasting
example.
Arkoun seemed convinced that radical criticism of the kind he offered
was valuable to believers as well as scholars. But it is not clear that the two
mindsets are similar enough to find this approach altogether congenial.
The fundamental question is an old one. It was first raised by Plato in his
discussion of the respective claims of myth and philosophy: the question of
lasting relevance. It is not always raised clearly or explicitly. But it has not
vanished, nor been resolved.
I may illustrate the importance of this question, as far as scholarship is
concerned, with the aid of a remarkable recent book by Aaron T. Hughes.15
This is not the place to discuss his basic premises about truth and knowledge.
What is clearly laudable about his work is his refusal to side with the scholarly
apologetics and anodyne defences of “Islam” (the quotation marks deserve
notice) which only too many scholars of Islam are nowadays prepared to
champion under the banner of “expertise”. Hughes’ forthright insistence
that there is, and ought to be, a firm dividing line between scholarship and
apologetics was, if anything, overdue in this field.
What position must someone speaking from within a religious
community take in this matter, however? Hughes is prepared to make an
exception for “theologians”. “Theologians” here may be understood to mean
religious leaders or preachers who speak to or on behalf their communities.
Every reflective practitioner of “theology” in this sense will appreciate
the difference between scholarly pursuit of knowledge and the kind of
partisanship demanded by “theology”. But this is not a finally satisfactory
position. The difference being drawn by Hughes raises important questions
in its own right.
Does the difference mean, for instance, that commitment to a faith
excuses (or even necessitates) intellectual compromises, not to mention
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duplicity? Are there two “truths”, or two approaches to a common truth? This
question is seldom examined in modern terms, let alone answered. Whatever
the answers – which could conceivably involve a renewed consideration of
what Aristotle called “rhetoric” or, more generally, the relation between
knowledge and politics – the question, surely, is of continuing importance
in an age when the religious and secular have become embattled notions.
Arkoun did not elaborate on this issue. But his thought certainly has
implications for it, if only because unlike secularists, atheists and positivists,
he is never condescending towards expressions of belief.
Arkoun’s rejection of modern disbelief gave him an impartiality and
equidistance which makes him potentially of interest to believers. Just as,
in his view, rational enlightenment remains “unthought” (and perhaps
epistemologically unthinkable) in terms of dogmatic religion, so belief
remains poorly understood and even unthought (and perhaps unthinkable)
in dogmatically secularist cultures.
To repeat, it is as much for the questions that Arkoun raised as for his
conclusions that we are indebted to him. In the field of Islam and religion
more generally, there are (as ever) intolerant dogmatists, liberal apologists
and intolerant adversaries of religion. Arkoun stood apart from all of
these. There are believers whose point of view is confined to their own
communities. Others favour religious dialogue, but, all too frequently, in
intellectually academic terms. Again, Arkoun was a man apart. The ground
on which he stood was not that of religion or anti-religion. He might not
have fully defined the alternative ground – what he called, without enlarging
on it, “emergent reason” – on which he wished to stand. He was critical too
of what in modern times passes as humanism. But at this point one must
turn from his books to the person he was. Those who, like myself, knew him
personally will remember him as a man of intellect as well as humanity; a
man capable, despite first impressions (not always easily offset), of tender
feelings; and a man at times movingly alive to the life histories of those he
knew, to whom he was ever generous in friendship and affection.
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The Authenticity of Sacred Texts
R. Stephen Humphreys

The central problem in the study of the beginnings and early development
of Islam is authenticity – that is, in what sense are the texts on which we
rely that which they claim to be? Do they in fact embody the actual
words produced during Islam’s first decades? Insofar as they depart from
original statements, do they nevertheless reflect on some level the ways of
thinking, the social and moral ethos of Islam’s beginnings? Does every text
need to retain its primitive shape to claim some level of authenticity, to
give meaningful testimony about the persons and events that it purports
to represent? This is a problem that confronts both medieval and modern
Muslim writers as well as non-Muslims, though of course each of these three
groups approaches the problem within a distinct frame of reference and has
a very different stake in its outcome.
In Western scholarship, this problem was first posed in a systematic way
more than century ago, in Ignaz Goldziher’s famous monograph on the
hadith.1 It was picked up by a number of his formidable contemporaries,
in particular Julius Wellhausen,2 Leone Caetani,3 and (in a somewhat
erratic and idiosyncratic manner) Henri Lammens.4 Their solutions to
the problem were provisional at best, as they themselves recognised, but
were not developed or revised in any systematic way until Joseph Schacht’s
groundbreaking Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence,5 the implications
of which have yet to be exhausted or even fully understood.
A quarter of a century later, an even more radical challenge was launched
by John Wansbrough, Michael Cook and Patricia Crone. They were inspired
by Schacht’s arguments, but they went even further, in effect declaring
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null and void everything that had been written about the whole period of
Muhammad’s prophetic career and the early Arab-Muslim conquests (in
effect, the six decades from 600 to 661). On a different level, the work of
Albrecht Noth and Lawrence Conrad6 suggested that most Arabic historical
writing from the late eighth and throughout the ninth century could be
reduced to a body of free-floating topoi and motifs, few of which could be
securely attached to any real persons or events. That is, Noth argued, the
same stories were told over and over again, but with differing locales and
casts of characters.
These challenges to the early Islamic textual tradition could be neither
ignored nor easily assimilated, and they have provoked a burgeoning and
very sophisticated set of responses. Leading names would include Lawrence
Conrad, Michael Lecker, Fred M. Donner,7 Chase F. Robinson, Robert
Hoyland,8 Harald Motzki,9 Gregor Schoeler, Stefan Leder, Alfred de
Prémare, Josef Van Ess and (quite recently) Suleiman Mourad.10 There is as
yet no consensus, and probably never will be, but it is fair to say that the way
scholars (Muslim as well as Western) think about this textual tradition has
changed forever. We are far more aware of the problems and possibilities of
the Arabic texts than we used to be. We have also learned that it will not do
to examine them in isolation from the other linguistic-cultural traditions of
West Asia during the seventh to ninth centuries; Arab-Muslim writing must
be situated and interpreted within a broad context: Syriac first of all, but
also Greek, Coptic, Armenian, Georgian and even Latin.
However, our discussions of texts from or about early Islam have
been confused and unnecessarily complicated by the fact that the term
“authenticity” is very freely used but almost never adequately defined.
“Authenticity” is what we seek and devoutly long for in these texts, but we
mean many different and perhaps contradictory things by it. Within the
discourse on early Islam, whether scholarly or apologetic, authenticity is
more an ad hoc notion than a rigorously articulated concept. We think we
know what we mean, in a rough and ready way, and so we do not ask whether
that is in fact the case. However, when we look at the ordinary, everyday uses
of the terms “authenticity” or “authentic”, we will quickly see how slippery
these words really are. “She has an authentic East Texas accent” – that is,
she is in fact a woman from Dallas, or perhaps she speaks just like a woman
from Dallas even though she grew up in Boston. “That novel is an authentic
work of genius” – not just a skilfully contrived tale, but rather a story that
communicates human experience in a powerful, convincing and enduring
manner. “An authentic performance of Handel’s Messiah” – presumably,
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a performance which we believe would sound much like those staged by
the composer himself 250 years ago, in spite of the enormous difference
between the instruments and vocal styles of his time and ours. An authentic
diamond necklace is made from real diamonds, but what shall we say about
an “authentic replica” of a necklace worn by the Duchess of Windsor? We
mean, I suppose, that it is meant to look like one she would have worn,
though she would not have been fooled. In short, authenticity might refer
either to reality, or to the illusion of reality, or to the recollection (real or
imagined) of reality. More broadly, authenticity seems to mean something
like “conforming to a certain defined pattern, adhering to an ideal type”.
In light of these remarks, we should not be surprised to learn that the
notion of authenticity may have different meanings – more properly, ranges
of meaning – when it is applied to different classes of texts. Taxonomies
are always problematic, fuzzy at the edges and contestable, whether we are
talking about texts or turtles. However, for the purposes of this discussion,
I will proceed from the premise that both Muslim and non-Muslim
constructions of early Islam rest on five categories of texts. Each of these
serves different purposes in Muslim discourse; each opens a different window
onto the beginnings and early development of Islam. They should reinforce
one another, and they sometimes overlap, but they are very different in
their putative authorship, in intended purpose, in literary and rhetorical
construction, in manner of transmission, in the uses to which they were
put. In order of the level of religious authority they carry, and the degree to
which they embody and reveal the divine purpose, they are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

prophetic revelation (the Qur’an),
the teaching by word and example of Muhammad (hadith),
narratives which recount the events of the Prophet’s life (sira),
narratives which recount the words and deeds of his successors and
followers after his death (ta’rikh, akhbar), and finally
poetry (shi’r) from his lifetime and the decades immediately there
after.

In this paper I will focus on the first three categories, since they embody by
far the most sensitive religious issues. Moreover, the historical akhbar that
address the early caliphate and the first conquests – that is, the three decades
following the death of Muhammad – retain many of the core characteristics
of the sira narratives and pose very similar methodological problems. Only
with the reign of Mu’awiya after 661, and even more with the rise of the
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Marwanids, do we see a gradual shift to a markedly different narrative
register. As for poetry, though forgery and suspicion of forgery abound,
much of it is widely regarded among modern scholars as archaic – that is,
actually composed during the period to which it is attributed. However,
poetry is normally imbedded in prose texts as a witness to or commentary
upon events and persons already presented there. Only in the Umayyad era
(most famously in the persons of al-Akhtal, Farazdaq and Jarir) does poetry
begin to constitute an independent witness to the ideological currents and
factional quarrels which beset Muslim society.
It will immediately be apparent that authenticity must mean quite
different things for each category (namely, the Qur’an, hadith and sira).
If, for example, the Qur’an is held to be God’s own eternal and uncreated
speech, transmitted verbatim by His chosen prophet, as Sunni dogma
ultimately declared it to be, then each and every aya must contain precisely
the words voiced by Muhammad in a state of inspiration, neither more nor
less. On the other hand, a narrative (khabar) about the Battle of Qadisiyya
faces a more forgiving standard. Here, authenticity is a very fluid concept.
It might refer to an issue of substance: that is, whether the khabar reports
more or less accurately an event that really did happen. Or it might refer
to the khabar as a text: whether it actually does transmit verbatim or at
least paraphrase the statements made by its purported original narrator, no
matter if he was a scrupulous truth-teller, a bold-faced liar or a spinner of
fables. Moreover, such a khabar need not have a fixed verbal form; there
is some room for editorial intervention in the course of transmission. It
is even permissible to have contradictory akhbar about one and the same
incident, since different reporters will have had different information. In
terms of sanctity and doctrinal significance, the hadith and sira represent
an intermediate status between the Qur’an and post-prophetic history, but
as we shall see, the hadith is subject to a far more rigorous level of scrutiny
than the sira.
This simple typology of sacred or quasi-sacred texts is clear and appealing,
but it reflects the frame of reference developed among Muslim scholars of
the ninth century and later. As such it has an obvious problem – it begs
the question, and in fact many questions. To begin with, it presupposes that
all these texts are stable (though not necessarily fixed) from the time they
were composed and put into circulation. It presupposes also that we can
determine with some certainty which texts actually do originate in the time
and place that they claim to represent, and which represent later iterations or
fabrications. Finally, it presupposes that the earliest generations of Muslims
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regarded a given text in the same way as did their successors in the ninth and
tenth centuries, and assigned to it the same level of sanctity and value. All
these presuppositions are demonstrably false.
The texts which emerged out of early Islam evolved continuously until
well into the ninth century, when they were more or less crystallised. (In
saying this I make a substantial but not complete exception for the text of
the Qur’an.) This fluidity has made it extremely difficult for scholars to date
the texts that have come down to us, to isolate archaic elements within them
and track the strata of editorial reshapings and interpolations. If scholars had
developed precise, agreed-upon criteria – the equivalent of well-established
archaeological pottery sequences – there would be a lot more consensus
than we now observe, but such criteria are still a work in progress.
The problem is complicated by the fact that early Muslims engaged in
intense and even vitriolic debate about everything, and that the nature of
this debate changed markedly over time. To name only a few points at issue:
the precise text of the Qur’an and how it was recorded and transmitted;
the sources of religious authority within the Community after the death
of Muhammad; and the political significance of certain critical events (for
example, the “election” of Abu Bakr, the revolt against ‘Uthman, the battles
of Siffin and Karbala’). Was some limited degree of variation in the text
of revelation to be tolerated or not? Who if anyone had final authority to
establish a Qur’anic text ne varietur? Did the authority to teach and guide the
Community after Muhammad rest with the caliphs, with charismatic imams
in the lineage of ‘Ali, with the consensus of learned and pious Muslims, or
with the Prophet himself through his recorded statements? Were the actual
rulers of the Community its lawful heads, and in what arenas (if any) did
they have the right to demand obedience from the Muslims? If so, by what
criteria, and what authority should they wield over the specifically religious
beliefs and practices of Muslims? These debates were of course never settled
(apart from the need for a fixed text of the Qur’an), but by the mid to late
ninth century they were at least flowing in regular channels. In contrast to
the chaotic arguments of the first two hundred years, there had come to be
a well-defined, indeed stubbornly durable discourse on each major point of
contention.
All of this tells us that we need to re-examine the concept of Qur’anic
authenticity as it applies to the different classes of early Islamic texts, this
time from a historical perspective – for, like all objects of human action,
texts are constantly being recreated or at least reimagined.
We begin, as one must, with the Qur’an. For historians (though of
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course not for the believer) one issue should be perfectly irrelevant: a
historian need not ask whether the Qur’an is authentic in the sense of being
literally God’s own speech. That is a question first of faith and secondly of
theology. In historical thought, the concept of authenticity refers to other
problems. One is obvious: whether the Qur’an in its present form is wholly
constituted of statements proclaimed by Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah in Mecca
and Medina between 610 and 632. Do we have the words, and only the
words, pronounced by Muhammad himself ? How confident can we be that
his proclamations were accurately collected and transmitted? Are textual
variants (such as those apparently preserved in the Yemeni fragments) merely
testimony to the fallibility of human memory and the rather haphazard way
the primitive texts were first recorded? Or do they signal a real fluidity and
instability in this text? In either case, did such variants substantially affect
the way the Qur’an was taught and understood during the first two or three
generations of Islam? Whatever our answer to these questions, I would
argue that we can properly affirm that the Qur’an is fully “authentic”, at
least in the sense that it contains the earliest memories and records of what
Muhammad had presented as revelation. That is, we can still rely on it to tell
us what Islam looked like as it first emerged in the first half of the seventh
century.
This conclusion would not be affected by the argument proposed
most recently by Christoph Luxenberg 11 that the Qur’an was at bottom
an assemblage of materials already quite familiar among the oasis settlers
of West Arabia – apocalyptic imagery and ritual texts derived more or less
directly from Syriac prototypes, Christian preaching and Jewish midrash,
combined with some scattered pronouncements of Muhammad himself.
From this perspective the Qur’an would be primarily a repository of the
religious currents criss-crossing early seventh-century Arabia; only the
contingencies of time and place would have made it a powerful, even
transformative religious vision. However, if the established canonical text
goes back to the time of Muhammad and his earliest followers, then however
it came into being, it would still be fully authentic in this sense: that it is a
true witness to the beginnings of Islam.
It is worth remarking that neither of these ways of seeing the Qur’an is
peculiarly modern; both go back to at least the early eighth century. By then,
Muslims were insisting that the Qur’an was precisely and literally God’s
word revealed through His chosen prophet Muhammad. Among Christian
observers, in contrast, the Qur’an was presented as a farrago of recycled
Jewish and Christian teaching, with some peculiar distortions added to
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the mix. We can trace these perspectives further back into the late seventh
century. The famous inscription in the Qubbat al-Sakhra (692) explicitly
links Muhammad with a new dispensation, with several passages that are
citations or a very close paraphrase of Qur’anic verses as we know them.
On the other side, Christian writers like Sebeos of Armenia (c. 660) and
John Bar Penkaye (c. 690) portray Muhammad as drawing freely on Jewish
and Christian teachings, though they do not explicitly ascribe a book or
scripture to him.
Now, suppose we adopt Wansbrough’s argument – whatever we might
be able to say about Muhammad (very little, in fact), the Qur’an as we now
have it certainly does not date back to him. It would have taken its present
form as much as two centuries later. Is there some meaningful sense in which
we could claim authenticity for the text? I would say that there is, though
no Muslim (and few non-Muslims) would find it at all satisfying. Under
this hypothesis, the Qur’an could not stand as a record of Muhammad’s
prophetic speech, but it would be an unambiguously authentic record of
what Muslims of the late eighth and early ninth centuries had established
and accepted as the revelation brought by him. As such, it would continue
to be the foundational text of all later Muslim religious thought and
practice. Scholarship based on the premise of a “late Qur’an” would have to
ask how such a long, complex text was moulded out of disparate elements,
and (far more importantly) how Muslims had been persuaded to accept this
text as the revelation vouchsafed to Muhammad two centuries earlier. On
the other hand, our understanding of how the Muslims of the ninth and
later centuries interpreted and used the Qur’an would – at least in principle
– hardly be affected. One might compare this (admittedly hypothetical)
situation to the one confronted by historians of Christianity. For students
of the first and second Christian centuries, it is crucial to ask when and how
the Gospels were composed and put into circulation. For students of the
third and later centuries, the Gospels are a fact; the point is what they meant
to those who read them.
Hadith and sira pose a radically different set of problems; here the
concept of authenticity cannot mean what it does with the Qur’an. Both
hadith and sira are sacred texts, albeit in different ways and on different
levels, but they represent human speech rather than wahy or tanzil – namely
the speech of Muhammad himself, and the speech of those who observed
and recorded his career. As such, their contents are sacred, but their words
per se are much less so. Sanctity and religious authority inhere in what they
say, not how they say it.
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Moreover, hadith and sira are far more fluid than the Qur’an in both
content and language, and they have been far more subject to challenge by
both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. The Qur’an became a closed corpus
very early on – at the death of Muhammad, in the ‘Uthmanic compilation, or
in the Marwanid recension, depending on how one reconstructs the history
of the text. Once it was fixed in content and language, its status as divine
speech meant that no one could alter it via emendation, inserted glosses,
the harmonisation of contradictory passages or the deletion of repetitions.
In contrast, neither hadith nor sira have ever constituted a genuinely closed
corpus, though great efforts were certainly expended by al-Bukhari, Muslim
and other scholars in the late ninth century to place hadith in precisely this
category.
On the other hand, though they appear to overlap in subject matter
(the words and acts of Muhammad), the two genres of text are really very
different in character and purpose. Some of the same anecdotes and dicta
do find a place in both, but they serve quite different functions. Put simply
(perhaps too simply), hadith constitutes formal doctrine: it is meant to yield
principles of belief (‘aqida) or rules of conduct (ahkam). In terms of formal
structure, hadith is fragmented into disjunct statements and anecdotes,
and these are typically decontextualised from particulars of time and place
– “Once the Prophet was seated in the marketplace, when a certain man
approached him and said…”. Sira, in contrast, provides a historical context, a
Sitz im Leben, for the Qur’an and hadith – texts which, taken by themselves,
are quite devoid of concrete references to time and place. (A colleague of
mine once commented that for the life of Jesus, we have a context but no
text; for the life of Muhammad, we have a text but no context: a neat if
aphoristic way of putting the matter.) By grounding these sometimes gnomic
texts in the life and struggles of the Prophet, sira makes them intelligible
and meaningful to those striving to follow in the path the Prophet laid
down. More broadly, sira portrays the world in which he lived and which
he strove to bring into obedience to God. Its fundamental purpose is to
inspire reverence and emulation; or, to paraphrase Bolingbroke, it is religion
teaching by examples. It might have suggested models of action to both later
Muslim rulers and their opponents, but it never constituted a formal source
for kalam and fiqh.
In view of these fundamental distinctions in structure and purpose,
it is obvious that hadith and sira have each posed very distinct issues of
authenticity, both for medieval Muslims and for modern Muslim and
non-Muslim scholars. In regard to sira, there was always something new to
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say about the Prophet’s life and career, and the criteria for admitting new
material into the sira were generous, to say the least. Medieval Muslim
scholars did not bar new material, as long as it was reasonably consonant
(doctrinally as well as factually) with what had already been accepted. In this
sense, the corpus of sira was open-ended. Indeed, from the tenth century
on, a great deal of new material, albeit mostly of the dala’il al-nubuwwa
genre, was continually added to the foundational narratives laid down in the
century and a half between Ibn Ishaq (d. 767) and al-Tabari (d. 923).
In the early sira compilations, scholars focused on recovering the facts
of Muhammad’s life, and on establishing the asbab al-nuzul through which
these facts were linked to the highly allusive statements of the Qur’an. In the
eyes of these scholars, such narratives could be very plastic in structure and
rhetoric without forfeiting a claim to authenticity. They needed only to be
what they claimed to be – statements about the Prophet’s words and actions
which could be reliably attributed to the reporter who first put them into
circulation. Moreover, this first reporter did not need to be an eyewitness
or contemporary of the events in question; he could well be a collectorcompiler from a much later generation. Recall that much of the material in
Ibn Ishaq is reported without explicit attribution, or simply on the authority
of “one whose testimony I do not doubt”.
These fluid criteria for admitting material into the corpus of sira mean
that modern scholars cannot always be certain on just what grounds a
particular item was thought worthy of inclusion. For example, when Ibn
Ishaq states, without citing any source, that a certain aya of the Qur’an was
revealed on the occasion of such-and-such an event, we cannot really know
whether this statement represents an opinion of the earliest Muslims, or an
opinion widely held among his own contemporaries, or just an idea of Ibn
Ishaq’s own.
For the early compilers of sira narratives, then, authenticity meant
the exclusion of forgeries (that is, statements falsely attributed to a given
reporter) and narratives wilfully distorted in the course of transmission.
Authenticity did not necessarily imply that a story was factually accurate,
though it goes without saying that the compilers tried to exclude material
they regarded as unreliable or mendacious. Likewise, a rigorously fixed
text was of no importance; a story could be told in various ways and still
constitute authentic testimony. Conflicting versions of an event were the
inevitable result of the frailties of human perception and memory. This
inclusive criterion of authenticity was acceptable because sira did not lay
down binding precedents or generate authoritative doctrine or rules of
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conduct. Its purpose – serious enough in its own right – was to provide
a compelling myth of origins for the Community of Believers, and to
encourage reverence for the Prophet and his unique place in human history.
What then should authenticity mean for modern students of sira?
Surely we have something more in mind than did these early Muslim
scholars, even if we share their concern to identify forgeries and spurious
lines of transmission. The meaning of authenticity depends on what we are
trying to achieve. If we are seeking a “historical Muhammad” in the manner
of a historical Abraham Lincoln or Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, this goal poses
specific kinds of problems. We have a rich fund of material to work with
– our medieval Muslim predecessors saw to that – but this material only
began to crystallise in something like its present form roughly a century and
a half after the death of Muhammad. However archaic some of it may be,
it has been heavily redacted to fit the religious expectations and political
concerns, the linguistic and literary models, and the scholarly criteria, of a
late eighth-century audience, with further redaction and reshaping as we
move into the generations succeeding Ibn Ishaq. We will all have our own
instincts about what adheres closely to the testimony of early witnesses and
what is a late forgery, about what reflects actual events and what is legend.
But I am not convinced that we have developed reliable and uniform criteria
for sorting all this out. Just about the only text in Ibn Ishaq that (almost)
everyone agrees has been transmitted in its primitive form is the so-called
Constitution of Medina, and it is so utterly different in language, content
and formal characteristics from everything else in his compilation that it
cannot be used as a template for other sira texts. A hallmark of good science
is that experiments and the results they yield can be replicated. Modern
students of sira have not yet worked out how to do this; our arguments and
conclusions overlap to some extent, but they do not concur across the board.
Most modern scholars would agree that “authenticity” in sira does not
require that a given narrative be told just as it originally was. Paraphrasing,
abridging and blending originally separate narratives, and emphasising
elements that speak to the compiler’s own concerns are all legitimate aspects
of transmission. We can only insist that the transmitter not alter a story so as
to change its meaning or invent things that never happened. But even as we
agree on this self-evident point, we seem unable to apply it to specific cases
in any consistent manner.
Early sira materials contain much that is miraculous (albeit not so
much as later increments do – such as the siras influenced by the model
of Dala’il al-Khayrat, that is, miraculous signs of prophethood) and this
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fact creates another set of problems for modern readers, especially nonMuslims. However, things that appear fantastic or legendary to a modern
consciousness would not have seemed so among the people of early Islamic
times. For them, miraculous events were an integral and even indispensable
element in the life and work of any prophet. For that reason we need to
take such stories seriously and not dismiss them out of hand. They may of
course be inventions intended to assimilate Muhammad to earlier prophets
or to the Syrian and Egyptian holy men of his era, but they may just as well
reflect the way his followers experienced his presence, however we may wish
to explain that experience. The problem is whether we can develop usable
criteria for testing miracle stories and legend-like narratives, and thereby
determine whether they embody some element of contemporary experience
or are merely conventional topoi. Without such criteria, these stories are
opaque and unusable; a stumbling block to our efforts to understand the
changing thought-world of early Islam.
In seeking for the “historical Muhammad”, therefore, we are forced to take
a minimalist approach. Rather than expanding the story, we find ourselves
reducing it to its barest structural elements. Ibn Ishaq and his successors
have given us a well-honed plot line, which we are constrained to follow
because we have no other. They have done this by selecting akhbar which
focus on what they regarded as the crisis points of Muhammad’s life and the
earliest community: the call to prophethood, the resistance and hostility of
the dominant lineages of Quraysh to him and his message, the Hijra and
the founding of the new umma, the three great battles which secured the
future of this umma, the struggle with the Jewish clans in Yathrib, and so
on. However, the stories and poetry which coalesced around these crisis
points may well be much later inventions or at best epic elaborations of the
primitive accounts. The fact that a given event really did happen does not
guarantee that the stories told about that event are truthful in any sense.
As a result, most modern scholarship on the life of Muhammad is simply
a process of thinning out this material; of deciding which of its elements
might reflect a factual reality rather than an imagined past.
More important, perhaps, is that these crisis points represent a specifically
Muslim way of remembering and reconstructing Muhammad’s life. We
might expect that his Qurashi opponents in Mecca or the Jews of Yathrib
would have chosen quite a different set of crisis points. Likewise, there were
certainly alternative Muslim grand narratives about Muhammad’s life that
have simply disappeared. We can discern traces of such competing narratives
in accounts of the succession to Muhammad – the Ghadir Khumm story in
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its fervent Shi‘i and anodyne Sunni versions, the acclamation of Abu Bakr,
the odd and very ambivalent role ascribed to ‘Ali in the days following the
Prophet’s death, and so on. And of course the competing narratives which
portray slightly later moments – such as the caliphate of ‘Uthman and the
‘Ali-Mu’awiya conflict – demonstrate just how bitter these debates over the
past could be.
Perhaps, then, we cannot reconstruct a verifiably documented historical
Muhammad, but only a hypothetical (albeit plausible) one. We cannot paint
a portrait from life, so to speak, but instead must fashion an image based
on uncertain and often contradictory second-hand memories. If that is so,
the criteria of authenticity that guided the early collectors and editors of
sira, even as modified to fit the methods of modern textual criticism, will
not quite work for us. We know what an authentic report about the life
of Muhammad would be according to these criteria, and there may well be
many such reports in the mass of material that has come down to us, but we
cannot be certain precisely which ones they are. Objective authenticity in
this sense is real and meaningful, but finding it is like chasing shadows at
twilight.
This conclusion does not mean that authenticity of a different kind is
unattainable, however. On the simplest and most obvious level, the sira texts
are incontestably authentic statements of how Muslims in the late eighth
and ninth centuries had come to think about the (multiple) meanings of
Muhammad’s life for their own society. Moreover, this era’s construction of
Muhammad continues to have powerful resonance, since it has provided
a durable template for Muslim thought and feeling about the Prophet
throughout the last twelve centuries. That is, it is in the simplest and most
literal sense an authentic witness to the ways in which contemporary
Muslims think about who they are and how they ought to direct their lives.
(The power and durability – indeed, the unassailable sanctity – of this
ninth-century template are also formidable obstacles to any serious effort
among Muslim scholars to re-study Muhammad’s life. But that is a question
for another paper.)
From this perspective, the very fact that the sira narratives are full of both
subtle and blatant contradictions, of puzzling gaps, of topoi skipping from
one report to the next, is not a problem. On the contrary, these anomalies
are direct testimony to the religious and ideological tensions of this period.
Sira texts embody the memory (properly, the many cross-cutting memories)
which Muslims constructed of their beginnings. Those memories were to
some degree grounded in the actual events, persons, conflicts and ideas of
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Muhammad’s time, but they were also constructed memories of an imagined
past – a past that was not conceived all at once, but rather had been built up
layer upon layer as Muslims in each generation tried to make sense of what
was happening to them, and to preserve (or revitalise) the ties between their
own lives and the sacred origins of the umma.
When we look at sira texts in this manner, as continuously generated and
reshaped through time, we need to think about authenticity in a third sense.
Sira texts are neither a direct record of Muhammad’s time nor (an equally
simplistic view) a snapshot of the several decades when they crystallised in
a stable and semi-definitive form – c. 760–840. Rather, sira texts embody
the long process by which they came into being. The metaphors of an
archaeological dig or geological strata come to mind, and these can be very
useful if one explores them seriously. In the sira, as in an archaeological site
or a complex geological formation, there are many layers. However, these
layers do not appear in any simple chronological sequence. In a geological
formation, strata are twisted and inverted; archaic strata wind up on top of
recent ones, and old rocks are transformed by the very processes that create
new ones. Likewise in archaeology, recent construction penetrates and
disturbs the earliest layers, while elements of the earliest settlements remain
imbedded in and shape the new ones in the most unexpected ways.
In this context, authenticity means bearing reliable witness to the multiple
layers imbedded in the sira corpus. A report (khabar) would be authentic
insofar as it was generated as part of one of those layers. The question is
whether these layers can be identified and recovered. We know they must
exist, but is there any method of analysis by which we can discern them with
some degree of consistency and confidence? In attempting this we confront
two problems. First, there is the need to deconstruct the existing texts –
to unpeel accretions, restore redacted passages to a more primitive form,
weed out partisan or sectarian interpolations, and so on. Second, and even
more challenging, the layers imbedded in the sira narratives are not clearly
separated; it is not a matter of red, yellow, blue and orange stripes. On the
contrary: these layers bleed into and contaminate one another.
Deconstruction – in the present context, the effort to recover
progressively earlier forms of the sira material – is an exceedingly delicate
task, and the further back we try to go, the less confidence we can claim
for our results. However, if we regard sira not as an isolated literary genre,
but rather as part of a highly integrated cultural discourse, we might
discover certain characteristics – of grammar, vocabulary, rhetoric, ways of
constructing an argument, topics of debate, and so on – that would allow
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us to situate such deconstructed texts in concrete times and places. We
could thereby claim, at some level of probability, that they were authentic
representations of a given phase in the development of sira. To be precise,
our reconstructed texts could not claim to recover the actual originals, but
we could plausibly argue that they constituted a reasonable facsimile of
those originals. To return to an example from the beginning of this paper,
the situation would be much the same as an “authentic performance” of
Handel’s Messiah in contemporary London.
One would begin this endeavour with the mid and late ninth century,
because we possess a rich body of contemporary evidence (not only literary
texts, but also coins and inscriptions) with which to reconstruct the religiopolitical discourse of those decades. Because we also have a stable and highly
developed sira literature from this period, we can see sira texts in their
full cultural contexts and determine just how they functioned within the
broader discourse. Obviously the evidence (or at least reliable contemporary
evidence) for the shape of religio-political debate as well as the broader
cultural milieu becomes progressively thinner as we move back in time into
the early Abbasid, late Marwanid and early Marwanid periods. Thus our
efforts to recover earlier versions of now-existing sira texts will inevitably
become more and more provisional and hypothetical. But once we have
defined how sira texts fit into the cultural discourse of the ninth century, we
should be able to apply the same method to earlier periods and thereby work
our way as far back (perhaps even to the age of ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I)
as we have some reliable independent evidence to guide us.
We turn at last to hadith. It is a very different matter from sira, although
a great many of the above remarks apply. To begin with, hadith quickly came
to have (no later than the third quarter of the eighth century) a distinctive
purpose of its own. Hadith does not exist primarily to exalt the Prophet,
although of course it does that by its very nature. Nor does it portray the
origins of the umma in a broad historical sense, though it certainly does
claim to articulate and fix the pure, original doctrines and practices of Islam.
The fundamental purpose of hadith is to give concrete, detailed guidance
to Muslims, to tell them how they should lead their lives, how they should
think and act. In a technical legal sense, it is a material source (asl) in fiqh; as
such it lays down authoritative cases and binding directives. Because hadith
is imbedded in a systematic scholarly discourse, and because so much is at
stake, authenticity must be far more rigorously defined than with sira. Or to
follow the argument of al-Shafi‘i, if Muhammad’s words were divinely guided,
though not divinely inspired in the full sense, then these words possessed a
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tremendous weight and sanctity; the flexibility (not to say laxness) allowed
in sira was not permissible here. Moreover, two competing objectives had to
be met: scholars should strive to recover the Prophet’s dicta as completely
as possible – ideally, the totality of the guidance he had provided to his
followers – even as these dicta had to be rigorously winnowed and sifted
in order to rid the corpus of anything spurious or doubtful. While hadith
scholars in the late eighth and early ninth centuries focused on the mandate
to collect as much as possible, those of the late ninth century stressed the
need to fix an indisputably reliable corpus. Later on, as hadith became
widely used for general moral guidance, practical standards were loosened a
bit – sometimes more than a bit – even as the critical methods of specialists
became ever more rigorous.
Ideally, hadith should have become a closed corpus constituted of
precise, unvarying texts, solidly attested all the way back to the Prophet’s
Companions who first reported his words. In reality that was never possible,
and medieval hadith scholars reluctantly recognised this fact. There were too
many uncertainties about lines of transmission, too much human fallibility,
too much disagreement as to which hadith actually met the criteria for
reliability that they struggled so hard to establish. Even to them, the origins
of hadith collection were murky and hard to document convincingly.
(Obviously these doubts have blossomed into full-blown scepticism among
most, though not all, modern non-Muslim scholars of the subject.) In
the end, the study and criticism of hadith represented an informed “best
guess” about what the Prophet had actually said and what he had meant.
Even with these reservations, however, medieval and most modern Muslim
scholars did build up a body of material which they believed they could use
with confidence. In the long run, a well-defined corpus of reliable hadith,
along with more apocryphal dicta that were useful as general doctrinal and
moral guidance for ordinary believers, was confirmed by almost universal
consensus, and this corpus remains normative down to the present. For the
overwhelming majority of Muslims over the last eleven hundred years, the
reliable hadith collections (the “Six Books”) unquestionably represent the
actual words and actions of the Prophet – or at least as close to those words
as it is humanly possible to get.
For non-Muslim scholars the matter is rather different. There is, to
begin with, no consensus among them as to the authenticity of the hadith
literature, or even as to what “authenticity” might mean. Some, following
the implications of Joseph Schacht, would deny any demonstrable historical
connection between hadith and the actual teachings of Muhammad. For
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these scholars, hadith is at bottom an invention of the mid-eighth century:
the statements of early pietists and proto-jurists retrojected back onto the
Companions and ultimately the Prophet himself. Since this interpretation
posits a radical disjuncture between the life of Muhammad and the historical
umma, it makes the question of authenticity almost meaningless unless one
wishes to restrict this concept to the discourse of the late eighth century and
later. That is, following Goldziher’s analysis, we could say that hadith is an
authentic statement of the ideas and values of this period, and of how these
ideas and values were understood to be part of the true original essence of
Islam. An interesting consequence of this perspective is that all hadith are
equal – that every hadith is an authentic statement of the doctrine held by
one group or another. The only issue is to discover which group it should be
attached to.
Schacht’s approach has not gone uncontested. More recently, some
scholars (most notably Harald Motzki 12) have argued that there is in fact
an authentically archaic core in this material, and that we can determine at
least some elements of it. Without being able to claim that any given words
were indeed the words spoken by Muhammad himself, we can re-establish
a meaningful connection between the hadith compiled in the late eighth
century and the doctrines and practices of the earliest Muslims. In effect,
this approach claims an authenticity of substance (though not necessarily
strict verbatim authenticity) for at least some parts of the hadith corpus. As
a matter of historical logic, this claim seems more satisfying than the almost
Pyrrhonean scepticism of some of Schacht’s followers, but still the argument
must be rigorously articulated on a case-by-case basis.
In spite of these fundamental disagreements, most non-Muslim scholars
would concur on a few points. First, all of the classical hadith collections,
even the revered Sahihayn of al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, contain
a considerable quantity of spurious material. By the criteria of ordinary
textual criticism (as opposed to the criteria of faith), a great many hadith
cannot possibly date from Muhammad’s time. Second, even those hadith
which might faithfully reflect the Prophet’s teaching should be considered
paraphrases rather than verbatim reproductions of his actual statements. The
frame stories are too stylised, the diction too “modern”, to represent actual
encounters between Muhammad and his followers. Third, Muslim scholars
should summon the courage to revisit the canonical corpus of hadith, either
to validate it or to try to build a new, more reliable corpus on the basis of
modern critical methods. This would admittedly pose very serious problems
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for any number of long-established theological and legal doctrines, but it
would be a crucial step towards rethinking Islam.
The preceding discussion demonstrates how fluid a concept authenticity
really is. Indeed, this concept is only meaningful and usable when it is
deployed in a precisely defined literary-historical context. Only rarely can
it mean that we have direct, unmediated access to words actually produced
by the supposed original speaker. At the same time, authenticity is not a
vacuous term. The statements we find in our texts were in fact spoken by
someone, and most often they represent a decades- or centuries-long process
of statement and restatement, of transmission, revision and redaction. For
the contemporary scholar – Muslim as well as non-Muslim – the search for
authenticity thus lies less in an often vain struggle to recover an original
form of words than in the effort to uncover and elucidate the process by
which the words we actually possess took shape and came down to us. In
this search we will never attain anything like irrefutable certainty. However,
a carefully articulated understanding of authenticity’s many meanings will
do much to guide our analysis. Such an understanding might also provide
some common ground, or at least points of constructive debate, for scholars
of very different religious and intellectual perspectives as they examine the
sacred texts of early Islam.
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Constructing Islam in the “Classical” Period:
Maqalat Literature
and the Seventy-Two Sects1
Josef van Ess

“Le mahométisme est divisé en plus de soixante et dix sects.”
(“Mohammedanism is divided into more than seventy sects.”) This is what
we are told under the entry “Philosophie des Sarrasins” in the Encyclopédie, a
document of the French Enlightenment edited by Denis Diderot and Jean de
Rond d’Alembert shortly before the French Revolution. Islam was presented
here by way of a Muslim source – a prophetic hadith to be exact. However,
the French reader was not informed of this. He was left alone with his
associations, and he must have thought that Islam was torn by innumerable
schisms, especially in contrast to Europe which had meanwhile entered
the Age of Reason. This was the way Europeans liked to see themselves at
that time: as heirs of the siècle des Lumières, living in the light as it were,
unlike the Muslims living in darkness. But religious wars had been rare in
the Islamic world, and most of the few “sects” mentioned in the article by
name were in reality juridical schools: the Hanafites, the Malikites, the
Shafi’ites. In their French incarnation they were all misspelled; the author
of the article “Philosophie des Sarrasins”, the Chevalier de Jaucourt, seems
not to have been sufficiently familiar with the topic. He relied on a German
source, for he spelled Shafi’ites with sch-, a peculiarity found only in German
orthography, and he dared not change it because he did not know how the
names sounded in Arabic.
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As a matter of fact, Martin Crusius, a Protestant theologian from the
university of Tuebingen, had already written in his Turcograeciae libri octo
(1587) – which witnessed to his good, though provincial relations with
Orthodox Christianity and the Patriarchate in Constantinople – “Superstitio
Mohametana est in septuaginta duas principales sectas divisa, quarum una
sola in Paradisum dux est, reliquae vero in inferos”. (“The Mohammedan
superstition is divided into seventy-two principal sects, of which one
alone leads into Paradise and the others indeed to hell”.) This is not exactly
what the Chevalier later said. We now have seventy-two sects instead of
seventy, and the Shafi’ites are not mentioned; instead, the Turcograeciae libri
octo confront us with the somewhat disturbing affirmation that all seventytwo will go to hell except for one. This was the discourse of people who
believed in a Realm of Evil; paradise only belonged to those who followed
the correct path or doctrine. The underlying dictum of the Prophet is the
same, but the conclusion is different.2
If there is “orthodoxy”, why then the great number of aberrations? Let us
first have recourse to philology: the word which stands for Latin secta in the
Arabic original, firqa, simply means “group” and is not necessarily pejorative.
It seems that the Muslims realised early on that their Islam was not a plain
phenomenon which looked alike everywhere, but rather consisted of a
plurality of nuclei and communities. On the one hand, they behaved like
a chosen people who had been given a new and ultimate revelation; this is
why some influential groups among them called themselves ahl al-janna.3
On the other hand, by their military success and the rapid expansion of
their movement, they acquired new and various identities in the highly
cultured areas of the Ancient World which they had conquered. What held
them together were two things: 1. an ethnic criterion – they were all Arabs,
and Muhammad was the Prophet sent to the Arabs, and 2. a symbolic act,
namely their peculiar and unmistakable way of praying. Over the centuries,
their expression for “all of us” or “the Muslims as such, irrespective of their
different denominations” was ahl al-salat or ahl al-qibla.4 In contrast to
this, the Qur’an did not yet serve as an entity. The text of the Scripture
was not yet fully available, and there was no single, reliable version. During
the campaigns under the first caliphs, the soldiers sometimes only had a
few verses which could be recited,5 and there were certainly not enough
qurra’ to accompany them and to serve as their imam. As far as doctrine
was concerned, they had to construct their identity, and later generations
would admit that the ensuing constructs had not always been the same. The
Muslims prayed in their Islamic way, but they had not yet defined where

constructing islam in the “classical” period …

65

this should be done. Masjid did not yet mean “mosque” but simply “a place
fit for prostration”. Sometimes the Muslims even prayed in churches, as
Suliman Bashear has described.6
The diversity could seem disconcerting and frightening. Firqa was
very close to furqa, meaning “schism, dissension”. In fact, the numbers
seventy or seventy-two, which marked the breadth of the split inside the
community, had been taken, by analogy, from a paradigmatic event which
was widely known in salvation history: the erection of the Tower of Babel
which humanity had failed to complete.7 Speech had been confused ever
since, and the languages which had sprung up had been connected, in early
exegesis, with the peoples mentioned in the preceding chapter of the book
of Genesis. These “nations” of the Ancient World, each of which spoke its
own idiom, had been counted as seventy or, following the Church fathers,
as seventy-two. Both numbers were symbolic, denoting plenitude and
perfection, and seventy-two occupied (as six times twelve) a special rank
in the sexagesimal system. In Arabic, the “peoples” had been translated as
milal, and under the influence of Ancient Syriac, the word milla had become
equivocal; in the Qur’an it could also mean “creed, religion”.8 This created
a new situation. As long as one had talked about a multitude of languages,
this could be accepted, without emotion, as a mere fact of life. The diversity
of religious doctrines, however, aroused strong feelings, for not only did it
provoke misunderstandings but also polemics and strife. It is true that the
Christians believed that the linguistic confusion was not irreversible, thanks
to their experience of Pentecost. But the Muslims noticed that the miracle
had not resulted in harmony; instead of finding a common language, the
Christian churches had continued quarrelling.9 In contrast to languages,
creeds and denominations multiplied. They throve on an inherent claim of
“truth”; this made them dangerous. Two reactions were possible: one could
accept religious diversity as an inexplicable decree of God’s will (today we
would call this tolerance). Or one could view it as a product of Satan to be
fought because it obscured the “truth”, a truth which could only be one. In
both cases it seemed advisable to learn more about the various factions. This
is the origin of what was once termed “heresiography”, originally a kind of
“Listenwissenschaft”,10 which under favourable circumstances could develop
into doxography – a compilation of philosophical doctrines.
Early Muslims seem to have reacted more with realism and resignation
than with interfactional aggression. Mu’awiya is said to have asked ‘Abid b.
Sharya, the old wise man from the Yaman,11 about the tabalbul of mankind
– their lack of “dialogue” as we might say today – and their “babylonisation”
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because of the confusion of languages or ideologies.12 And the preachers of
his time, the qussās, began to talk in a typological way about the division
of the Children of Israel into seventy groups13. What they wanted to say
was that hoping for union and harmony had already deceived the Jews
and the Christians; it had turned out to be an illusion which had emerged
everywhere in salvation history. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that Islam
was special. What was happening was simply that the Muslims made their
own mistakes due to their military strength and their rapid expansion. The
third caliph was murdered, and it was said that ‘Uthman had been killed by
the “Egyptians”. In the same way, the followers of ‘Ali who had not supported
him were the “Kufans” (ahl Kufa). They were not yet known as Shi‘i – this
term appeared later. The regional differences were the focus of the trauma.
This is at least how our first witness explained the situation, when
he spoke about the dramatic event in terms of firaq. Maymun b. Mihran
was an Umayyad bureaucrat who lived in Upper Mesopotamia and died
around 734.14 After this political disaster, which to him was a kind of
“Urkatastrophe” – similar to the First World War – Mihran says we
encounter firstly the adherents of ‘Uthman, who consisted of the people
from Syria and Basra, secondly the adherents of ‘Ali, who were from Kufa,
and lastly the Murji’ites, who had not wanted to side with either. The latter
group is not explicitly located because, according to Mihran, the Murji’ites
had been on a campaign and when they returned to Medina where ‘Uthman
had been assassinated, they saw that the old unity had ceased to exist.15 From
what we know about the community of the original “believers”, we might
assume that they were Yemenites rather than Medinans, for the Hijazis (at
least those who were wealthy enough) had not joined the campaigns but
had stayed at home to enjoy or administer the revenues of the unexpected
expansion.16 The fitna had brought the underlying tensions to the surface.
Before the fitna, Maymun diagnosed only one faction: the Kharijites, the
first great challenge of the community. However, they had dispersed and
therefore remained locally undefined.
Apart from these four groups, Mihran identifies a fifth group which he
names the fi’at al-islam, using a new key, as it were: religious rather than
geographical. We are reminded of our modern Islamists, but in fact we
do not find this term again during the entire Middle Ages. What we find
instead is an expression similar in meaning though not yet used by Maymun:
al-firqa al-najiya. Maymun leaves no doubt that, like a firqa najiya, his fi’at
al-islam followed the right path. They may appear similar to the Murji’ites,
but there is one notable difference: whereas the Murji’ites took a negative
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stance and “doubted” (that is, they did not side with anyone), the ahl alislam declared their solidarity with ‘Uthman as well as ‘Ali. They left the
matter of guilt open and avoided any discussion. What they wanted was
jama’a, to live in harmony, almost as in a modern democracy. However, we
do not know for sure how they understood their jama’a: as “concord” (that
is, an abstract ideal), or as “majority” (the concrete demographic realisation
of this ideal, in the sense of al-sawad al-a’zam as one would later say in
Iraq and especially in Central Asia).17 Behind the term jama’a, we discover
Mu’awiya’s policy and the ideology of the Umayyads. In an empire no longer
ruled from what had become the periphery (Medina) but from an old
power centre (Damascus), it was expedient to promote concord under the
pretension of representing the majority of the Muslims. The year in which
Mu’awiya hoped to assemble the adherents of both ‘Uthman and ‘Ali behind
him (by having bribed Hasan b. Ali) was aptly called ‘am al-jama’a.18
Maymun had belonged to the circle of ‘Umar b. ‘Abdal’aziz. But in his
old age he knew that the plan for jama’a had not worked. It is true that,
among the factions or “sects”, Maymun did not yet mention the Qadarites
who emerged under Hisham (and in the army at that), but we can guess
that politically and religiously the concord did not reach far beyond Syria.
Mu’awiya was said to have equated the jama’a with the firqa al-najiya, but in
the context of the same apocryphal saying of the Prophet which predicted
the split of the community. This allowed for the question of how a group that
goes to Paradise could be the majority when seventy or seventy-two other
groups existed alongside it. Mu’awiya had allegedly solved the contradiction
by adding one more prediction of the Prophet: “There will arise people in
my community in whom there is a frenzy as if from rabies” (“Yatajara bihim
kama yatajara l-kalab”).19
This was a clear allusion to the Kharijites. Although few in number, they
had split endlessly. They were the seventy-two then; the rest was the jama’a.
But this interpretation could not be retained, for the Shi‘ites also split, and
when the Qadarite doctrine was taken over by the Mu’tazilites they also
founded numerous individual schools. This was not necessarily a negative
experience. The development could be seen as an example of plurality, a
plurality that was tolerated because it was not fostered by the government
(which meanwhile had become Abbasid).
One could say, of course, that such diversity is based merely on
theology; that it is useless and misleading, just idle talk, kalam. Outside
the intellectual world, theology was widely considered a rather dubious art
discredited by the Christians. In Christianity, theology was protected by
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an institution, and some churches were on uneasy terms with one another
because of their differing views on the subject. In contrast, Islam treated
theology as a matter of the market – people could simply boycott it. But
they also had the freedom to choose the variety they preferred, at least
in the big towns. The “schools”, many of which were rather like debating
clubs (and not only so among the Mu’tazilites), advertised themselves by
issuing an ‘aqida (creed).20 A considerable number of these texts (symbola or
Bekenntnisschriften) still exist, especially for the second and third centuries
ah. They were carefully preserved and documented, but none of them lasted
forever as the Christian dogma did, which is still recited in every divine
service. One of our oldest theological treatises, Dirar b. ‘Amr’s K. al-Tahrish
(which has recently been discovered in Yemen), deals with these schools
as a fact of the author’s world. Dirar wrote his treatise because somebody
had complained about the ikhtilaf (the difference of opinions), and as a
matter of fact, Dirar himself was unhappy with the situation. He quotes the
saying “bada’a ghariban wa-saya’udu ghariban” (“[true] Islam is a stranger
in this world”). But he does not deny that the phenomenon exists. Rather,
he undertakes to simplify matters by showing that certain groups which
had different names were nevertheless identical and merely distributed
regionally. For instance, the Murji’a was known as “Jahmiyya” in Khorasan,
“Ghaylaniyya” in Syria, “Shamiriyya” in Basra and “Waddahiyya” in Kufa,
without any notable doctrinal difference.21 Even Abu al-Qasim al-Ka’bi, the
first great Mu’tazili heresiographer, who lived a century after Dirar, did not
yet deal with religious reality in terms of true and false. Rather, he collected
the opinions and doctrines out of professional curiosity; he noted where his
earlier Mu’tazili colleagues cultivated their idiosyncrasies and “stood apart”
(tafarradu) from them,22 but did not attack them for their differences. These
idiosyncrasies did not become heresies or “objects of abomination” (fada’ih)
until a century later, in ´Abdalqahir al-Baghdadi’s Farq bayna l-firaq.
The understanding of the lists depended on how Islam was construed.
The Mu’tazilites knew the hadith about the seventy-two sects; it is quoted
in a heresiographical work probably composed by Ja’far b. Harb.23 But they
did not use the hadith as a guideline, nor did they talk in terms of jama’a
or the firqa al-najiya. This was done elsewhere, not so much in Iraq as Iran,
among the disciples of ‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak (d. 797). We also notice the
consequences of this phenomenon in some early texts of Iranian origin,
such as Khushaysh b. Asram’s (d. 867) K. al-Istiqama, parts of which were
later included in Malati’s K. al-Tanbih wal-radd. Khushaysh is one of the
first authors to count the sects in order to get seventy-two of them; he then
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refutes them with a flood of Qur’anic quotations in the name of the firqa
al-najiya.24 The author who brings this method to perfection is Abu Muti’
Makhul al-Nasafi (d. 930), an Iranian contemporary of Abu l-Qasim alKa’bi. He managed, in his K. al-Radd ‘ala ahl al-bida to arrange the seventytwo sects so as to illustrate an underlying “orthodox” ‘aqida. Each sect was
then connected with only one heresy, so that rejecting these seventy-two
aberrations amounted to defining the true creed. The sects themselves, their
names as well as their doctrines, were a product of the author’s imagination
rather than of a living reality, but whoever had read Nasafi’s book or taken
an introductory course on its basis knew henceforth how to understand
Islam.25 The text did not help in learning about events outside Central
Asia, but it was apt as a cicerone to the virtual world of orthodox belief,
and as such enjoyed an enormous reputation. Its nomenclature survived
for a millennium, both in Iran and in India, and was included in modern
encyclopedias such as Dehkhuda’s Lughatname.26
The region where K. al-Radd ‘ala ahl al-bida had emerged, the town of
Nakhshab (or Nasaf as it was known by the Arabs), was in certain ways a
backwater, devoid of historical information about the wide range of Islam.
This was different in Iraq, where Abu l-Qasim al-Ka’bi had studied, who
came from the same area. Instead of learning the seventy-two sects by heart,
the students there were taught how to engage in disputations. This produced
a kind of academic literature characterised by the term maqalat. The genre
is best represented by Ash’ari’s Maqalat al-islamiyyin. Note the expression
islamiyyin, which has nothing to do with Maymun b. Mihran’s fi’at al-islam,
but means “the Muslims in their entirety”, the ahl al-salat; this is why the
title continues with wa-khtilaf al-musallin.
Maqalat books did not aim at a creed. They were the leftovers of prior
and perhaps forgotten speculations; theological ideas of the past that
it was helpful to know (and perhaps better to avoid) when discussing
matters with a rival of one’s own school. The theologians, known as
mutakallimun, acquired their name from their attempts to push their ideas
through by way of dialectics (kalam, derived from takallama). Today we
would speak of “dialogue” in this respect, but in Ash’ari’s time, the way of
achieving kalam was not by loose dialogue but by more or less disciplined
disputation (munazara). In order to prepare for this intellectual exercise,
the participants seem to have memorised the arguments and positions they
might expect from the opponent. During the public exercise, the “talk
show” as it were, it was also expedient to keep in mind all the errors which
had been committed in the past. The goal of the endeavour consisted, of
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course, in attaining the truth, but in contrast to the ‘aqa’id, the maqalat had
a historical dimension, and the participants were perhaps still aware of the
fact that even when victorious they had not yet reached a result that would
withstand all criticism.
This was another way of construing Islam, equally as successful as the
former. In its own way, it lasted as long as Abu Muti’ al-Nasafi’s approach,
especially due to the work of Shahrastani. Shahrastani intended to be
objective, as had Ash’ari. Neither kept to their promise consistently, but
this was as at least what the literary genre demanded. Shahrastani could not
explicitly state his personal conviction anyway – he was an Isma‘ili who had
managed to pose as an Ash’arite.27 Nevertheless, his presentation was taken
up by countries from Iraq to Spain, and especially by Egypt. Most people
did not realise his non-orthodox connection; they liked the way he merged
Islamic denominations with pagan schools, especially of Greek philosophy.
The Isma‘ilis had been doing this for generations.
In addition to that, however, Shahrastani had something else to offer that
seems unusual – at least to us, if not so much so to his contemporaries. When
organising his material, he used a system derived from the practice of Iranian
bureaucracy. He describes the system in the last of his five introductions,
and Daniel Gimaret was the first to furnish us with an astute interpretation
of the relevant passage.28 Shahrastani was familiar with the hisab diwani
in Iran – that is, the way the revenue was administered and calculated in
the chanceries – and he distributed the denominations in the same way. A
feature of the “construction” was its reference to bureaucracy. At all times,
bureaucracies produced classifications; classification was the only way to
grasp the confusing plenitude of living reality. The Christians owed their
name “Christ people” in contrast to the ordinary Jews.29 Sasanid practice
of the same kind seems to survive in the way the Muslims categorised the
dualist “sects”, for when enumerating the Manicheans, the Mazdakites, and
so on, they usually forgot the Zoroastrians – probably because the Muslims
had taken over a system which dated from the time when Mazdaism was the
dominant religion in pre-Islamic Iran and had defined who was a heretic
and who was not.30 In the second half of the third century ah, a certain
Misma’i, a nephew of the Mu’tazili theologian and heresiographer Zurqan,
produced the book K. Ma’rifat ma yahtaju l-muluk ila ma’rifatihi fi usul aldin wa-aqawil firaq al-umma, a kind of manual for the government which
contained, besides a catechism, a survey of the Islamic denominations.31
Our best example is Khwarazmi with his Mafatih al-‘ulum, for in his
endeavour to serve the needs of secretarial organisation he made use of the
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tradition of the seventy-two sects.32 The list he incorporated into his manual
corresponds to the list we find in a contemporary Isma‘ili text, the Bab alshaytan from Abu Tammam’s K. al-Shajara (recently edited by Paul Walker
and Wilferd Madelung). The list can perhaps be retraced to Abu Zayd alBalkhi, another contemporary of Abu l-Qasim al-Ka’bi and Abu Muti’ alNasafi. Shahrastani, however, did not take it up; perhaps he did not know it.
In these administrative manuals the system showed its useful side. It
did not aim at coercion; it aimed at tax-paying. Even when a firqa pushed
its doctrine or its social behaviour to the point at which it transgressed the
borderline between sectarianism and unbelief, the officials in the chanceries
mainly thought about money; they made “the sectarians” pay jizya instead
of kharaj. The adherents of the Muqanna’, a man who had been persecuted as
a rebel and an unbeliever, were not extinguished; they were found centuries
later as peasants living in the mountains of Central Asia paying the jizya just
as the Zoroastrians had, and travellers such as Muqaddasi boasted of having
visited them.33 The Nusayris, again peasants but also retailers in remote
places, survived in Syria.34 Today, due to their denominational ‘asabiyya, they
lead the government. There are, of course, groups and communities who
were less fortunate, and I abstain from making further statements about the
modern period. But in general, and up to the nineteenth century, divergent
religious convictions were, in spite of all criticism and polemics, ultimately
treated as maqalat. Generally speaking, with regard to religion, the Islamic
world remained more peaceful than Europe before the Enlightenment.
What I have discussed until this point are simply virtual realities; when
we say “Islam” we use a construct. This is true for the past as well as for
the present. These constructs have expanded enormously due to ideological
pollution and the media’s influence. On the other hand, constructs are
fragile; they can lose their persuasiveness from one moment to the next.
We know this from our economy and from our politics. As historians,
our dilemma is that we are constantly dealing with constructs (all of our
written sources are constructs), yet we want to know the reality. We should
never pretend to have discovered it; we are able only to present constructs
ourselves. But we can develop theories that help to explain these constructs.
Is there any theory that explains what I have described in this paper? I have
not elaborated any theories myself, but one in contemporary religious
studies seems to fit: denominationalism.
This is how I imagine early Islam. Islam did not present itself as a
union then, and neither does it do so today. Religion always exists in small
communities. When you walk through a North American town, it seems as
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though you find a church at every second corner, but Christian belief may
be presented differently from church to church. Similarly, when we want
to interpret the situation in early Kufa according to our heresiographical
sources, we find all kinds of people trying to explain Islam to themselves
under certain assumptions, everybody in his own way, and probably in his
own mosque. None of them lacked a community, for without an audience
their ideas would not have been recorded. The reports were collected and
publicised as a catalogue of idiosyncrasies. This is how the talk about ikhtilaf
came up, with or without resentment concerning the phenomenon. At
the end of this process we get a literary genre, heresiography, or rather a
whole gamut of genres: maqalat literature, creeds, administrative manuals,
polemical pamphlets, and so on. Each of these points to the plurality of
Islam (though not to its pluralism, since pluralism was not yet the habit
of the age). There was, however, no institution which endeavoured to
stand for them all (no “Church”), and on the fringe there was syncretism,
transculturation and liminality.35 People noticed the differences either with
curiosity or with exasperation. Specialists prepared lists of groups: “sects” or
“heresies”. However elaborate the lists, they did not last forever, and became
obsolete after some time. In contrast, the phenomenon itself survived; a
man like Muqaddasi took plurality for granted. Even today, Moroccan Islam
differs from the Saudi or Iranian variety, and there is no indication that this
will change.
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Modern Discourses of Superiority:
Muslims and Christians in Contact
Stefan Wild

In order to honour a globally acknowledged scholar of Mohammed Arkoun’s
standing, it is tempting to take a cue from one of his major and most recent
study, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought.1 I freely admit that
I have succumbed to this temptation. One of the most important chapters
in Arkoun’s book deals with authority and power in Islamic thought. My
paper is an attempt to analyse an aspect of the power structure inherent
in inter-religious polemics. Part one will deal with Christian and Muslim
discourses of superiority. I will compare the role of reason in and for
religion as seen by Pope Benedict XVI and the nineteenth-century Egyptian
reformist, Muhammad ‘Abduh. In part two, I will attempt to point to subtle
but significant changes of attitude in inter-religious dialogues between
Muslims and Christians in modern times. Here we find first attempts to
transcend the discourse of superiority and to overcome what has been called
“exclusivism”. How does the introduction of the “religious Other” into
theological discourse affect the construction of belief ? There are not many
theologians or intellectuals on either side of the Christian–Muslim divide
who deal with these questions. And it has to be admitted that the ideas and
proposals that I will discuss may at present interest only a small minority of
believers. Nevertheless, the “theology of the religious Other” in a globalised,
multicultural and multi-religious world is a new concept that may provide
a possibility for overcoming the fairly worn-out discourses of superiority.
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1. Discourses of Superiority: Pope Benedict XVI,
Muhammad ‘Abduh and the Role of Reason in Religion
Christianity and Islam claim to have privileged, if not exclusive, access to
transcendental truth.2 Without this claim, and the concomitant claim that
this truth is of crucial importance for the well-being of the individual and his
or her community both in this world and the hereafter, these religions would
lose their meaning. Religious belief as seen from the inside is, therefore, to
some extent irreducible, incommensurable and beyond rational comparative
evaluation. In multi-religious societies, however, no religion can enforce
any longer what it considers its superior and exclusive claim to truth. As
globalisation spreads religions across the world, the multi-religious factor
in many societies will most probably become more visible. The staunchest
atheist will have to live beside the most pious religious literalist, be they
Christian or Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu. The constant confrontation with
a multitude of religious possibilities may in the long run blunt the edges of
exclusivism. One aspect of religious reality, overlooked at times, is that the
average individual did not and does not choose a religion, but was born into
a religion. History and geography are in this respect often as important as
or even more important than theological doctrine and individual choice.3
Early and medieval Muslim societies enjoyed a living experience of
pluralism that was stronger than that in parallel Christian societies.4 Under
Muslim rule, several communities (Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians) could
exist side by side – at least in principle. They had scriptures in different
languages that were nevertheless acknowledged to contain similar messages.
Three important Sunni legal schools taught that even non-Arab pagans had
a protected status under Islam.5 Under medieval Christian rule, however,
the fact that Jewish scripture was also part of Christian scripture usually
did nothing to alleviate the mostly deplorable reality of Jewish life under
Christian rule. For Muslims under medieval Christian rule, prospects were
even dimmer.
The inter-religious competition over whose religion was the true one,
has marked religious and social life through the ages wherever different
religions have come into contact. Christianity and Islam are to this day
caught up in these discourses of superiority, and are linked to or maybe even
trapped in this competition. This rivalry shows itself in missionary activities,
in Christian tabshīr and Muslim da‘wa. Many theologians on both sides,
true to their universalist claims, agree that giving up tabshīr or da‘wa would
betray their most cherished values. For mainstream theology, proselytising
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as a principle is in both cases not negotiable. The missionary competition
between Muslims and Christians in many parts of the world, notably on the
African continent, is very much alive. In Europe, where conversions between
Islam and Christianity are a growing phenomenon, this competition is
widely seen as an unsolved religious problem. In the course of history, blood
has been shed by the adherents of both religions in order to prove their
point – less on the Muslim side than on the Christian side, at least until the
advent of modernity. One cannot overlook the fact that just as much blood
has been shed within Christianity and less blood within Islam to make
“religious truth” prevail and “heresy” or “error” disappear. Nor should one
forget that militant anti-religious movements and regimes have produced
no fewer victims among the religious either. In Central Europe, the concept
of the freedom of religion, including the right to change one’s religion or to
profess no religion at all, has been successfully implemented, by and large,
even where there is a Christian state religion. In countries dominated by a
Muslim majority, the issue of this type of full religious freedom is often seen
either as marginal or as artificial. The Muslim diaspora, however, disagree.
The most important Muslim organisations in Germany accept the principle
of full freedom of religion, without reservation.
In any case, religious truth in Christianity and Islam was and is still
tied up with the idea that there is only one true religion and that all other
religions are wrong. “Exclusivism” consists of the idea that only one religion,
Christianity or Islam, is true or even that only one particular brand of
Christianity (such as Roman Catholicism) or of Islam (such as Sunni Islam)
is true. “Inclusivism” means that while there may be elements of truth in other
religions, only one religion possesses truth in a singular and unsurpassable
way. Inclusivism, however, while seeming generous, may actually co-opt
other faiths without their leave.6 Finally, “pluralism” theologically allows
for different religious accesses to truth. For unsophisticated mainstream
Christianity and Islam, missing the true religion and adhering to a wrong
one is punishable, if not already in this world then certainly in the world to
come.
Within Christianity and Islam, the conviction that the religious “Other”
will be eternally punished and burn in hell was for a long time the dominant
paradigm, and it is still fairly widespread. Conversely, many Christians
and Muslims are convinced that on the strength of their beliefs and their
behaviour they stand a fairly good chance of entering paradise, even if they
can never be completely sure of eternal salvation and bliss. This stance is not
mitigated by the fact that in the eyes neither of Christians nor of Muslims is
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the other religion completely false. But in spite of large areas of overlapping,
Christianity and Islam encapsulate a particularly strong antithesis between
true and false religion. Many Christians still fear Islam; many Muslims
still fear Christianity. My thesis is that in modern religious discourse and
in its construction of belief, the opposition between a completely true
and a partially false religion is gradually being replaced by the opposition
between a culturally superior religion and a culturally inferior one. Thereby,
hegemonic aspects are introduced: which religion is the more vibrant, the
more modern, or the more successful in converting others? Such aspects
tend to be superimposed on the question of mere truth. Mohammed
Arkoun has already pointed out the way an “Islamic reason” and a “Western
secularised reason” oppose each other.7 He argued for an anti-hegemonic
critique of both. Islam is feared in many parts of Europe because it contests
the hegemony of the Christian Churches and/or of secularism. Christianity
and secularism are feared in many parts of the Muslim world because they
are perceived as hegemonic doctrines. It is often, therefore, not so much the
truth of competing religions that is at stake today, but their attractiveness,
their vitality and their power. Numerous Muslim scholars consider a
powerful Islam inextricably linked to an Islamic state. They act as though
even the fundamental rituals of Islam are not “practices Muslims must
undertake because they are an irreducible part of being a believer, but rather
because they are socially useful in inculcating the habits and the discipline
that assist in the project of striving for an Islamic state”.8 On the other hand,
a diaspora situation leads many Muslims, silently or openly, to renounce the
idea of a universal Islamic state.
What I mean by “discourse of superiority” is best explained by a
comparison that may seem far-fetched: that of Muhammad ‘Abduh and
Pope Benedict XVI, and how both construct the role of reason in their
religions.
Pope Benedict XVI, in his famous lecture in Regensburg of 12 September
2006 on “belief and reason” (Glaube und Vernunft), discusses the role
of reason in Islam. He quotes a public religious discussion between the
Byzantine emperor Manuel II and a learned Muslim in 1391. Among other
issues, this dialogue deals with jihad, and the Pope quotes Manuel II with
the words, “Show me what Muhammad taught as new and you will find only
evil and inhumanity – such as Muhammad’s command to spread the faith
which he preached by the sword.” Muslim troops at the time stood not far
from Constantinople. Even if the Pope called this quotation “unacceptably
gruff in form”, the damage was done. According to the Pope, Islam taught
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that religion should be spread by the sword. This is why, in his view, the
religion of Islam cannot be said to be built on reason. Christian theology, on
the other hand, teaches that “not to act with the logos” (that is, with reason)
is incompatible with God’s essence. And the Pope links this position with
the fact “that Christianity, in spite of its origin and in spite of important
developments in the Orient, received its historically decisive imprint in
Europe”.9
In Islam, and to a lesser extent in parts of Protestantism, Pope Benedict
tells us, this amalgamation of revelation and Greek reason is weak or
absent. Pope Benedict compared (Catholic) Christianity with Islam (and
Protestantism), and few people were surprised when he found (Catholic)
Christianity to be superior. The question of how revealed religion relates to
human reason is, of course, one of the oldest questions of philosophy and
theology in both cultures. And the kind of comparison that the Pope uses
has a long polemical history on both sides.
We find analogous statements of comparison in many modern Muslim
treatises dealing with Islam – of course, invariably in favour of Islam. Islam,
in this view, is superior to all other religions, and in particular to Christianity.
A main argument is that Islam is the most “reasonable” of all religions, and
that it is in particular more reasonable than Christianity. This is already
manifest in Muhammad ‘Abduh’s (1849–1905) well-known apologetic
polemic against Christianity, “Islam and Christianity, in relation to science
and culture”.10 Farah Antun (1874–1922), a Greek Orthodox Christian and
Egyptian nationalist, had espoused Ernest Renan’s (1823–92) idea that Islam
as such was inimical to science and reason, and had written about it in the
learned Egyptian journal al-Jami‘ah. Renan had based this view on a mainly
racist anti-Arabic paradigm of history. Muhammad ‘Abduh, and after him
numerous Muslim scholars, rose to defend Islam. Many of them claimed
and claim that the tension between reason and belief so often invoked in
different Christian theologies simply does not exist in Islam. And the
argument was reversed: Christianity, according to ‘Abduh, rests on belief in
the irrational. ‘Abduh did admit a possible divergence of religion and reason
in Islam. But according to him, any potential conflict was easily resolved:
“The adherents to the Islamic faith – except for a negligible few – agree that
if reason and (religious) tradition conflict one should follow reason.”11
So according to an overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars, the
central tenets of Islam are “more reasonable” than those of Christianity.
Here ‘Abduh probably underrated or downplayed the number of the
“negligible few” dissenters. In any case, for him reason was embodied in the
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first place in the natural sciences. But reason also had to reign in metaphysics.
The unity of God is a more reasonable proposition than the dogma of the
Trinity; the dogma that God’s son had died on the cross defies human
reason. Furthermore, ‘Abduh criticised the fact that Christian doctrine is
based on Christ’s miracles and that it teaches its adherents to keep aloof
from worldly things – both stances contradict reason. So we find that Pope
Benedict XVI and Muhammad ‘Abduh – more than a hundred years apart
– take contradictory but symmetrical positions. Each finds his own religion
superior because it can be shown to be more “reasonable”.
In both cases, the main addressee is not the “religious Other”. When
Muhammad ‘Abduh, the mufti of Egypt, wrote his treatise, there were
very few non-Muslims who read him. One of these must have been Ignaz
Goldziher (1850–1921), secretary of the Israelitish community of Budapest,
and the foremost European authority on Islam at the time. Goldziher’s
relation to Judaism was problematic, and his view of Christianity even more
sceptical. He had met ‘Abduh personally in Cairo in 1873–74. He wrote
very much in Abduh’s line of thought:
During these weeks, I so much assimilated the Mohammedan spirit,
that in the end I was convinced that I was myself a Mohammedan.
I found that this was the only religion, which even in its official
doctrinal shape and formulation could satisfy philosophical brains.
My ideal was to elevate Judaism to a similar level. Islam, I learnt
by experience, was the only religion, in which superstition and
pagan rudiments are not countered by rationalism but by orthodox
doctrine.12
But Muhammad ‘Abduh’s message addressed neither a European public
nor the Coptic reader in Egypt. The implied recipient was the enlightened
Muslim intellectual inside and outside Egypt, who spoke Arabic. This type
of discourse is normally in the first place self-assertive: it addresses the
community of co-believers, and it is designed to strengthen their belief and
their cohesion. This, in my opinion, is also true for Pope Benedict’s lecture.
However, with the latter – more than a hundred years after Muhammad
‘Abduh’s death – globalism had struck, and the more polemical parts of a
lecture delivered in the provincial German town of Regensburg reached a
Muslim public worldwide within hours. We all know the consequences:
Muslims reacted with a remarkable Open Letter to the Pope (signed by thirtyeight Muslim scholars, dated 13 October 2006), and a second letter called
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A Common Word Between Us and You, signed by 138 Muslim scholars and
directed not only to the Pope but also to twenty-two Orthodox patriarchs,
archbishops and metropolitans; to four Protestant and Anglican bishops;
to the Secretary General of the World Council of Churches; and to the
“leaders of all Christian Churches” (13 October 2007 = ‘Id al-Fitr 1428).
There are numerous other discursive devices to “prove” religious
superiority. Let me add one other instance. Religious superiority is often
invoked by claiming to have a better, meaning superior, idea of who or what
God really is. This is often expressed in endless discussions – mostly amongst
Christians, I think – of whether Muslims, Christians and Jews believe in the
same God or not. Post-Holocaust Christian theology in Europe was eager to
emphasise the dependence of Christianity on Judaism, the relative autarchy
of the Jewish religion, and the privileged closeness of Christianity to Judaism.
In this vein, the German Jesuit, Felix Körner, argued that whereas Christians
and Muslims cannot be said to believe in the same God, it is appropriate to
say that Christians and Jews do.13 The aspect of superiority is clearly visible:
Jews and Christians have the better, the “truer” image of God, which they
share, and which Islam prevents Muslims from attaining.

2. Beyond Superiority and Exclusivism: the “Religious Other”
Whereas in Islam and Christianity there are and have always been strong
currents that insist on the superior character of their own truths, in modern
times, there are growing tendencies to assure the “religious Other” of a
partial overlapping of truths and to stress this partial agreement in a gesture
of inclusivism. Differences are not denied but recalibrated. This also has a
dialectic of its own: it is admitted that the teachings of the “other religion”,
the wrong one, are not completely false, especially if interpreted in the light
of the tenets of the speaker’s religion. This often works in a retroactive way.
Christianity could not but accept parts of Judaism; Islam could not but
share parts of Judaism and Christianity. But Christianity for a long time
accepted Jewish scripture only if it was interpreted in a Christological way.
Similarly, many contemporary Muslim religious scholars judge the validity
of Christian and Jewish scripture by the measure of their compatibility with
the Qur’an and hadith.
This official inclusivist emphasis on a partial inter-religious agreement
usually serves a dialogical aim. A good example is the concept of an
“Abrahamic tradition”. The construction of an Abrahamic unity between
Islam, Christianity and Judaism was foreshadowed by the Qur’anic concept
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of the “religion of Ibrahim” (millat Ibrahim, for example, sura 2:130) as well
as by the concept of Ibrahim as a hanif Muslim (for example, sura 3:65–
70). Ibrahim’s monotheist religion was in a way an Islam before the term
existed. Ibrahim’s religion existed before the Qur’an had been revealed and
before the Prophet Muhammad was born. This had its legal consequences
in the concept of dhimma (covenant of protection) in Islam. It was taken
up or reinvented much later, mainly by Christians and was, as far as I know,
only unfolded as a possible starting point for dialogue between Muslims,
Christians and Jews in the twentieth century. Names like Louis Massignon
(1883–1962) and Youakim Mubarac (1924–95) come to mind. The bestknown modern proponent of the construction of an “Abrahamic” bond
between the monotheist religions is possibly Pope John XXIII in Vatican II
with his famous statement on Abraham in Nostra Aetate:
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the
one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful,
the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take
pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees,
just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in
linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge
Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honour Mary,
His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In
addition, they await the Day of Judgement, when God will render
their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead.
Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through
prayer, almsgiving and fasting.
Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities
have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges
all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding
and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of
all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and
freedom.14
In this statement, the Pope acknowledged for the first time that the free
choice of religion was a fundamental human right – even in the Roman
Catholic Church. There was salvation outside the Church; there was even
salvation outside Christianity.
There is a certain analogy between this “Abrahamic tradition” and
what in modern Muslim terminology are often called the three “heavenly
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religions” (al-adyan al-samawiyya), a term that stresses the similarities more
than the differences between the three monotheist religions. I must confess
that I do not know how old this term is, but it seems to me to be fairly
modern.
A further element of constructing an inter-religious monotheist bond
was and is the fight against a common enemy. This enemy was, for a certain
period, militant communism. After the downfall of state-controlled
socialism, the perceived ideological positions of the common enemy were
mainly agnosticism, materialism and atheism. To this triad, secularism very
often has to be added. While it has to be admitted that a common enemy
can be a powerful element in forging a unified front, it is less clear whether
a pluralist approach to religion will gain anything by marginalising and
vilifying these positions. Be this as it may, it is pleasing to see that at a time
when dialogue has become a byword for tolerance and peace, there are
specialised learned journals from both sides of the religious divide that deal
exclusively with questions of Muslim–Christian dialogue: Islamochristiana
(Rome) and the Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies
(Amman) are just two examples. The “religious Other” – a term which
would have been incomprehensible a hundred years ago – is on its way to
becoming part of Christian and Muslim theology.
There are many theological initiatives from both sides to transcend
the discourse of superiority and to replace or at least complement it with
a different approach.15 I will not go into the obvious similarities between
Muslim tasawwuf and Christian mysticism. That would be too vast a
subject. Instead, I have selected four of the lesser-known attempts to bridge
the inter-religious gap:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The anima naturaliter Christiana and the fitra, that is, the concept of
Islam as encompassing all monotheist religions.
The concept of an “anonymous Christian” in Vatican II theology, and
the muslim / mu’min difference in modernist Muslim exegesis.
The call for a Christian recognition of Muhammad as a prophet.
The self-view of Muslims as an umma wasat (“a moderate
community”) and Muslim pluralism.

i. The anima naturaliter Christiana and the fitra
Church father Tertullianus (d. after 220 ce) developed the doctrine of a
“naturally Christian soul” (anima naturaliter Christiana). According to
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Tertullianus, some pagans show by their behaviour that deep in their hearts
they believe in God’s unity, in the immortality of the soul and in the existence
of evil spirits. They share, therefore, major Christian tenets. Their soul is, as
it were, naturally Christian, independent of their professed religion. In the
Middle Ages in Europe, some saw in the Roman pagan poet Vergilius (d. 19
bc) an example of just such a “naturally Christian soul”. This concept was
taken much further in the twentieth century by Karl Rahner’s development
of the idea of an “anonymous Christian” (see point 2).
I see in the Islamic concept of fitra a certain analogy with Tertullianus’s
“naturally Christian soul”. According to a well-known hadith, every human
being is born in the fitra: the inborn religious predisposition of every child.
Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 ce) explains:
I saw that the Christian children grow up in Christianity, and that
the Jewish children grow up in Judaism and that the Muslim children
grow up in Islam. Every child is born in the fitra, then his parents
make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian. And my innermost
feeling reached out to find the truth of the original fitra.16
Such texts imply that every child’s predisposition or inborn nature is
Muslim; every child has an anima naturaliter Islamica, so to speak. It is only
the environment, that is, the parents, who imbue it with a deviant belief.

ii. The Concept of an “Anonymous Christian” in Vatican II Theology,
and the Muslim / mu’min Difference in Modernist Muslim Exegesis
The concept of an “anonymous Christian” was developed by the German
Jesuit, Karl Rahner (1904–84). All salvation is through Christ. However,
people who have never heard the Gospel or even rejected it might still
be saved through Christ, and could therefore be called “anonymous
Christians”, Rahner suggested. This concept became part of the declarations
of the Vatican II (1964), which stated:
Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who through no fault
of their own do not know the gospel of Christ of his Church, yet
sincerely seek God and, moved by grace, strive by their deeds to do
His will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience
(Lumen Gentium).17
This inclusivism is at present a widespread inter-religious position in
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Europe. Non-Christians “can have the salvific grace of God, through Christ,
although they may never have heard of the Christian revelation”, nor of the
cross, the Trinity, incarnation or resurrection.
This doctrine came under fire from two directions. Firstly, there was the
traditional Catholic view, protesting that “biblical Christianity is true and
other religions are not”. After Vatican II, some groups even separated from
the Catholic Church, and often gave this very inclusivism as one of their
reasons. Secondly, there was the liberal voice from inside and outside the
Catholic Church that found this idea possibly well-meant but paternalistic
in the extreme. Hans Küng stated, “It would be impossible to find anywhere
in the world a sincere Jew, Muslim or atheist who would not regard the
assertion that he is an ‘anonymous Christian’ as presumptuous.”18 John
Hick agreed with him by criticising Karl Rahner’s notion of an “anonymous
Christian” as “an honorary status granted unilaterally to people who have
not expressed any desire for it”.
The Syrian scholar, Mohamad Shahrour (b. 1938) developed an idea
somewhat analogous to Karl Rahner’s concept, in his book al-Islam wa-liman.19 This book – famous in the eyes of some Muslims, notorious in the eyes
of others – distinguishes between the notions of islam and iman, of Muslim
and mu’min. He vigorously contests the widely accepted position that the
word islam in the Qur’anic text more or less equals iman. For Mohamad
Shahrour, these are two radically different concepts: islam designates the
universal religion of mankind in which Muslims, Christians, Jews and other
peoples of good faith are united. All mankind of good will is muslim, all are
members of this all-embracing one religion (din) called Islam. This is true not
only for Jews and Christians, but also valid for most (or all?) other religions,
such as Buddhism and Hinduism.20 Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” seems
close to Shahrour’s concept of being Muslim without realising it. It would
be possible to speak of an “anonymous Muslim”, though Shahrour never
does so. Still, the reasoning behind Rahner’s and Shahrour’s concepts is
rather similar: many Christians limit paradise to Christians only; all others
go to hell. In the same way, most Muslims confine paradise to their own
religion while all others are condemned to the eternal fire. In reality, for
Shahrour, all people of good will who follow their natural universal religion
have to be called “Muslims” and therefore can enter paradise.21 On the
other hand, what people call “Islam” today should, according to Shahrour’s
understanding of the Qur’anic text, be called “Iman”. The “five pillars of
Islam”, in the sense of the five religious duties of the followers of the Prophet
Muhammad, should be called the “five pillars of Iman”, and the specificity
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of him who was heretofore called a Muslim is guaranteed in that he is a
Mu’min. Islam consists of the belief in God and in the Day of Judgement
and thus comes close to the concept of an Abrahamic monotheism.
An early predecessor of Shahrour was al-Ghazali. In his book The Decisive
Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Clandestine Apostasy22 he speaks of
non-Muslims who can be excused for not adopting Islam:
Those whom the call i.e. to Islam, SW has not reached are of three
kinds. The first kind are those who have never heard the name of
Muhammad, they are excused; the second kind are those who have
heard his name and his virtue and his miracles and who live close to
the Muslim land and have contact with them, they are the unbelievers
and the heretics; and there is a third group between them. They have
heard the name Muhammad and have not heard of his qualities and
traits, but they have from their earliest youth heard that a treacherous
liar named Muhammad claimed to be a prophet. Those belong in my
view to the first kind. Because they have heard his name and at the
same time the opposite of his qualities and that does not motivate
them to further enquiries. That means that most Christians from the
Rum and of the land of the Turks will be covered by God’s mercy.23
The first and the third group can in the hereafter expect God’s mercy without
professing Islam.
Shahrour’s method was criticised by many – the best-known and most
competent among his critics was probably the Egyptian, Nasr Hamid Abu
Zayd (b. 1943).24 Nevertheless, Shahrour can serve as an example for a bold
revisionism. He certainly is one of a new brand of Muslim intellectuals in
the public sphere who have led to a “collapse of earlier, hierarchical notions
of religious authority based on claims to the mastery of fixed bodies of
religious texts”.25

iii. The Call for a Christian Recognition of Muhammad as a Prophet
There is a long-standing complaint among Muslim theologians that
Christianity did not and does not acknowledge the prophethood of
Muhammad, while the Qur’an does recognise the prophethood of Jesus.
In recent times, some Protestant theologians have argued that Christians
should acknowledge Muhammad’s prophethood. One of them is the
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German theologian Reinhard Leuze in his book Christianity and Islam.26
Another, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, wrote:
I myself – after studying the history of the Islamic and the Christian
movements and having friends in both groups – am not able to think
of any reason that one might reasonably have for denying that God
has played in human history a role in and through the Qur’an, in the
Muslim case, comparable to the role of Christ in the Christian case
in and through Christ.27
The most famous proponent of such a view, however, seems to be the
controversial Swiss Catholic theologian, Hans Küng (b.1928), whose
authority to teach Catholic theology was revoked by the Vatican. Since
1995 he has been President of the Foundation for a Global Ethic (“Stiftung
Weltethos”). He wrote:
If the Catholic Church after the declaration on the non-Christian
religions in Vatican II (1964) … ‘also sees the Muslims with great
respect who pray to the one and only God … who spoke to mankind’
– then the same Church – and all Christian Churches – should …
see the one person with great respect whose name is not mentioned
in that declaration out of embarrassment, although he and he alone
led the Muslims to worship this one God and although God spoke
through him, Muhammad the Prophet.28
We all know that Hans Küng does not represent Catholic mainstream
theology – but I find it difficult to contradict him.

iv. The Self-View of Muslims as an umma wasat (“a Moderate Community”)
and Muslim Pluralism
A complete pluralism is reached when some modern Muslim exegetes offer
a new interpretation of Qur’anic verses, such as 2:143 and 5:66 that describe
righteous Muslims as constituting a “moderate community” (umma
wasat) and righteous Jews and Christians as a “balanced community”
(umma muqtasida). “Taken together, these verses clearly suggest that it
is subscription to some common standard of righteousness and ethical
conduct that determines the salvific nature of a religious community
and not the denominational label it chooses to wear”.29 The Indonesian
scholar Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) used to stress in his exegesis the
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importance of sura 2:62: “Surely they that believe, and those of Jewry, and
the Christians, and those Sabeans, whoso believes in God and the Last Day,
and works righteousness – their wage awaits them with their Lord, and no
fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow.”30 In his view, this and other
Qur’anic verses show that all non-Muslims who believe in God could be
recompensed by paradise. He was convinced that not only Jews, Christians
and the mysterious “Sabeans”, but also Hindus, Buddhists and adherents of
other religions would find grace with God. He thus comes close to Mohamad
Shahrour’s interpretation of the Qur’anic word “Mu’min”.31 This in some
way reflects the reality of Indonesian society. Hamka (Haji Abdulmalik
ibn Abdulkarim Amrullah, d. 1981), also an Indonesian exegete, emphasises
in his commentary that religious sectarianism, exclusion of other religious
groups and attitudes of superiority are far removed from the original aim of
religion to attain truth. Those who believe that only they possess the truth
and that all others err, will only create strife and will not achieve any good for
others. Sura 2:62 aims above all for a peaceful coexistence of all religions.32
Sura 2:62 has for some time been interpreted in a fairly inclusivist or
even pluralist way. The Bombay-born scholar Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872–
1953) commented on this verse in his translation The Holy Qur’an. Text,
Translation and Commentary (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers: Lahore,
1938):
The point of the verse is that Islam does not teach an exclusivist
doctrine, and it is not meant exclusively for one people… Even the
modern organized Christian churches, though they have been,
consciously or unconsciously, influenced by the ‘Zeitgeist’, including
the historical fact of Islam, yet cling to the idea of Vicarious
Atonement which means that all who do not believe in it or who
lived previously to the death of Christ are at a disadvantage spiritually
before the throne of Allah. The attitude of Islam is entirely different.
Islam existed before the preaching of Muhammad on this earth…
Its teaching (submission to Allah’s will) has been and will be the
teaching of Religion for all time and for all peoples.33
The official Saudi Qur’an text, along with an English version, was prepared
by the King Fahd Complex in Medina in 1990. It used Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s
translation as well as his commentary with the fairly inclusivist exegesis of
sura 2:62. However, the revised edition of the Qur’an, printed in Medina
by the same King Fahd Complex in 2009, chose two translators from
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Medina and radically changed the explicative commentary. In a staunchly
traditionalist and exclusivist note to sura 2:62, the reader was warned that
this verse had been abrogated.
A well-known Catholic theologian, Christian W. Troll, comes to a
sceptical judgement on the overall merits of Yusuf Ali’s stance versus Judaism
and Christianity, in spite of the latter’s inclusivist tendency:
What many readers may well object to is that Yusuf Ali repeatedly
attributes the fact that Christians did or do not accept key teachings
of Islam proposed to them to morally reprehensible motives on their
part. Little room is made for honest dissent. In this respect, Abdullah
Yusuf Ali’s notes remain pre-modern in a negative sense.34
Finally, the South African Muslim Farid Esack is determined “to find a
space in my own theology for those who are not Muslim, yet are deeply
committed to seeing the grace and compassion of an All-loving Creator
expressed in the righteous and caring works of ordinary men and women”.
He also criticises some Muslim movements as “anti-everyone-other-thanourselves”.35 My impression is that, in general, contemporary Muslim
commentators who write in Arabic are much less inclined to admit that Jews
and Christians have a chance of salvation than those who write in Turkish,
Persian or Indonesian. In the eyes of many Arab mainstream exegetes, the
link between the exclusive superiority of Islam, on the one hand, and the
certitude that non-Muslims are doomed to eternal damnation, on the other,
is obvious. There is also a link between a militant exegesis and takfir (charge
of unbelief ). The comparatively inclusivist position of Muhammad ‘Abduh
and Rashid Rida toward sura 2:62 was and is, in the eyes of the Academy of
Islamic research of al-Azhar, a “deformation” for which only “some heretics”
can be responsible.36
Let me close this paper with a prediction: new Muslim approaches toward
their religion and toward the religions of others will come mainly from
Islam in the periphery (India, Indonesia or Malaysia) or from the Muslim
diaspora. They will probably not come from Cairo or Rabat, let alone from
Mecca or Medina. The person in whose honour we have assembled here and
the institution that hosts us both seem to confirm this point.
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The Political, Social and Technological
Construction of Understanding:
An Essay in Analysis of the Disruptive
Mark Sedgwick

Understandings of religions, like many other understandings, can be analysed
in terms of their production and in terms of their reception. The analysis
of the production of understandings of Islam is relatively well advanced.
Scholars working in the ancient Muslim tradition have been studying the
relevant texts for centuries, and scholars working in the contemporary
Western tradition have been studying many of the relevant texts, histories
and biographies since the nineteenth century. The study of the reception
of understandings of Islam is far less advanced. Its contrast with the study
of understandings of Christianity in Europe is striking. The study of the
work and biography of the Protestant theologians of the Reformation, for
example, was really the enterprise of the nineteenth century; modern studies
generally focus not on the production of Protestantism but on its reception.
This essay examines the reception of one particular understanding of
Islam: that typified by the name of Muhammad ‘Abduh. At one point in
the nineteenth century, this understanding of Islam appeared to be in the
ascendant in Egypt. Today, this is no longer the case. Similar understandings
persist and have become more sophisticated but are not in the ascendant.
Taking a historical approach and focusing on political, social and
technological factors, this essay attempts to explain why.
This essay’s inspiration is the work of François Guizot, now remembered
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principally as a nineteenth-century French prime minister, but also one of
Europe’s greatest historians. Guizot’s work was an inspiration not only for
European thinkers such as Karl Marx,1 but also for ‘Abduh, and it is strange
that so little attention is paid to it today.
In his Histoire Générale de la Civilisation en Europe, published in
1838, Guizot challenged the then standard focus on political history by
demonstrating the interrelation between three varieties of history: the
political, the intellectual – which he saw as being partly determined by
the political but also as helping to determine the political – and the social,
which he saw as both determining and being determined by the other two.
Marx and his followers emphasised the impact of the social (and especially
of the social’s economic element) on the political and the intellectual.
This essay retains both Guizot’s emphasis on the political as an
independent variable and a somewhat Marxist emphasis on the economic
element of the social. It does not, however, understand class in purely
economic terms. Instead, class is understood in the broader sense of a social
group defined both “horizontally” (by economic and occupational factors)
and “vertically” (by social and cultural criteria). Among others, Mattei
Dogan has argued for this approach, pointing out that most societies are
structured in this way:
A country in which there were only vertical cleavages would lose its
unity. If a large number of horizontal cleavages were superimposed
without counterbalancing vertical cleavages, the society would
experience social unrest. The fabric of a well-established democracy
is formed by the weave of cleavages.2
Dogan was especially interested in well-established democracies, but his
argument holds true for other types of polity.
In addition to looking at the political and socio-economic aspects of the
reception of ‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam, this essay will look at a further
variable that neither Guizot nor Marx saw as having much independent
importance, but which many recent studies have emphasised in various
contexts: media of communication.

The Political
The relationship between ‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam and political
history is relatively easy to explain. Initially, ‘Abduh and his understandings
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were promoted by the political – by the khedive who appointed ‘Abduh
to his post as mufti, and by Lord Cromer, who sponsored ‘Abduh after he
lost the support of the khedive. The khedive’s exact motives for appointing
‘Abduh are not known, but were probably more political than intellectual:
an expectation that ‘Abduh would be a reliable and efficient administrator.
There must also have been, however, an intellectual element, since the
khedive can hardly have been ignorant of ‘Abduh’s general intellectual
position. Cromer’s support was certainly also politically motivated, but
there was evidently an intellectual sympathy between the two men.3
Political patronage did not last. First the khedive turned against ‘Abduh,
as it was felt that he was too close to Cromer, and then Cromer’s successor,
Sir Eldon Gorst, sought a rapprochement with the khedive and so turned
against ‘Abduh’s former associates, who themselves became opponents of
English influence. After a brief period during which some of those former
associates and their sympathisers held powerful positions, political power
promoted other forms of Islam: nationalist, mobilisational, revivalist.
‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam, then, has not enjoyed political support in
the Arab world for a century. However, variations on those understandings
are now beginning to attract some political support in Europe, as well as in
Tunisia and, perhaps, Syria.
The political aspect of the story, then, is well known and easily told.4

The Social
A similar approach to the one taken below was used in a short article in
MERIP Reports in 1977 by Judith Gran, to explain two very different
attitudes towards women in Egypt: the “pro-emancipationist” and the
conservative. Gran proposed that these two attitudes were “associated with
a particular social class and a particular nationalist ideology”. The “proemancipationist” was “associated with the upper classes and upper-middle
classes”, with the Hizb al-Umma and the Wafd. “Conservative attitudes”, on
the other hand, were associated with the lower-middle class, with the Hizb
al-Watani, the Society of the Muslim Brothers and the Free Officers.5
Although Gran was careful to use the word “associated” (and needed to,
since Tala‘t Harb was an opponent of Qasim Amin in so far as questions of
gender were concerned), she also suggested explanations for the associations
she had observed. Men of the upper classes and upper-middle classes
benefitted from Egypt’s trade links with the West, Gran suggested, and as
such they were especially receptive to Western values; as time passed, the
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sphere of their wives’ activities expanded. The men of the lower-middle class,
in contrast, suffered economically from those same links, and became more
hostile to the West and to Western values. As they moved from householdbased artisanal production to employment outside the home, the sphere of
their wives’ activities decreased.6
Gran’s economic explanation is interesting but not wholly convincing,
and may be open to the charge of “crude materialism” made in another
context by Eric Davis. In the context of studies of radical Islamism, Davis
has described Gran’s type of approach as “anaemic”:
Ideology is either viewed in terms of crude materialism or in terms of
psycho-social needs. In one instance, it is a reflection of class interests
... and in another, a reflection of ... social strains ... This means that
the internal structure of Islamic radical thought, causes underlying
its changes over time, its emotive power, and the political constraints
and advantages it bestows on its adherents are never fully discussed.7
The present essay, however, is limited in its ambitions. It does not aim to
investigate the ideology or understandings of ‘Abduh or of his heirs, on
which much work has already been done. It does not aim to investigate
the emotive power of those understandings, which might be an interesting
project. It does not examine the relationship between ideology, economic
interests and psycho-social need. It merely assumes that such a relationship
exists, and looks at socio-economic factors underlying changes in ideology
over time by establishing a correlation between changes in classes and
changes in predominant understandings of Islam.

The Classes that Welcomed Muhammad ‘Abduh
Initially, ‘Abduh’s work appealed to at least two groups, one in Egypt and
one in Syria. These groups can be seen as a single class and understood as a
social group defined both vertically and horizontally. Why ‘Abduh’s work
appealed to these two groups is not difficult to see, but it falls beyond the
scope of this essay, which is more interested in the fact of the association of
particular understandings with particular classes, and in the consequences
(not the causes) of that fact.
One of the groups to which ‘Abduh’s work evidently appealed was
the group to which he himself belonged, along with his closest associate,
Sa‘d Zaghlul, and other members of the Muslim Benevolent Society to
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which both ‘Abduh and Zaghlul devoted much time in the 1890s.8 The
second group was that for which ‘Abduh initially composed his Risalat altawhid (“The theology of unity”): young men studying at the Sultaniyya,
an ambitious modern school in Beirut that aimed to rival the European
and American schools that had recently proved so successful.9 ‘Abduh’s
understandings may also have appealed to other groups: he was, for example,
clearly appreciated by that section of the Egyptian general public which
attended his Azhar lectures. We know little about this public, however, save
that it was numerous, educated and included Christians.10 This does not give
us enough to go much further.
The class in Egypt to which ‘Abduh and Zaghlul and their friends on
the board of the Muslim Benevolent Society belonged was associated more
with the ṭarbush than the turban. Its typical member was a lawyer or a judge
– and ‘Abduh had of course been a senior judge in the National Court
system before becoming mufti. Vertically, it was defined by its familiarity
with European languages, thought and culture on the one hand, and by its
attachment to Egypt on the other. Horizontally, it was defined by its growing
prosperity: this was the small Egyptian professional class that had emerged
to serve the modern state that had been established during the nineteenth
century. The social origins of its members were often modest, but their rise
put them in touch with the highest horizontal levels, as Zaghlul’s marriage
to Safiyya Fahmi (daughter of Prime Minister Mustafa Fahmi) indicated.
The group found at the Sultaniyya was similar. It was defined vertically
in exactly the same way that the Egyptian group was: on the one hand, by
familiarity with European languages, thought and culture. This familiarity
was one of the main objectives of the Sultaniyya. On the other hand, the
group was defined by its attachment to the Syrian version of the Ottoman
order: this, again, was one of the main objectives of the school, and the
main reason for establishing an alternative to the foreign schools in the
first place. It was, in ‘Abduh’s own words, the group that, having learned
modern European science and philosophy, might look at the ignorance of
the Muslim ‘ulama’ and turn away from Islam, regarding it as “a kind of old
thawb [garment] in which it is embarrassing to appear”.11 The horizontal
definition of the group is less clear. The school educated some children of
the Syrian elite, including seven members of Jerusalem’s Husayni family,12
but cannot have been a purely elite school, as the children of the elite were
hardly numerous enough to fill an entire school.
The two groups, then, seem to belong to the same class: the modern but
patriotic professional upper-middle class. This conclusion is similar to that
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reached by Gran. In fact, Gran traced the “pro-emancipationist” attitude to
women via this class, from ‘Abduh to graduates of the American University
in Cairo during the 1970s.13

The Disruptive Class
The professional upper-middle class is important in any society, save,
perhaps, in extremely authoritarian states of the sort established in some
places during the twentieth century, which did not really have such a class.
It was especially important in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century
because it was a rising class, increasing in numbers, wealth and power. In
other words, it was a “disruptive” class. The adjective is borrowed from
economics, where it is commonly applied to technology; for example, a
“disruptive technology” is a new invention that dramatically undercuts
or destroys the market for an existing product.14 Classic examples include
the railway and the motorcar, which destroyed the stage-coach business
and made riding horses a leisure activity; the digital watch, which made
mechanical watches a luxury item; and the personal computer, which
entirely destroyed the typewriter. A disruptive technology makes waves in
a way that other technologies do not. Likewise, the new professional uppermiddle class made waves in the late nineteenth-century Egyptian and Arab
world. Most importantly, it disrupted the ‘ulama’, destroying their former
semi-monopoly of intellectual life, and taking over many of their sources of
income and prestige. As a disruptive class, it was in a position that allowed
it easily to take the initiative. Faced with disruption, established classes (like
established technologies) are, by definition, on the defensive: weakened,
and with little room for manoeuvre.
Conceived horizontally, the Egyptian upper-middle class also included,
in the words of Juan Cole, “government officials, large landowners, foreign
investors, and large-scale entrepreneurs”.15 Of these, the professional uppermiddle class and the class of foreign investors were the most disruptive.
Large landowners were important but not disruptive, as they had been
important since the days of Mehmet ‘Ali Pasha, or perhaps since the
eighteenth century.16 Foreign investors, though disruptive, were not of
great importance for Islam. Large-scale entrepreneurs – for whatever reason
– do not feature in any accounts of the intellectual life of the period, save
occasionally as donors.
The disruptive class of ‘Abduh’s time was closely allied with the then
disruptive medium of communications: the newspaper. As the work of Ami
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Ayalon and others has shown, there was a remarkable overlap between the
group that had gathered around Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the 1870s and
the creation of an independent political press in Egypt.17 In later years too,
the newspaper was important to ‘Abduh: not just Al-Manar, but also AlMu‘ayyad, edited by ‘Abduh’s friend, ‘Ali Yusuf.18 Why a disruptive class is
often associated with a disruptive medium (today’s such class is associated
with the new media, including social media) is a question that falls
beyond the scope of this essay. It does, however, often seem to be the case.
Newspapers were the perfect medium for the transmission of ‘Abduh’s work
– they reached other members of his class, and they encouraged relatively
thoughtful, non-professional reading.

The Rise of the Urban Working Class
and of the Lower-Middle Class
The professional upper-middle class and the newspaper remained
important in Egypt after 1921, but neither remained disruptive. The
early twentieth century saw the emergence of two new disruptive classes
as the urbanisation of Egypt began. Slightly more than a third of the
population of Cairo in 1907 had been born elsewhere, presumably in the
countryside.19 An urban working class, though small in comparison with
the industrial proletariats of European capitals, was developing. The 1907
census reported 280 thousand Egyptians engaged in manufacturing; that
of 1917 reported 420 thousand.20 This presumably reflected the impact of
British demand during the First World War. At the same time, a lowermiddle class was emerging: school teachers, minor officials and university
students. Primary-school enrolment increased from 193 thousand in
1926 to 1.08 million in 1941,21 and numbers of school teachers increased
accordingly. By 1941, there were nine thousand university students
in Cairo.22 Although this was not a substantial number in itself, it was
disruptive in a society that had only recently acquired a modern university.
Students were especially prominent in later years in the Muslim Brothers,
comprising a remarkable 24 per cent of those arrested in 1954.23
This lower-middle class was the new disruptive class, sometimes joined
by the new urban working class: demonstrations and strikes became a
regular part of Egyptian political life after 1919, and especially from the
1930s onwards, led by the lower-middle class (including students) which
was sometimes joined by the small urban working class. Joel Beinin and
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Zachary Lockman have shown the disruptive impact of these classes on the
society and politics of the period.24
These new disruptive classes both differed from the professional uppermiddle class horizontally, in terms of their economic position and their
relationship to political power. They also differed vertically. They were
familiar with European languages, thought, and culture, but superficially so,
having in general been educated in Arabic-language schools rather than the
French- and English-language schools favoured by the upper-middle classes.
They knew of European culture and thought, but only in outline.
The work of ‘Abduh and his immediate heirs was evidently not
particularly attractive to either of these new disruptive classes. The question
of why this should be, once again, falls beyond the scope of this essay. We
can deduce that it was the case partly from the fact that the most vocal and
destructive opposition to ‘Abduh during his final years as mufti had come
from Himarat Munyati (“Donkey of my desire”),25 a newspaper whose
readership probably came from precisely these classes. That ‘Abduh’s work
did not appeal to them can be deduced by looking at the understanding of
Islam that they clearly did find attractive: that of the Muslim Brothers. The
Muslim Brothers are sometimes seen as linked to ‘Abduh through Rashid
Rida, but the analysis of Muhammad Haddad – that Rida’s claim to be
‘Abduh’s successor served to legitimise him but lacked much real basis –
is entirely convincing.26 ‘Abduh and the Muslim Brothers had some points
in common, of course, but the differences between them are surely more
significant.
Hasan al-Banna was a school teacher, and thus of the lower-middle class.
The leadership of the mature Society of the Muslim Brothers had a similar
profile: that of what Richard Mitchell has called “an emergent and selfconscious Muslim middle class”.27 The Muslim Brothers was not, however,
just a lower-middle class organisation. Its first members in Ismailia were
workers, and in later years the Muslim Brothers emphasised that most of its
members came from the working class.28 The nascent workers’ movement,
where the Muslim Brothers competed with the Communists, was one of
the Muslim Brothers’ major fields of activity.29 However, in Cairo it was
reported to be “the student, the civil servant, the teacher, the clerk and office
worker” that predominated, as well as “the professional in their Western
suit”.30 Since the quality of the suits is not described, it is hard to say whether
their wearers came from the older upper-middle class or the newer lowermiddle class – most sources fail to make a distinction between the two.
Although there were probably some members of the upper-middle class in
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the higher ranks of the Muslim Brothers, the lower-middle class seems to
have been the most important group, just as the urban workers were the
most important group in the active base. Certainly some members of the
Muslim Brothers were from rural areas, but though they were of some
significance numerically, peasants were almost impossible to organise, and
so were not of major importance.
The Muslim Brothers were not, of course, equally attractive to all: some
members of the lower-middle and working classes also evidently contented
themselves with conventional Islamic practice, while others adopted the
relaxed understanding of religion that modernisation theory would predict.31
The Muslim Brothers, however, were the new and notable expression of the
understanding of Islam favoured by the disruptive classes of the period, just
as the Islam of ‘Abduh had been a new and notable expression in the earlier
period. In a sense, the Muslim Brothers’ understanding of Islam was in itself
disruptive. And one of the established features of life it could not help but
disrupt was the understanding of Islam typified by ‘Abduh.
During this second period, additional media emerged. Egyptian Radio
started broadcasting in 1934 and Studio Misr was established in 1936,
marking the beginning of a major Egyptian film industry. The Muslim
Brothers themselves may be considered a sort of medium of communication:
the mass movement is also a communications network. These new media
are, once again, associated with the new disruptive classes. The case of
the Muslim Brothers has already been considered. Radio audiences came
predominantly from the same classes, with the urban working class listening
to the radio in cafés, and the lower-middle class perhaps even affording to
buy a radio set for use at home.32 The low price of cinema tickets also placed
film within the reach of the urban working class.33
The Muslim Brothers’ communications network promoted
understandings of Islam very different from those proposed by ‘Abduh.
Unlike the newspaper, the mass movement did not encourage reflection;
rather, it encouraged conformity. The other two media were probably
neutral. The black-and-white musical is not a suitable medium for intellectual
or religious purposes; Egyptian Radio remained under British control until
1947,34 and its religious broadcasting was presumably conservative.
The changed class and media configurations in Egypt during the first
half of the twentieth century explain the changed status of ‘Abduh’s
understanding of Islam during that period. Whatever else happened,
‘Abduh’s understanding could hardly have maintained its ascendency
against the rise of the new disruptive classes. Heirs of ‘Abduh such as Taha
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Husayn and ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq were active in this period, but their voices
were in competition with new voices: not just the old voices of the ‘ulama’
that ‘Abduh’s voice had competed with, but the new and powerful voices of
the Muslim Brothers.

The Late Twentieth Century
Two further class shifts during the twentieth century may be identified.
One of these is the period of Arab nationalism typified by the presidency of
Gamal Abdel Nasser; the other is the period of the Islamic resurgence.
The greatest difference between the period of Arab nationalism and
the periods that preceded it was political, not social. The Nasserite state
established a monopoly on information and the public sphere, giving little
scope for dissenting voices. This was not so much a period in which a new
disruptive class appeared, then, as one in which earlier socio-economic
developments reached a political conclusion. The two disruptive classes of
the early twentieth century finally replaced the dominant classes of ‘Abduh’s
time, the lower-middle class leading and the urban working class following.
The urban working class had continued to expand, growing significantly
during the Second World War in response to the needs of the British war
effort as well as to the decline in imports,35 though this expansion was in
some ways temporary: the end of the Second World War brought mass
unemployment to those whom the war effort had employed.36
The class origin of Nasser’s army officers and senior officials is unclear,
but this group did not represent a new class. They portrayed themselves as
lower-middle class – in order to “solidify their populist base”, according
to Joel Gordon – but may not always have been as lower-middle class as
they seemed. They were not of the upper-class and upper-middle-class
backgrounds that had dominated the military academy before 1937, but
some were the sons of architects, engineers or judges.37 In horizontal terms,
they formed a new class as they established control over Egypt and began to
enjoy the fruits of that control, but in vertical terms there was less change.
Such change was delayed until subsequent generations. Power and prosperity
did not make the dominant class of Nasser’s Egypt any more interested in
European thought, unless Soviet ideology can be considered European.
Whatever understanding of Islam was attractive to the urban working
class of the 1960s, the Nasserite state’s monopoly on information in the
public sphere meant that the Islam that mattered was that of the section of
the lower-middle class that had taken power. As is well known, this might
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almost have been the understandings of the Muslim Brothers, to whom
many of the Free Officers had once been close. In the event, however, politics
intervened: the logic of the consolidation of power led to the suppression of
the Muslim Brothers, and thus to a silence in which the voices of the ‘ulama’
unexpectedly re-emerged.
The period of Arab nationalism was a continuation of the first period of
the twentieth century. The period of the Islamic resurgence that succeeded
it marked a new discontinuity, and coincided with the emergence of new
disruptive classes and of a new medium. It coincided also with the weakening
of the Nasserite state.
The new disruptive classes in Egypt were public-sector employees and
the urban poor. The urban poor had always existed, but the size of this class
increased dramatically during the last decades of the twentieth century, as
the total population of Egypt grew dramatically, driving urbanisation. Cairo
grew from about three million inhabitants in 1947 to about eight million
in 1976,38 and then to probably more than fifteen million by the end of the
century. Some of this increase reflected natural growth, but much – perhaps
most – came from rural migration. Reliable statistics do not exist, but it is
clear that many or most of these new Cairenes lived in poverty.
By many measures, Nasser’s industrialisation programme was not a
success, but it did create a massive new class of public-sector employees,
to which university students can be added. The nine thousand university
students of 1941 were in the lower-middle class; the three and a half million
Egyptians who graduated from universities and technical and vocational
institutes during the eight years between 1983 and 199139 were in a different
class, both horizontally and vertically.
As a result of employment guarantees dating from the 1960s, government
and public sector employment, as well as the tertiary education certificates
that gave access to them, grew steadily until, during the 1980s and ’90s,
about a third of Egypt’s labour force was working for the state in one way or
another.40 As the drain on the state budget of paying the salaries of so many
unproductive employees grew, inflation was allowed to erode the real value
of wages, which had never been high, and which fell by some 60 per cent
between 1981 and 1986, and continued to fall thereafter.41
Horizontally, these two disruptive classes differ: public-sector employees
and students enjoyed slightly more economic security and social status than
the urban poor. Vertically, however, they are more uniform, characterised
by poor education and, probably, an inherited religious practice and piety,
often of rural origin. That their education was poor is clear. It was the result
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of a dramatic increase in enrolments without commensurate increases
in funding, and of a shortage of qualified teachers – the pre-existing
educational system was relatively recent and not without its own problems
in the first place. The millions of university graduates, let alone the others,
had in most cases only limited knowledge of their own thought and culture,
and minimal familiarity with European languages, thought and culture.
The inherited religious practice and piety are harder to establish, but are
suggested by casual observation.
Again, the work of ‘Abduh and his successors was not attractive to
the new disruptive classes, and again, this can be seen by examining what
understanding of Islam was attractive. The Islam of the Muslim Brothers
clearly retained some appeal, though of course the Muslim Brothers of
the 1990s differed in many ways from the Muslim Brothers of the 1930s.
This time, the most striking development was the spread of public piety.
Congregations at Friday prayers spread beyond the mosque into the street.
For women, the hijab became almost universal. The period also saw the rise
of radical Islamism, but it was the hijab, not the suicide bomb, that became
the norm.
Like the Muslim Brothers of the earlier period, public piety during this
period only represents a particular understanding of Islam – that is, it is a
“proxy” for that understanding, not the essence of that understanding.
And like the Muslim Brothers themselves, it was not universal. Given
human diversity, an essence might be hard to find, and no understanding is
universal. Like the understanding of Islam of the Muslim Brothers, however,
the understanding of Islam for which public piety is a proxy was disruptive,
and was hardly compatible with the understanding of Islam typified by
‘Abduh.
Two new media are associated with this period. One, appearing towards
the end of the twentieth century, was satellite television. Its impact was
delayed. The other, appearing at the beginning of this period, was the cassette
tape: this, as in Iran, was highly disruptive, circumventing the state’s media
monopoly, and proving a highly efficient medium for the circulation of
revivalist preaching. Recorded preaching, like the communications network
of the mass movement, encourages conformity more than reflection.
The Islamic resurgence in Egypt was part of a global pattern of religious
resurgence which went beyond the Muslim world. This global religious
resurgence is a matter for another essay, but it will be noticed in passing that
it too may have a class basis. In Turkey, it is associated with the emergence
of new disruptive classes that successfully challenged the established
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secularist elite; in Israel, it is associated with the end of the dominance of
the Ashkenazi socialist elite; it may be associated with similar developments
in India and in the United States.

Conclusion
This essay reveals some fundamental reasons for the continuing limited
enthusiasm for the understandings of Islam which ‘Abduh’s name typifies;
understandings which had once been in the ascendant, encouraged by
the political, the disruptive classes, and the disruptive media of the late
nineteenth century. This does not mean, of course, that no other factors were
at work. Lest this essay seem overly deterministic or even simplistic, it should
be emphasised that its purpose is not to advance a complete explanation of
the waning of receptivity to ‘Abduh’s variety of understanding, but rather
to draw attention to certain factors which have had a significant impact on
Egyptian intellectual history.
Before ‘Abduh, the understandings of the ‘ulama’ reigned almost
unchallenged. What challenges there were – from the Wahhabis or the
Senussis, for example – came from the periphery and had little impact and
no political support in places such as Cairo. The rise of a new professional
upper-middle class, familiar with nineteenth-century European culture
and thought, was associated with the ascendency of new understandings of
Islam. These also received some political support, first from the khedive and
then from Lord Cromer.
During the first half of the twentieth century, as Cairo’s working class
and lower-middle class grew, it was the Islam of the Muslim Brothers that
was ascendant: not universal, but certainly disruptive, as were the classes
with which it was associated. This understanding did not receive political
support, but neither did the understanding of ‘Abduh receive the political
support it had once received. During the second half of the century, political
changes resulting from the establishment of the Nasserite state suppressed all
dissenting voices, whether those of the Muslim Brothers or of the remaining
advocates of the understandings typified by the name of ‘Abduh.
By the end of the twentieth century, it was no longer the industrial
working class and the lower-middle class that were growing, but the urban
poor and the class of underpaid public-sector employees. Although there is
no proxy for the understanding of Islam of these disruptive classes as obvious
as the Muslim Brothers was for that of the second period, public piety
seems the best proxy, and again this was disruptive, and again the disruptive
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understanding was very different from the understandings typified by
‘Abduh. Public piety was not promoted by the Egyptian state, but it did
receive some political support in the sense that the state was careful not to
affront the pious. For example, the state’s failure to intervene in support of
Nasr Abu Zayd was, in a sense, a form of political support for his opponents.
Whatever the merits of ‘Abduh’s understanding of Islam, an
understanding that appealed to the newspaper-reading upper-middle class
of the 1890s could hardly be expected to appeal to the industrial worker
listening to a member of the lower-middle class at a meeting of the Muslim
Brothers in 1941, nor to a member of the urban poor listening to a cassette
tape of a revivalist preacher in 1991.

the political, social and technological construction of understanding …

107

Notes
1. L. Siedentop, Introduction to François Guizot, The History of Civilisation in Europe
(1864) trans. W. Hazlitt (London: Penguin Books, 1997).
2. M. Dogan, “From Social Class and Religious Identity to Status Incongruence in PostIndustrial Societies”, Comparative Sociology 3, no. 2 (2004), pp. 166–67.
3. This section and the following paragraph are distilled from my book Muhammad
Abduh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).
4. Those interested in pursuing this aspect further should consult K. Dalacoura, Islam,
Liberalism and Human Rights (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 76–106, where an
argument similar to that made in this essay is developed, placing somewhat greater
emphasis on the political. I read Dalacoura only as this essay was about to go to press.
5. J. Gran, “Impact of the World Market on Egyptian Women”, MERIP Reports 58 (June
1977), p. 3.
6. Ibid. pp. 3–7.
7. E. Davis, “Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt”, in From Nationalism to Revolutionary
Islam, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: SUNY, 1985), p. 138.
8. L. Herrera, “Overlapping Modernities: From Christian Missionary to Muslim Reform
Schooling in Egypt”, CIAO Working Paper, 2001. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.
org/conf/mei01/hel01.html (Accessed: 8 February 2011).
9. J. Hanssen, Fin de siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 174.
10. M. Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), p. 84.
11. Muhammad ‘Abduh, Risala al-tawhid (Cairo: Matba‘a al-kubra al-amiriyya, 1897),
p. 153.
12. J. Hanssen, Fin de siècle Beirut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 175.
13. J. Gran, “Impact of the World Market”, MERIP Reports 58 (June 1977), pp. 4 and 6.
14. The term derives from J. L. Bower and C. M. Christensen, “Disruptive Technologies:
Catching the Wave” in Harvard Business Review 73, no. 1 (January–February 1995),
pp. 43–53.
15. J. R. Cole, “Feminism, Class, and Islam in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt”, International
Journal of Middle East Studies 13 (1981), p. 389.
16. P. Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism, Egypt 1760–1840 (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1979).
17. A. Ayalon, The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
18. It was Al-Mu‘ayyad who published Muhammad ‘Abduh’s response to Gabriel
Hanotaux.
19. N. Hanna, “The Urban History of Cairo around 1900”, in Historians in Cairo: Essays
in Honor of George Scanlon ed. J. Edwards (Cairo: AUC Press, 2002), p. 196.
20. Z. Lockman and J. Beinin, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and
the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),
p. 38.
21. D. M. Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 112.
22. Ibid. p. 119.
23. Davis, “Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt”, in From Nationalism to Revolutionary
Islam ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: SUNY, 1985), p. 142.
24. Z. Lockman and J. Beinin, Workers on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988).

108

the construction of belief

25. I. F. Gesink, “Beyond Modernism: Opposition and Negotiation in the Azhar Reform
Movement, 1870–1911” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Washington University, St.
Louis, 2000).
26. M. Haddad, “Les oeuvres de ‘Abduh : histoire d’une manipulation”, Institut de Belles
Lettres Arabes (Tunis) 60 (1997), pp. 197–222; and M. Haddad, “‘Abduh et ses
lecteurs: pour une histoire critique des lectures de M. ‘Abduh’”, Arabica 45 (1998),
pp. 22–49.
27. R. P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), p. 330.
28. Ibid. pp. 277–78.
29. Z. Lockman and J. Beinin, Workers on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), pp. 364–65.
30. R. P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), p. 330.
31. “Evidently” because this comment is based on informal recollections of family history
by contemporary Egyptians.
32. See, for example, discussion in V. Danielson, The Voice of Egypt: Umm Kulthum,
Arabic Song, and Egyptian Society in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997), p. 85.
33. Until 1941, when falling real wages made them difficult to afford, and arrangements
for cheaper access to Gone with the Wind were demanded on behalf of the workers. Z.
Lockman and J. Beinin, Workers on the Nile, p. 248, note 28.
34. P. Starkey, “Modern Egyptian Culture in the Arab World” in The Cambridge History
of Egypt, ed. M. W. Daly and C. F. Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998) vol. 2, p. 424.
35. Z. Lockman and J. Beinin, Workers on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), pp. 259–62.
36. Ibid. pp. 260–62.
37. J. Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 42.
38. Census figures taken from the Institution of Civil Engineers, Greater Cairo Wastewater
Project (1993), p. 5.
39. R. Assaad, “The Effects of Public Sector Hiring and Compensation Policies on the
Egyptian Labor Market”, The World Bank Economic Review 11, no. 1 (1997), p. 88.
40. Ibid. pp. 86–95.
41. Ibid. p. 92.

Believing and Belonging:
The Impact of Religion for “Muslim”
Adolescents in a Pluralistic Society –
Empirical Findings from Hamburg, Germany
Ursula Günther

Oddly enough, the paradox is one of our most
valuable spiritual possessions, while uniformity of
meaning is a sign of weakness. Hence, a religion
becomes inwardly impoverished when it loses or
waters down its paradoxes; but their multiplication
enriches it because only the paradox comes anywhere
near to comprehending the fullness of life.
C. G. Jung1

Introduction
“Reflexive modernity” or – speaking with Jürgen Habermas – “the postsecular situation” confronts the individual with a radical plurality of
meaning, including the challenge of living with the paradox and the end
of security-providing certainties presented by a central perspective. In
other words: certainties are replaced by possibilities. Polyphony turns out
to be the magic word. Unfortunately it does not endow individuals with
the necessary tools to deal with plurality in terms of decision-making. The
individual is compelled to engage in negotiations, which are accompanied
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by a permanent balancing, coordination and integration of conflicting
interests, loyalties, value and norm systems, and meanings. Processes of
reflexive questioning are often innovative since any loss of meaning is
accompanied by the development of new visions and patterns of action.
The field of religion and religiosity is not excluded from this development –
quite the contrary. Processes of pluralisation, among other things, give rise
to the questioning of religious or theological monopolies of interpretation,
while new perspectives, interpretations and concepts of religious
worldviews are negotiated and again put up for negotiation according to the
context they face. These processes can often be interpreted as educational
(Bildungsprozesse) in the sense of a profound transformation of how one
perceives the world and the self.
These challenges of modernity – albeit very condensed – are particularly
significant for the findings elucidated below. Since the paper is relatively
short, two perspectives provide a focus: the first aims to clarify the concepts
of religion and religiosity. This will be embedded in the current debates
concerning the secularisation thesis and the possibilities offered by the
individualisation thesis, since it is in this context that the notions of believing
and belonging have been introduced in the last two decades, namely by
Grace Davie. However, applying these terms in a “Muslim” context, at least
with regard to “Muslim” minorities in “non-Muslim” countries – that is,
the context of the study referred to – necessitates some modifications. The
second perspective concentrates on the relationship between believing and
belonging, still considered two major indicators for religiosity. For that
purpose the adolescents I interviewed and their statements will take centre
stage. There will also be a brief outline of the research project, accompanied
by some insights into the particular context of Germany’s “Muslims”,
illustrated with prominent elements of the discourse.
At this point, the use of the term “Muslim” in quotation marks deserves
an explanation: I make the emphasis in order to point out that the notion
“Muslim” provides information neither about a person’s religiosity (let
alone its degree), nor about their adherence to a particular denomination
or dogma. “Muslim” includes both practising believers and numerous
individuals “who make claims upon a culture, a sensitivity, a spirituality,
in other words an Islamic ethos without confining their thought to the
dogmatic closure of a single orthodoxy”.2
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Religious Education among “Muslim” Adolescents:
Outline of a Research Project
The findings elucidated below relate to an empirical research project
conducted in Hamburg under the current working title of “Religious
education among ‘Muslim’ adolescents in the fields of school and mosque”.
The approach is an interdisciplinary one: theoretical and methodological
prerequisites established by empirical research in the social sciences (the
qualitative approach) are applied in order to transform questions that
originate in religious studies and the sociology of religion into a research
project located at the nexus of education and Islamic Studies. Keeping in
mind the ongoing debate about dominant discourses and past and present
Western hegemonic ambitions, a temptation that neither intellectuals nor
scholars are entirely proof against, especially where “Other” cultures or
religions are the subject of their study, post-colonial critique can be deployed
to adjust perspectives through critically questioning the implicit and explicit
systems and frames of reference. Gender as a research perspective provides
an additional analytical framework.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to unfold the entire research project
as well as the research process in its methodological details. The following
pointers should suffice for depicting the broader context of the project: on
the one hand, it is based on thirty-nine interviews with “Muslim” adolescents
between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four; on the other hand, twenty
interviews with professionals mainly in the field of education, theology,
sociology of religion and related areas, both “Muslim” and non-“Muslim”.
Thirteen of the adolescents are migrants, though only six could recall the
experience of migration. The others were either infants or toddlers when
their parents fled or left their country of origin. The rest are regarded to
have a “family migration background”. The importance of this distinction is
evident in the following explication. The adolescents represent a wide range
of cultures of origin, such as Albanian, Afghan, Algerian, Bosnian, Iranian,
Kurdish, Lebanese, Syrian, Tunisian and Turkish, as well as some of bicultural origin. Their voices are polyphonic. They offer impressive insights
into religious experiences and approaches to religion. Their religiosity varies
between rather orthodox readings of Islam, indifference to or outright
renunciation of religious issues, agnostic positions, and positions detached
from either orthodoxy or dogmatic readings, or outside the bounds of
religious institutions. Of particular interest for this paper is the diversity of
approaches to religion and/or religiosity beyond dogmatic closure.
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The findings of the interviews are counterbalanced with participant
observation during Religious Education classes both at school and in the
mosque. Furthermore, I will consider the broader context on a national
and international level as reflected in the manifold discourses concerning
“Muslims” and Islam in Germany/Europe, religion and religiosity in
the post-secular situation, as well as the impact on educational concepts.
Interviewees were selected using the method of “theoretical sampling”,
combined subsequently with the “snowball sampling” method.
The research project does not aim to present a typology of religiosity or
of approaches to Islam. It focuses on decisive aspects concerning religious
education in two fields of education, namely school and mosque, and the
approaches to religion for young people that result from this constellation.
The second focus consists of the pedagogical priorities in terms of religious
education and whether they are innovative or not. Thirdly, the needs
and desires that the adolescents articulate themselves are of particular
interest. Though this point comes last, its central importance needs to be
emphasised: on the one hand, the findings offer a valuable corrective to onesided or even wrong assumptions about “Muslims” in Germany, while on
the other hand the findings illustrate how ideas about Religious Education
need to take account of the changing situation of the main stakeholders: the
young people themselves. Therefore it is important to investigate whether or
not these needs were integrated in the schools’ and mosques’ concepts, and
why. This is necessary for finding out whether they answer the demands of
modernity as they are present in Germany while meeting the requirements
of a pluriform society.3 Furthermore, the research project should provide
indications concerning the impact of Religious Education by dealing with
tradition and “orthodoxy”, since for the parents’ generation the religious
community corresponded to a “place to save the Turkish-Islamic way of life
in Germany”.4 This is no longer the case for the third or fourth generations,
such as the interviewed adolescents. They are looking for other approaches
to religion. This is due to the changing socio-political context as well as their
migration background and their ways of dealing with this heritage. All these
elements lead to the issue of changing discourses reflecting a different way of
searching for meaning in a pluriform society.
It is evident that the findings of qualitative research are not representative.
However, they outline tendencies. In our case they provide insights into
“Muslim” life in Germany. Although the interviewees do not form a
homogenous group, they have a lot in common: at the very least they have
to deal with ascriptions and perceptions, and balance conflicting interests,
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loyalties and multiple forms of belonging in order to find their place in
German society.

Religion and Religiosity: Conceptual Remarks
There have been many attempts, theological and sociological, to define the
term “religion”, and no consensus has been reached. A satisfying definition
would address the term in its complete plurality, a demand that appears
impossible to meet. Nonetheless, defining the concepts of religion and
religiosity must be an indispensable part of any research project, even if
the definition falls short of full inclusivity. Its suitability will ultimately be
judged in the light of the data generated.
Anyone working with current definitions of religion and religiosity
will have to enter the controversial debate surrounding what is known
as the secularisation thesis. Detlev Pollack shows that despite massive
criticism of this thesis, the empirical data for Europe does not contradict
it. Furthermore, he emphasises that secularisation in terms of a universal
and global phenomenon due to processes of modernisation has almost
been disproven.5 However, the shift of religiosity into the private sphere
does not – at least in Europe – mean a decline in the social significance of
religion. This phenomenon is addressed in a further development, namely
the individualisation thesis:
This thesis more or less accepts the theoretical framework of the
secularization theory by arguing that the social status or religion
within modernity is determined by processes of industrialization,
urbanisation, cultural pluralisation, economic growth, rising
levels of education and functional differentiation, but it describes
other consequences for the role of religion in modernity. While
the secularization theory predicts the inevitable stable decline in
the social significance of religion as a consequence of processes of
modernization, the religious individualization thesis concedes that
the traditional churches and church-related behaviours in modern
societies have been affected by an obvious decline but they contend
that this does not mean a loss of religiousness of the individual. On
the contrary, the decline of the established religious institutions goes
hand in hand with a rise of individual religiosity.6
The individualisation thesis allows us to demonstrate empirically that
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individual processes of emancipation and a distancing from institutionalised
forms of religiosity are taking place in connection to religious orientation
today. This is, among other things, the result of individual decisions in the
course of the negotiation processes that are part of all pluriform cultural and
religious orientations, and the broadening of horizons that modernisation
brings. Simultaneously, this reflexive modernity is invariably accompanied
by a loss of established certainties. Fixed points of orientation seem
irretrievably lost, forcing the individual to make decisions.
Many authors, amongst them again Detlev Pollack, state that the
secularisation thesis and the individualisation thesis are the most
appropriate ways of describing the religious changes in Europe.7 One should
point out here, though, that when experts in the field speak of religious
changes in Europe, they are usually referring to developments in Christian
churches. The dimensions of religion and religiosity that Charles Glock
developed in 1962 and that are still widely applied, refer to Christianity
as well as the corresponding model of an institutionalised and established
religion, which also implies a degree of dogmatic rigour.8 We can assume
that each implicit frame of reference is equally based on a Christian model.
Comparable studies of “Muslims” are very rare, be they of majority- or
minority-“Muslim” societies. In those that do exist, such as Germany’s 2008
Religionsmonitor which was followed by a representative study dedicated to
“Muslims” in Germany as the second largest religious group in the country,
religious change is not the focus of attention.9 Needless to say, a focus on
change would question the dominant discourse about Islam and “Muslims”
still considered to be a homogenous entity with a high degree of religiosity.10
Research with regard to religion and “Muslims” usually concentrates on the
importance of traditional religious settings and formal aspects of religiosity.
The German Religionsmonitor also refers to the five dimensions of religiosity
as developed and defined by Glock:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The subjective dimension, which describes religious experience.
The ideological dimension, corresponding to agreement with specific
tenets of faith.
The ritual dimension, relating to adherence to certain religious
practices and strictures.
The intellectual dimension that corresponds to basic knowledge.
The dimension of social consequences that is equivalent to the impact
of religiosity on social relationships and interactions.

believing and belonging: the impact of religion for “muslim” adolescents …

115

This approach can be characterised as rather normative and orientated
towards formal aspects of religiosity, and it has an immediate impact both
on questionnaires and on expected results. However, it is still the prevailing
basis for studies of religiosity, regardless of the above-mentioned processes
of reflexive questioning also observed in religious matters. To what degree
the proponents of this understanding of religiosity should face the reproach
of perpetuating rather than productively deconstructing orthodoxies – be
it consciously or unconsciously – remains to be seen. The importance this
approach is accorded in empirical research mirrors the implicit frame of
reference of Western scholars, namely the “Christian Occident”, as well as
the need for theoretical and conceptual shifts, particularly in the context of
“Muslim” approaches to religion and religiosity. In other words: the context
of institutionalised or organised religious communities needs to look more
closely at individuals claiming to be religious without a particular affiliation
to a specific religious community, organisation or dogma. And this does
not necessarily mean that these individuals do not articulate any feeling of
belonging at all. Such a shift of perspective will reveal that institution is not
a sine qua non of a sense of belonging. This at least is expressed implicitly by
many of the adolescents interviewed in the study referred to in this paper.
Institutionalised or organised religion – particularly in the societal
context of a religious minority – implies in most cases readings within
dogmatic closures that claim to represent the majority of the supposed
adherents. Research projects that adopt this claim of monopoly of definition
without questioning it risk being one-sided and more descriptive than
analytical, quite beside the fact that a huge part of the religious reality of
“Muslims” is not taken into consideration. This is true not only of Germany
and societies where “Muslims” represent a minority, but also of societies
where “Muslims” form the majority. An inclusive approach is promising,
since it both reflects dominant discourses, and broaches the issue of the
secularisation dilemma and changes of attitudes and approaches responding
to socio-cultural change. Simultaneously, it tries to explain current trends
in religiosity and religious consciousness outside the context of organised
religious communities and therefore outside the bounds of religious
institutions.
The challenge to be faced when leaving the institutional or organised
context of religion or religious communities is to develop a wider
understanding of religion and religiosity that embraces the two major
principles of belonging: firstly, belonging to a concrete religion, religious
institution and community offers elements of prescribed belief and

116

the construction of belief

formalised patterns of behaviour. Secondly, and generally neglected
in research dealing with religious phenomena, a sense of belonging
without prescribed paradigms and the support of a religious institution
or community, but with the support of belonging to a particular culture,
spirituality or ethos, as mentioned above.11 This element of belonging refers
to individual approaches, forms and realisations of religiosity.
The adjective “religious” can refer to both religion and religiosity.12 John
Cumpsty’s broad understanding of religion provides a helpful incentive
while searching for different approaches, taking into consideration the
changing elements concerning believing and belonging, since his focus
leaves open whether religion takes place within or without the bounds of
religious institutions:
Religion is the quest for, maintenance or realization of belonging to
an ultimate-real. The ultimate-real being that to which the individual
most feels the need to belong in order to secure, give meaning to, or
otherwise enrich his or her existence.13
Introducing the notion of belonging leads us to a broader understanding of
religiosity taking into consideration different layers of meaning. Religiosity
can refer to a fundamental ability:
to arrive at an integrative meaning relation of your own life and the
world in such a way that both your own personality and the world
are experienced and interpreted in the awareness of a transcendent
reality, which we usually refer to as God.14
Religiosity can also refer to the individual realisation of the way in which
religious elements are integrated into the life of an individual. This is closely
related to the development of the personality of an individual and must be
understood as a dynamic process. This dynamism and flexibility extend to all
the dimensions of this religiosity that develop over time. Hemel’s approach
does not follow the rather normative and formal dimensions developed
by Glock. Instead, he takes into consideration current trends concerning
religiosity and religious consciousness outside the context of religious
communities. This leads us to the following dimensions of religiosity that
can be connected with learning tasks from an educational perspective:
1.
2.

Religious sensitivity that ties into the task of religious perception.
Religious content that ties into the task of religious education in the
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sense of a differentiated religious view. Here, the cognitive level is
addressed.
Religious communication that ties into the ability to express and
communicate religious content.
Religious expression that ties into the task of finding and assuming
your individual religious role.

These four dimensions give no indication of the relevance that religious
issues have in an individual’s life. He or she may well possess considerable
religious sensitivity and communicative competence without necessarily
according religion a central role in his or her life. It is the dimension of the
religiously motivated life that indicates the individual relevance of religion.
By raising the question of the difference between religiosity and faith,
Hemel touches on a crucial, current issue, especially as it is becoming
increasingly clear that this difference does not lie in content but in
identification, that is, the expressed sense of belonging to a defined faith
community. The idea of faith then takes on a dual reference of its own: it refers
to individual beliefs as well as social belonging. According to Hemel, the
impact of the context of and the identification with a religious community
is important for “believing religiosity” (his phrase) or a concrete religiosity,
without neglecting the individual features of this religiosity. Although the
notion of religiosity mainly covers the relation to transcendence, it is not
necessarily linked to a particular religious denomination. Obviously, this
interpretation can easily apply to religions other than Christianity. However,
my data proves that some modifications concerning the understanding
of believing are necessary, particularly bearing in mind the approach of
the individualisation thesis. The notion of believing should not equate a
believer’s identification with a concrete religious community. This aspect
will be covered by the notion of belonging. This is the moment to mention
Grace Davie, since it was she who coined the phrase “believing without
belonging” (BWB).15 The necessity of such a modification is evident when
we are comparing the adolescents beyond dogmatic closure with those who
strongly identify with a religious community affiliated with a mosque and
who emphasise the necessity of following all obligations. This is the major
feature of their self-image of being a “Muslim” or being religious. Most of
these adolescents were rather shocked by other “Muslim” peers, as well
as Christians, professing to be religious without practising or respecting
religious obligations. Many of them even showed tendencies to condemn
such behaviour. Understanding the notion of believing as Hemel does
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would mean for the “Muslim” context that a rather orthodox perspective
is projected onto the “rest”. Furthermore, the understanding of belonging
should be enlarged, since many adolescents mention the feeling of belonging.
They do not refer to a particular community or mosque association but to
the aspect I mentioned earlier, quoting Mohammed Arkoun: they refer
to a culture, a sensitivity, a spirituality; in other words, an Islamic ethos.
However, before we shift our attention to the adolescents themselves, we
should outline the German context in order to conceive of the reality –
including the one hidden in discourses – that these youths face.

“Muslims” in Germany
In 2011, about 3.6 million “Muslims” live in Germany, representing
approximately 4 per cent of the total population. More than 2 million of
them are of Turkish descent. Of the Germans from “Muslim” families,
35.5 per cent were born in the country (679 thousand), with the number
of German converts, many of them through marriage, accounting for an
estimated additional 100–120 thousand.16 German citizens with a migration
background from “Muslim” countries, estimated at around 1 million,
are not counted in official statistics. It is illuminating how statistics on
“Muslims” in Germany (or other European countries) are generated: they
are based on immigration statistics which take the country of origin for a
presumed religious orientation. Numbers of adherents of other religions
immigrating from “Muslim” countries, naturalised German citizens from
“Muslim” countries, and conversions to Islam taking place in Germany are
estimated.17 Thus, descent, not religious practice or belief, is used as the
statistical reference. Nonetheless, “Muslims” as a group are assumed to be
unusually religious and observant.
This quotation from a “Muslim” working professional regards the
realities of “Muslim” life in Germany:
I think I got the epithet ‘Muslim’ on 9/11. Before that day, I was all
kinds of things: the Austrian in Germany, the Persian in Bavaria, the
Bavarian, the Indian in Bavaria, all kinds of things people imagined I
might be. But I became a Muslim in people’s eyes on 9/11, everybody
asked me about it afterwards. […] After 9/11 being ‘Muslim’ is more
important. When I was invited to a conference as an expert of the
Max-Planck-Institute, I never was perceived in the past as: ‘She is
telling this because she is “Muslim”’. They never asked me questions
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like ‘you as “Muslim”, what do you think?’ I don’t like these questions
since I think which part of my speech did invite you to ask my religion.
As if as ‘Muslim’ you have to feel different. Yes, I feel things because
I am ‘Muslim’, or because my parents are ‘Muslims’, or because I have
the impression Islam is attacked by ‘Muslims’ and non-‘Muslims’
and I have to protect it somehow. The impression that you have to
defend this part of identity, I think this is something many people
of ‘Muslim’ societies share. That their reactions are not really due to
the fact that they are ‘Muslims’ but that they are immigrants, and as
such part of a minority. It is an awareness of minorities. They always
remind you that you are different, that you don’t belong to them.18
These words aptly illustrate a sense of discomfort expressed either explicitly
or implicitly by many interviewees, and not just by young people. This
discomfort goes hand in hand with a sense of the need to justify themselves
for having a “Muslim” identity. Two examples show this: firstly, the increasing
tendency of “Muslim” organisations in Germany to formally distance
themselves from terrorist actions through public statements; secondly, the
question of what “the Muslims” think of Germany’s Basic Constitutional
Law is gaining greater prominence in the public arena. At the same time,
these words – just like the quotation marks around the word “Muslim”
– indicate the effect of ascribed identities and labels on the continuities,
fractures and reconstructions of self-constructed identity.
The trend in discourses on “Muslims” is also an important indicator
of opinions in mainstream society. Here, one must bear in mind that,
however paradoxical it may seem, no matter how detached from reality
many discourses on “Muslims” may be, they are nonetheless real, even if
they are located outside the reality of “Muslims”’ lives and often at odds
with their state of mind and environment. The importance of the social and
socio-political context as a matrix for self-definition and the reformulation
of self-images must not be underestimated. If we look more closely at the
development of the public discourse that labelled those arriving in Germany
as “Muslims”, we get the following picture: the term “guest worker”
(Gastarbeiter) was coined after 1955, when religious affiliation was still off
the radar. In the 1970s, the expression was replaced by “foreign worker”
(ausländischer Arbeitnehmer) or “foreigner” (Ausländer). Here, too, the
actual origin and religion of the worker in question are irrelevant, most
likely due to the prevailing assumption at the time that they would return
home after a number of years. In the course of the 1990s, the focus shifted
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away from the status of worker to that of religious affiliation. “Muslims”
became the centre of attention. This shift went alongside a broadening of
focus that moved “Muslim” women into the realm of public debate. They
entered the picture in a very real sense. At the same time, a newly vigorous
discourse on integration – connected with changes to citizenship law
that culminated in the immigration law of 2004 – focused on migrants
and especially “Muslims”.19 Rising numbers of naturalisations meant that
“Muslims” increasingly took part in the discourse themselves, as newly
German former foreigners, Turks, migrants or fellow citizens of foreign
nationality (ausländische Mitbürger) – a contradiction in terms that nicely
mirrors the internal contradiction of German attitudes; and could no longer
simply be categorised as “other”. What nevertheless made them “other” was
their religion. Overall, we can state that the power of the public discourse
on “Muslims” in Germany that views them as observant adherents of a
strictly normative reading of Islam goes almost unchallenged. Even German
citizenship offers no protection from being labelled with the stigma of the
cultural and religious “other”. The power to assign this definition lies with
the majority, which keenly guards this presumed right. This seems to be one
explanation of why citizenship alone does not make German “Muslims”
equals.

Believing and Belonging: the Adolescents’ Voices
The opening question in the interviews was, “What does it mean for you to
be a ‘Muslim’ today?” It goes without saying that the findings do not provide
answers, but they might deliver insights into “Muslim” adolescents’ realities,
and at best they will contribute to a better or different understanding of
recent dynamics regarding religion and religiosity, particularly believing and
belonging, two of the most important indicators for religiosity.
The following quotations represent only a selection of the adolescents
interviewed, namely those whose access to religion and religiosity lies
beyond the bounds of dogmatic closure and outside the bounds of religious
institutions. Interestingly, this group includes many who have experienced
migration. This differentiation between migration experience and a family
migration background has already been touched upon. The data indicates
the importance for changes in the relationship between believing and
belonging as it refers to both a changed context and a horizon of experience
not shared by German-born “Muslims”. Migration not only changes the
social context but also the terms of belonging. Social pressures to conform
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and control are decreased, and this fosters a more individual religiosity and
private faith. This phenomenon is not limited to Germany and “Muslims”.
It has been observed by Grace Davie in the UK for the Christian context.20
Belonging no longer consists of social considerations and the balance of
advantage and disadvantage, but expresses individual acceptance of the
fundamental beliefs of a concrete community arrived at by personal choice.
This kind of development is exemplified by the statement of twenty-oneyear-old Faiz. He was strictly observant when he came to Germany from
Afghanistan aged fourteen, and considered himself very religious during his
first two years in the country:
My parents did not force me, but the environment did. When I
didn’t go to mosque, it was not my father who asked me about it but
the neighbour or the teacher. These are things I don’t like, now. Now
it’s totally different for me, I live in an open society, nobody can force
me to do something I don’t want to do […] At some point I read my
second book, I became a little more critical, I struggled with myself
about what faith and religion really is. Why does religion exist?
What is it good for? Why should we be religious? Why do I pray
and for whom? Why should I get up at five in the morning and pray?
If you are ‘Muslim’ and take religion seriously, you get up. I also got
up for two years and then I stopped, I didn’t see the sense any more
and I said to myself: ‘You’re still a “Muslim”, but you stay critical, you
can critically address Islam and religion as a whole, you don’t need
to take the one way prescribed by Mohammed or another prophet,
i.e. you must find your own faith that you can stand up for and that
fulfils you. You don’t need to follow anyone.’ My father allowed me
to think the way I want to. I am free to think that this religion has
those advantages and that one those and to choose the third. That is
my affair. I can’t say whether I am religious, I can’t say whether I have
a religion, I can’t say whether I’m an atheist. 21
Faiz, like many other youths with a migration background, speaks of an
experience that second- or third-generation immigrant children did not
have: that of a social presence of Islam, an Islamic lifestyle and a social
“normality” of Islam, in which almost everyone is “Muslim”. In this case,
the change in social context created new opportunities. This also applies at
the mental level, where a consciousness opens new spaces and leaves behind
the idea that religion, tradition, faith and habit need be conterminous.
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In many cases this consciousness results in changes in believing, which
is now characterised by a more individual approach to religion and a
new critical perspective. Belonging, too, is changed in the course of this
process of negotiation and individual decision. Finally, the relationship
between believing and belonging shifts. However, there are differences
from the findings of studies that investigated processes of religious changes
unfolding in Europe, particularly religious changes concerning Christianity,
such as the one described by Grace Davie. In the interviews, it emerged
that belonging refers not only to a specific religious community, usually
a mosque association in the German context, but also to a broader sense
of being “Muslim” and belonging to a community of persons who share a
common culture and spirituality without a concrete adherence to a specific
orthodoxy. In Faiz’s case, the decision of how to position himself in terms of
believing and belonging is not yet complete.
Kali, an eighteen-year-old Tunisian who came to Germany at the age
of sixteen, provides an example of belonging in the sense of belonging to
a common culture, without believing in concrete tenets of faith. She says:
I really don’t know whether I’m a ‘Muslim’, but I am – as my father
puts it – culturally ‘Muslim’. I don’t practise any religion, but I observe
Ramadan, that is more out of habit. Tradition is something else. I
don’t know if that means much but I know I would never convert. It’s
the religion I have. Despite everything that has happened recently,
even if I’m not observant, it is still my religion.22
Kali expresses a particular aspect of belonging by fasting during the month of
Ramadan, although her fasting does not refer to the tenets of faith. Obviously
she does not feel the ambivalence an outside person might perceive. On the
contrary, she copes very well with it. Later she states vigorously, albeit with
regret, that she will never enter a mosque, since she would be obliged to wear
a headscarf: something which she finds unacceptable.
Many of the youths used expressions such as “if you believe it in your
heart” or “if your heart is pure” to describe their “Muslimity”. They distance
themselves from notions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy and are highly
critical of the mosque associations that structure religious practice in
Germany. This type of community and this form of belonging seem to be of
no importance for their faith or their experience of a “Muslim” normality.
They re-appropriate the Qur’an and the traditions and, in the process,
reinterpret them to fit their specific context. Their reinterpretations can
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take on different shapes, though as a rule without recourse to the religious
authorities present in mosques. Instead, they use modern communication
media to access information on religious questions, to research literature
and to exchange views. They meet to read the Qur’an together in the spirit of
a halqa, and many of them, especially women, consciously practise positively
modern forms of ijtihad. It is interesting that they do not allow polarities
and paradoxes to disconcert them, but instead use the potential that they
find in their position between two simultaneous systems of reference, which
they do not experience as contradictory.
“If you believe it in your heart, you don’t need to prove to anyone that
you are a faithful ‘Muslim’, because as a believer I know that God sees it,”
as nineteen-year-old Hamburg-born Tyson puts it.23 Such a position can
be helpful when you are trying to understand inner conflicts such as the
question of whether to wear a headscarf and risk losing an apprenticeship or
whether to delay this choice and ensure yourself a better education. Another
matter is adherence to prayer hours as well as school work despite the fatigue
this entails. In most cases, religious considerations take second place to other
concerns, and are frequently put off until later in good conscience.
I will close this section with a statement from twenty-two-year-old Leyla,
who comes from a mixed German–Turkish family and was socialised in both
cultures and religions. I choose this example not least because the number of
people from bicultural and bi-religious families is on the increase in Europe’s
pluriform societies, and we should expect interesting developments in
terms of believing and belonging. Leyla represents a specific form of hybrid
identity emerging through cultural and religious cross-interferences in the
immediate environment, holding considerable transgressive potential that
goes hand in hand with a renewal of established structures.
Well, part of my identity may be that I think of it as equally valid
because I feel I somehow always feel bicultural, bilingual, that
everything has two sides, that may be part of my identity. Maybe that
is also the reason why I can always fit it together, somehow, that gives
me a bit of freedom maybe, just to say I can believe this way […] Yes,
that is my freedom in a way. […] But it has always been like that,
I wasn’t aware of it, but it gives you a good feeling to somehow be
comfortable with yourself.24
This approach to believing and belonging should hold quite a few challenges
to theologians and other guardians of orthodoxy.
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Conclusion
The selected adolescents’ voices are almost self-explanatory. They point
out simultaneously that an intensive empirical study of young “Muslims”,
who are sadly neglected in many academic contexts, can contribute to an
overdue shift in perspective on the importance of Islam in the context of
reflexive modernity, and the changing needs of believing and belonging.
The few examples presented above show that it is not only religion that
influences people, but that people also shape religion and believing. Even
though the frame of reference might be unclear or does not correspond to
what would be expected from “Muslims”, we should take the phenomenon
into consideration.
Furthermore, the data proves that in many cases educational processes
are taking place, a concept introduced and developed by empirical research
on education that might open up a horizon for further research:
Education (Bildung), (i.e. what educational action should enable and
promote) can be understood as a process of basic transformation of
the way persons behave with regard to the world and to themselves.
Bildung in terms of such transformations always then takes place (or
better: can take place) when humans make experiences that cannot
be coped with using the existing means and options. Formulated
differently: Bildungs-processes exist in the emergence of new forms,
new figures of world views and self concepts in dealing with issues
that cannot be processed by the existing figures of world views and
self concepts.25
This kind of transformation also affects forms of believing and belonging,
and reveals dynamics which could be interpreted as an individual integration
of the achievements of intellectual modernity as well as a way of coping
with a radical plurality of meaning. This kind of integrative effort is often
experienced as emancipatory by the adolescents themselves.
The ultimate consequences this will have on theological and educational
issues are as of now impossible to predict. One thing is certain, however:
even though secularisation processes will not displace individual religiosity,
we must expect significant changes that both Islamic theology and
“Muslim” associations and organisations will need to react to; ideally, in
the spirit of modernity, in a multi-perspective approach that will put an
end to the shadowy existence of the paradox and that will lead us to a more
comprehensive vision of religious change.
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Veiling and Unveiling Muslim Women:
State Coercion, Islam, and
the “Disciplines of the Heart”
Malika Zeghal

As emphasised in the works of Mohammed Arkoun, theological and
interpretive questions surrounding Islam must be read – as in any other
religious tradition – not only as textual issues but also as political stakes.1 This
is particularly true of the concept of reform (iṣlāḥ) in the history of Islam,
a concept at the heart of the Prophet’s mission: “I only came to reform” (in
urīdu illā al-iṣlāḥ) (Qur’an 11:88). Iṣlāḥ, or the operation of re-ordering,
correcting and transforming necessitates an interpretation of the current
situation and a vision for a future one. Its object may be the individual as
much as the collective entity or institution. As such, the enterprise of reform
is not only the aim of individual religious reformers who write essays about
the purpose and methods of reform, but is also among the interests and
concerns of the modern state that crafts policies.
This paper will focus on the ways in which, in Tunisia, the postcolonial
state elites, in their projects to build a cohesive nation and to reform their
society, referred to Islam to mould specific domains of life, and developed,
in the process, theological lines of reasoning and justifications. Among
countries of the Middle East, independent Tunisia’s governments are often
seen as having enacted policies shaped by a strong secularist ideology and
having relegated Islam to the private sphere.2 Contrary to this common
analysis, the case of Tunisia illustrates that far from being “secularist”
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states circumscribing religion to the private domain, authoritarian Middle
Eastern states often defined themselves as “Muslim” states and produced
public theological definitions that were instrumental in their enterprises of
reforming their societies and defining their national identity. One privileged
domain of intervention for Middle Eastern postcolonial reformist state
elites is that of “the woman question”. In Tunisia, the nationalist movements
as well as the post-independence state elites aimed to improve women’s
rights. Their project defined women as full participants in the nation and
helped define all Tunisians, men and women, as citizens who shared the
same national values, in particular their attachment to the new state.
The “womans question” revolved around issues of gender equality in
education, gender segregation, veiling, and polygamy and, as explained by
Deniz Kandiyoti, “coincided with a broader agenda about ‘progress’ and
the compatibility between Islam and modernity”.3 Kandiyoti describes
two sides to the debate on women in the Middle East: on the one hand, a
“secularist elite” with “progressive aspirations”, and on the other hand those
who “expressed in Islamic terms” a “hankering for cultural authenticity.”4
This article will show that this dichotomy, whereas used by many actors,
was also highly unstable and dissimulated deep convergences between these
two positions. The progressive aspirations of nationalist and state elites
were framed within a repertoire of cultural authenticity that often included
Islamic terms. As for the Islamist trend that emerged in the 1970s, its activists
also articulated their conception of the “woman question” in the vocabulary
that the nation state elites had built to speak of the “Tunisian woman” as a
virtuous citizen.
The period I will concentrate on starts in the late 1920s – when Tunisian
nationalism against French occupation had matured into an organised
movement – and ends in 1987, the year that marked the end of Habib
Bourguiba’s regime. I will focus on Bourguiba’s shifting position on veiling, to
help us understand how the veil became a complex and multilayered political
issue in Tunisia over the course of the twentieth century. I will emphasise
Bourguiba’s continuities with Muslim reformist thought – in particular the
Tunisian al-Tahar al-Haddad’s writings since the 1930s – and, perhaps more
surprisingly, how the Islamist writings of the 1980s echoed the Bourguibian
tropes about the Tunisian woman. In its reforming enterprise, the Tunisian
independent state articulated a language and conception of religion that
moulded themselves into older reformist tropes. These tropes were later
re-appropriated by Islamist movements in their political opposition to the
Tunisian government. If the political positions of state representatives and
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Islamist opposition are conspicuously different on subjects such as the veil,
they nonetheless operate under the same regime of thought regarding the
relationships between nation, religion and reform. I will argue that the
opposing views of the state’s elite and Islamists on the subject of women’s
dress are in fact formulated within similar reformist vocabularies regarding
female subjectivity, the place of women in the world, and the intentionality
of religious norms. I will argue that state elites and Islamist activists shared
similar conceptions of “religion” as circumscribed domains of interpretation
and efficacy, which were in many ways comparable to the reformist ideas of
the first part of the twentieth century.

1. The Controversy of 1929: Nationalism, Westernisation,
and the Islamic Identity of Tunisia
On 11 January 1929, the francophone Tunisian nationalist newspaper
L’Etendard Tunisien published an article by Habib Bourguiba, then a young
nationalist activist and member of the old Destour party. The publication
of the article marked one of the heated moments of the “battle of the veil”.
This article was Bourguiba’s account of a meeting held at L’Essor, a literary
socialist club, where he participated in a fiery debate with Tunisian and
French socialists – among them Muhammad No‘man and Joachim Durel –
about the wearing of the veil by Tunisian women. In this debate, Bourguiba
defended the wearing of the face veil, in particular against “a certain Miss
Ourtani”,5 whom he accused of belonging to a group of “heroic apostles of
dress feminism” supported by the French socialists.6 Referring to another
Tunisian young female activist, he added not without irony: “Ms. Menchari,
a charming young lady, came, her face uncovered, and wanted to move us
about the fate of her unfortunate sisters who are deprived of air and light
and live under the triple weight of ignorance, gossip and the veil.”7 Manoubia
Ouertani and Habiba Menchari were indeed young feminist activists who, as
early as 1924, had defended the possibility of unveiling, and they themselves
had appeared unveiled in public.8 If Bourguiba stood against them, it was
not because he was against sufūr (unveiling); it was because he wanted to
publicly defend what he called “the Tunisian personality” (al-shakhsiyya
al-tunisiyya) against the coloniser’s intent to Westernise Tunisia, which
had been under French protectorate since 1881. Indeed, for the Bourguiba
of 1929, the veil could not be abandoned as French socialists proposed,
because it was a signifier of the identity of a nation under occupation.
Hence, to defend the veil was to perform an act of resistance against the
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coloniser. Bourguiba interpreted the wearing of the veil as a symbol of the
nation, rather than as a religious obligation ordered by the revealed texts or
a freely chosen way of dressing that resulted from voluntary and deliberate
individual choices by women.
Bourguiba did not see the veil as a religious prescription. He considered
it a custom (‘āda) that had been anchored in the practices of the national
community for a long time and that had become part of the mores of his
society. Bourguiba’s justification made the veil the symbol of a collective
tradition rather than an individual preference.
We have in front of us a custom anchored for centuries in our mores,
evolving with them at the same pace, which is quite slowly. The
mores of a group, be it the family, the tribe or the nation, are what
is most inherent, the most irremediably subjective to this group and
what distinguishes it from all others. In a word, it is what makes its
proper individuality, its personality … Is it in our interest to hasten
the disappearing of our mores? … My response, given the very special
circumstances we live is without doubt: No!9
Bourguiba defined the concept of “personality” (shakhsiyya) again, when
addressing Mr Durel:
The unity of territory, the community of belief, language, customs,
past, the joys lived together, the failures and humiliations experienced,
all of this according to Mr. Durel does not contribute to create,
between the children of this country, any sentiment of solidarity,
no idea of patria. … Reality is entirely different. This is because the
action of the individual on customs is extremely limited.10
To build a nationalist ideology, Bourguiba drew upon the concept of a
“national personality”, which he defined as a community of shared practices,
sentiments and dispositions that crystallised through history and could be
symbolised by a custom such as women’s wearing of the veil. The practice
was so firmly anchored that it could not be eliminated by the efforts of a few
individuals. Bourguiba would later affirm – and attempt to show – that it
would take the power of an independent state to uproot the custom of veil
wearing.
His reaction contrasted with other opponents to unveiling, who argued
that by abandoning the veil, Tunisian women would lose their respectability
and fall into immorality and prostitution, subsequently leading Tunisian

veiling and unveiling muslim women …

131

society into corruption. They had described the veil as a woman’s “religious
duty”.11 But for Bourguiba, the veil was not a device protecting women
and defending the integrity of a certain moral order. He saw it as a social
problem, even while defending its subsistence. In his 1929 article, he wrote,
dismissing the veil’s religious meaning: “I believe that it is relevant to look at
the subject from a social point of view, the only point of view that presents
an interest.”12
In the words of Bourguiba, the veil was the sign of women’s “unconscious
atavism”, but it was the veil of the colonised, and as such, it had to remain:
The day when the Tunisian woman, going out unveiled, does not
experience the strange impression that is as a scream of revolt coming
from her unconscious atavism, on that day, the veil will disappear
by itself without danger, because what it will be the symbol of will
have disappeared. But for the moment, we are not there yet. The best
proof of this is that at the end of the meeting, none of the Muslim
ladies who came to listen dared to throw their veils.13
However, in his 1929 article he had already hinted at the necessity of unveiling
in a society that had become independent, an idea that he developed later
during his presidency: “Evolution must happen, otherwise, it is death. It
will happen, but without a break, without a rupture. We must maintain in
the perpetual evolution of our personality a unity through time that can be
continually perceived by our conscience.”14 Ms Ouertani had thrown off her
veil in a dramatic gesture during the debate at L’Essor. Bourguiba recognised
that in principle the gesture was legitimate, and even a question of life and
death, but he also warned that it was premature.
Whereas Bourguiba described the veil as an element of the Tunisian
personality, another Tunisian reformer, al-Tahar al-Haddad (1899–1935),
who studied at the Zaytuna between 1911 and 1923 and frequented the
reformist milieus,15 developed a notion of the veil as an obstacle to women’s
participation in public life, announcing Bourguiba’s later shift of viewpoint.
One year after the 1929 debate at L’Essor, Haddad published the controversial
book Our Woman in the Shari‘a and Society.16 This book is relevant for my
argument not only because it contains a justification for unveiling that
Bourguiba would reassert after independence, but also because it deploys
a line of reasoning about Islam as a potent religion (dīn) with a deep and
positive impact on people’s lives. This idea of religion as an instrument of
social change and progress became instrumental for reformists who wanted
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to link projects of improving women’s status with Islam and was redeployed
by Bourguiba in the context of the postcolonial authoritarian state.
In the preface of his polemical book, Haddad wrote a long meditation
on Islam and its role in social reform:
The reform of our social condition is necessary for all aspects of our
life (wujūh al-ḥayāt), and in particular for what touches our existence
in life (wujūdinā fī al-ḥayāt). I see with certainty that Islam is not
an obstacle against reform (iṣlāḥ) as the accusations proclaim. On
the contrary, it is the religion relevant for reform (dīnuhu al-qawīm),
and the inextinguishable source of reform. As for the decline of the
Muslim world, it has no other cause than superstitions and customs
that we have grown to like over a long time.17
Haddad saw Islam as an intrinsic source of vitality. Islam was “the eternal
book of life and the regulating principles for useful work” (dustūr al-‘amal
al-nāfi‘).18 He made Islam a set of “regulating principles” (dustūr) that would
prove to be “useful”. The use of the word dustūr was not politically neutral
since the old nationalist Tunisian Destour party (al-ḥizb al-ḥurr al-dustūrī)
had been established in 1920, demanding the drafting of a constitution for
Tunisia. For Haddad, who had become a member of the Central Committee
of the Destour in 1923, Islam had a social and political role to play in order
to provide guiding principles for social life. In addition, for Haddad and
Muslim reformers of his time, Islam’s meaning had to be recalibrated if it
were to define the principles guiding social life. Hence, it was important for
them to explain what Islam said as well as what it did not say.
On this basis, Islam’s functionality in life could be established. There
was a double purpose in Haddad’s enterprise of reform, which could be
generalised to individual and state reformers of his as well as later generations:
first, a principle of delimitation of the faith’s meaning, and second, a process
of importing this meaning to the real world. There was therefore at the same
time a limiting aspect (the circumscribing of meaning through a specific
interpretive orientation) and an expanding one (the implementation of this
meaning in society). Haddad, who was examining what Islam said and did
not say about women, believed that in order to reform society in the light of
the principles of Islam, it was necessary to sift out social practices that did not
belong to the religion. Prescriptions such as polygamy or the face veil were
not “inherent to the religion”.19 He distinguished between “the essence”20 of
Islam and the prescriptions that could disappear without harming Islam. For
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Haddad, laws had two essential aims: “noble morality and the person’s vital
needs”.21 This was because Haddad saw the Qur’an as intrinsically related to
life (ḥayāt); not only was Islam to be a constant source of life, but also “the
[Qur’an’s] shari‘a was a result of life evolving, and not chapters formulated
in advance to be imposed on life”.22 The revelation had thus been produced
in response to questions emerging in everyday life and had been applied in
life. Haddad felt that this dialectical relationship between religion and life –
which implicitly made religion a humanly mediated set of principles – had
to be reactivated.
One should note that Haddad, who had published an earlier essay on
the condition of Tunisian workers and who himself came from a poor
background, was deeply preoccupied with poverty, which he linked to social
backwardness.23 In Our Women in the Shari‘a and Society, he describes at
length the difficult living conditions of poor families and links this situation
to the harsh treatment of women by their fathers and husbands. In these
descriptions, Haddad relates misery to the “disorder” of the home.24 He
mentions domestic accidents, unattended children and the disputes between
wives in polygamous families. This disorder, according to Haddad, drove the
husband to lead a private life out of the home: “the wife, therefore, finds
herself isolated in a world of worries and suffering.”25 A reform of family
life, in which respect and love between wife and husband would prevail,
was therefore seen as the basis for the reform of society. Haddad defines
marriage as “a sentiment (āṭifa) and a duty (wājib), the coming together of
two people and reproduction (ta‘mīr)”.26 To extend the idea of sentiment,
he quotes Qur’an 30:21 (Sūra al-Rūm), which uses the word mawadda
(love) and describes marriage as a relation of reciprocal trust and intimacy
through the idea of “tranquility of the soul with another soul” (sukūn al-nafs
bi’l-nafs).27
Haddad’s adversaries fiercely rejected this evocation and public
recognition of “sentiment” as a basis for marriage. They identified several
reasons for their rejection of Haddad, such as his treatment of Muhammad’s
prophecy and his imitation of Westerners, if not his “alliance” with Christian
missionaries; but one argument stood as crucial: they did not favour the
public deployment of sentiments produced by the visibility of women’s
uncovered bodies in society. Shaykh Ibn Murad, a high-ranking scholar from
the Zaytuna University, in his response to Our Women, addressed Haddad:
You find repugnant the education we give to the Muslim girl on
the basis of the reserve (ḥayā) we teach her and that is one of the
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branches of the faith. You claim that it kills sentiment (āṭifa). Let
this sentiment die … Let us bury this sentiment and not raise our
daughters on adornment (tabarruj).28
After independence, Bourguiba followed Haddad in his attempt to mould
a new female public persona. Through his own public relations with
Tunisian women, he often exemplified a public intimacy showcasing a
public persona of “the Tunisian woman” and what her virtuous behaviour
should be. Indeed, Bourguiba did not produce a liberal conception of the
role of women. He rather envisioned a shift that the Tunisian woman had
to experience – from a position of seclusion and isolation to a position from
which she could communicate with the world around her. Women were
expected to participate in the public arena, and this participation proceeded
from the construction of family as based on reciprocal relationships and
shared sentiments between husband and wife. Bourguiba later wrote in his
justification for the 1956 Personal Status Code:29
The family is the basis of society. It lacks all happiness and harmony if
it is not founded on a man and a woman who are united by love and
respect … With our new reform, we do not only want to elevate the
woman’s level, but we want also to elevate the level of the Tunisian
family.30
Hence, according to both Haddad and Bourguiba, the progress of society
was irremediably linked to a reform of the family, of the woman’s role
and status in it, leading to her integration in a public world of reciprocal
relationships.
Haddad describes the face veil (which he calls at times ḥijab, at others
niqab) as the device wrongly used to protect men and women from
temptation: a “material barrier”,31 the “greatest separation between man
and woman that prevents them to choose one another when they want
marriage”32 and “a social protection against evil”.33 His critique takes a
symbolically harsh tone when he writes: “There is not that big a difference
between the niqab the woman uses to cover her face to prevent debauchery,
and the muzzle that we put on a dog so that it does not bite the passers-by.”34
For Haddad, the veil conjures the idea of separation, closure and lack of trust,
which prevents a woman from opening up to the world and in particular
from having access to knowledge, be it the knowledge of her future husband,
technical and scholarly knowledge or her very consciousness of the world.
Therefore, unveiling is an act by which a woman can access awareness and
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knowledge: rather than being imprisoned in the home, her body must be
located in the world to allow contact with society. Haddad also denounces
segregation between a husband and wife at home, strangely relating this issue
to the wearing of the veil, which in principle was not worn at home among
family members: “The use of the veil has led the husband to lead a private
life (ḥayāt khāṣṣa) outside of his home, a life that women do not know.”35
This absence of a shared experience – or private life – between husband and
wife could not logically be related to the wearing of the veil. The veil was
in fact, in the work of Haddad, a metonymy for the broader problem of
gender segregation and female seclusion, which were the themes that most
preoccupied Haddad. The husband’s absence produces an “abyss of death”36
for the family and a life of “debauchery”, “immoral activities, drinking,
gambling and other distractions” for the husband.37 Haddad also relates the
wearing of the veil to what he sees as problematic sexual practices that occur
with gender segregation: “It is well established that hiding women from men
has been one of the main factors in the spread of homosexuality, lesbianism
and onanism.”38 Hence, not only will unveiling integrate women into social
life, but it will also provide true intimacy in the home and reinvigorate the
relationships between men and women within their families.
While Haddad’s project of improving the status of Tunisian women was
based in part on the idea of liberty (ḥurriyya), his essay does not recommend
individualism and freedom to choose any type of dress. He did not defend
a Western liberal conception of women, and while he saw the movement
of unveiling as “triggered by European civilisation”, he was against a simple
imitation of European ways.39 He was impressed by the level of education
of European women, and wanted Tunisian women to emulate them in this
regard, but he also considered western influence as harmful: “our sick society
… is under the onslaught of a transformation that we do not understand
and that completely assimilates us into a European trend dominating our
current situation. We can only emerge alive from this … if we cling to our
inherent strength.”40 Islam, he argues, is the religion of freedom (dīn alḥurrīya), but Islam “accepts only the servitude towards Allah”.41 Although
Haddad defends unveiling, “I will only accept emancipation in the limits
of the law and morality.”42 Women will have to learn how to manage their
home, which should be for them a “function” (waẓīfa) and not a “prison”.43
The goal of their emancipation is to repair the “pain and injury” (alam wa
jurḥ) that is felt by women as well as men, not the realisation of a liberal type
of society.44
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2. “A Strong State Deeply Rooted in the Hearts”:
How Can a State Shape Individual Preferences?
While Haddad was an individual thinker and scholar of Islam, Bourguiba
was a political activist who became a statesman. Early in independent
Tunisia, Bourguiba took the reins of the state and authoritatively imposed
reforms on Islamic institutions: he standardised the legislation related to
family matters with the codification of personal status law in 1956, closed
down the University of Zaytuna, and nationalised the Habous (religious
endowments). In this paper I do not intend to evaluate Bourguiba’s policies
towards women in their effects on Tunisian social life, but rather, I attend to
the subtle meanings deployed by Bourguiba when he dealt with the question
of the veil, and to the personal proximity he built with Tunisian women to
mobilize them in favour of the new Tunisian state. The ideas he developed
with regard to the status of women were very close to Haddad’s, but during
these reforms, Haddad’s name was not officially mentioned. Haddad had
died young and politically isolated, his book having become the object of the
ire of prominent ‘ulama’ of the Zaytuna.45 Bourguiba imposed his reforms
authoritatively, and perhaps did not want to take the risk of invoking such a
contentious figure as Haddad.
Echoing the writings of Haddad, often word for word, the president
of Tunisia shifted his earlier position on the veil and tried to persuade
Tunisian women to unveil. His general views on the veil did not change: it
was still a reproachable custom, the weight of which could not be lifted by
mere individual efforts. However, the context had changed: a strong state
was now presiding over the destiny of the Tunisian nation, and this state
was robust enough to uproot such “atavistic” practices as the wearing of the
veil. Within the larger context of state authoritarian reforms of religious
institutions, Bourguiba attempted to convince Tunisians of the legitimacy
of unveiling in his speeches as well as in his public performances, during
which he unveiled Tunisian women in the streets.
In a speech on 5 December 1957, Bourguiba tackled a combination of
issues that demonstrate the close relationship between reform, the strength
of a state apparatus and the building of an emotional relationship between
the state and its subjects. He developed arguments about the state’s power
of persuasion, the attachment of Tunisians to that state, and the question of
the veil. He linked “the country’s prosperity and the individuals’ liberties” to
the existence of “a strong state, deeply rooted in the hearts”.46 At this time,
French troops were still evacuating the south of Tunisia. Bourguiba, the
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Council’s president since 25 July 1957, was still affirming his power: “I know
that my words are listened to, that they have an effect and that my directives
are followed.”47
The metaphor of “a state deeply rooted in the hearts” expressed
Bourguiba’s desire for a direct and close relationship between the state and
the Tunisian people. The moulding of a personality for a nation was possible
only through state institutions: “There is one essential condition to safeguard
a people’s personality. It is necessary to have political power.”48 The highest
representative of the state was also attending to the deepest emotions of
Tunisians. He wanted them not only to feel emotionally attached to their
nation – which they had become already – but, more deeply, to have at heart
the best interests of the institution of the state. In a sense, women, more
than men, were to illustrate the emotional attachment of Tunisians to the
Bourguibian state, through the physical proximity Bourguiba built with
them in public performances, as I will describe. This physical proximity was
infused with a sense of hierarchy and emotional attachment. At the end of
his speech, Bourguiba introduced the issue of women under the rubric of
“social problems”, as he had done in 1929, and mentioned resistances to his
enterprises of persuasion regarding the veil.49
We have been informed of satisfying progress in the movement that
liberates the Tunisian woman from the veil. Nonetheless, it seems
that there is still some resistance. I would like the public opinion to
understand exactly what our aim is with this reform. Statistics reveal
that sex crimes are decreasing. It is remarkable that the cases that are
still occurring precisely only implicate those young women who are
raised within traditional biases and in seclusion.50
As in Haddad’s book Our Women in the Shari‘a and Society, the veil and
women’s segregation were related in Bourguiba’s speech to immoral and
criminal behaviour, through his reference to sex crimes. In the same speech,
the veil became “a horrible rag that has nothing to do with religion”.51
Unveiling was not imposed through a law by Bourguiba at that time, and
nothing close to legal dress codes was put in place in Tunisia until at least
1981. Rather, the Bourguibian strategy was a subtle mix of pedagogy and
legal change. However, Bourguiba also considered direct coercion. From the
same 1957 speech:
At the social level, we understand the repugnance of aged women
to abandon an ancient habit but we can only regret the obstinacy of
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parents who constrain young women to wear the veil to go to school.
We even see civil servants go to work rigged in this horrible rag. We
continuously repeat that it is abandoned in Muslim countries and
that it has nothing to do with religion.52
He continued with implicit threats of coercion:
Parents should understand that we want the good of their children
and that it is not suitable to stand against an important reform. They
better not push us towards the means of constraint that we have
refused to use so far.53
The iṣlāḥ (reform), supported and implemented by the state, assured the
“protection” of the “virtue and honour” of women, and was to be “more
efficient than the protection of a miserable rag”.54 These statements were
repeated over the years, in continuity with the metaphors of life and death
Bourguiba had used in 1929 and that were present throughout Haddad’s
essay.55 In a 1959 interview in the Tunisian magazine Faiza, Bourguiba
described the veil as “a sinister shroud that hides the face”.56 He associated
state reforms with life and progress, and communicated and implemented
them in rather illiberal ways that domesticated religious institutions and
produced state pedagogies on the proper bodily conduct. The subtle,
ambiguous mix of physical and psychological persuasion with the threat of
coercion that Bourguiba used vis-à-vis Tunisian women and their families,
is reflected in a documentary about the emancipation of Tunisian women
aired on French television on 8 January 1968.57 The fifty-minute black-andwhite film weaves footage of Bedouin women in remote areas, working in
their traditional garb, with scenes of women wearing the urban traditional
veil (safsārī) in the city, and women from the elite wearing sleeveless dresses
– “the bourgeoisie of Tunis,” says the narrator, “who have not worn veils for
a long time” – in the presidential palace in Carthage at a reception, being
welcomed by President Bourguiba. Scenes of Bourguiba unveiling women
on 13 August 1967, Tunisian’s Woman’s Day, help us to understand state
reforms as a practice that deployed itself through direct, local interactions
between the state’s elite and ordinary Tunisians.
On the side of a road in an unknown location, where Bourguiba is
probably visiting a town, Bedouin women in traditional dress are welcoming
him. (Properly speaking, their dress is not a veil, since a safsārī, a long piece
of white fabric attached at the waist and covering the whole body, would be
impractical for women working in the fields.) Urban women wearing the
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safsārī are also welcoming Bourguiba, who is guarded by policemen. It is
difficult to say whether the crowds have gathered spontaneously. Bourguiba
was popular at that time, but these events were closely monitored and served
as propaganda to appear in newspapers and on the radio.
To understand the performance of that day, it is important to comprehend
the shape and use of the traditional urban veil that Tunisian women wore
at that time. The safsārī provides some flexibility for a woman to cover and
uncover because it is held on the head and shoulders by the hand or teeth
rather than by pins. With a quick move of the hand, it is easy to cover and
uncover one’s face and shoulders.
Facing this crowd of women, Bourguiba embraces several Bedouin
women and their children. The women seem spontaneously to go towards
him and embrace him. He then directs his attention to a woman in a
safsārī, and uncovers her head. This gesture seems easy and is not met
with any resistance. The woman is holding the safsārī over her head with
her hand, and the veil’s fabric slides down her hair. The woman smiles, but
seems slightly embarrassed, and attempts to put her veil back on her head.
Bourguiba uncovers her again in the same motion. This series of successive
gestures, a silent yet public exchange through physical contact between the
anonymous woman in the midst of the applauding crowd and the president,
concludes with the woman remaining unveiled. We do not know if she
covered herself again when the camera stopped filming, but it is a fact that
the wearing of the safsārī by Tunisian women became uncommon in Tunisia
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a sign that the changes effected by the
Bourguibian elite certainly had an impact on women’s dressing practices
and gender relations in Tunisia. In the documentary, the atmosphere seems
calm, and some policemen guarding the event are smiling and laughing
with the women. The president continues to unveil some of the women
before leaving with his motorcade. Revealing to the public and the camera
the dresses they wear beneath their safsārī, the women seem happy. In this
moment of public intimacy with Bourguiba, the process of unveiling does
not seem to cause them pain. This atmosphere of liberation and happiness
hides the enterprise of soft coercion at play in the public performance of
unveiling. The unveiled women seem attracted to and entirely persuaded
by – even if after slight hesitation – the path of change that Bourguiba has
opened to them.
While at the first glance the film does not suggest imposition or
submission, the presence of the policemen and the slight hesitation of one
woman subtly indicate that the state project of liberation of women was a
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pedagogical endeavour disseminating new types of disciplines. A change
of habitus – represented by the “habit” of the veil that was ingrained in
body and mind – had to be brought about by the seemingly gentle physical
intervention of the state’s highest representative. Bourguiba’s gesture was to
be taken as a model to be replicated by all Tunisian women.
The desire for such a general transformation was resented in some
milieus, celebrated in others, but most importantly for the argument of
this paper, the desire for transformation was moulded by a state that was
progressive in the sense that it aimed for progress, but was not democratic
and liberal. The state did not attempt to hide its illiberal nature, and its
representatives saw their function as to shape the preferences and behaviours
of their population authoritatively. Important elements of patriarchy and
conservatism accompanied this vision, which was not necessarily based on a
conception of the nation as a collection of free individuals.58 Family values in
particular had to be preserved as well as a sense of morality, echoing Shaykh
Ibn Merad’s appeal to ḥayā’ (a sense of modesty). For instance, in 1966,
Bourguiba’s speech to the National Union of Tunisian Women addressed
women on the necessity of adhering to moral behaviour: “one has to know
how to discipline her heart.”59 Bourguiba’s woman, like Haddad’s, was
expected to shape her behaviour according to the reformers’ conceptions of
dignity and morality.

3. The “New” Veil: How State and Islamist Opposition
Share a Reformist Stance
In the early 1970s, a new type of dress appeared in Tunisian towns and cities.
Women were wearing a garment that was neither the face veil that Bourguiba
was still protecting in 1929, nor the safsārī or any traditional type of veiling.
It was the hijab we know today: a short veil covering the hair but not the
face, secured with pins, and combined with a long dress or trousers. The
hijab was not worn as an instrument of seclusion in the home and did not
prevent women from going to school or from attending the workplace, since
it was precisely in these public domains that women in this new attire made
themselves visible. It showed itself publicly, exemplifying a new version of
religiosity that was urban, young and educated. It was no longer the “horrible
rag” that Bourguiba had associated with rural life and ignorance, but a sign
that women had found the veil to be a relevant dress for the public arena.
The varying interpretations of the wearing of the veil – as a way to discipline
oneself into piety, an instrument for emancipation, a tool for patriarchal
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reproduction, a sign of female submission, an instrument of liberation – are
numerous and diversified. I will not explore them in this paper,60 but will
instead underline the changes in the political elite’s perceptions of the veil
and the possibility for these meanings to form a multilayered, complex set
of interpretations.
In the 1970s, when the new veil appeared in Tunisia, it surprised most of
the intellectual and political elite, who saw it as the “symbol” of the nascent
Islamist political opposition who wanted to signal its new power, and not
as a way to public piety and virtue on the part of veiled women. The ways
in which different segments of society viewed the hijab were in fact linked
with the state of relations between government and the Islamist opposition.
In 1981, an administrative decree (no. 108)61 that forbade the wearing of the
hijab in schools, described it as “confessional and sectarian”.62 This was two
years after the Iranian revolution, when Tunisia was witnessing the influence
of foreign Islamist movements within its borders, as well as the emergence,
since the end of the 1970s, of a potent domestic oppositional Islamist
movement. This decree was not applied in any systematic way, but was used
at random by the authorities when dealing with the Islamist opposition, in
particular in secondary schools and on college campuses.
To understand how the Islamist opposition dealt with the question
of veiling and related to Bourguiba’s interpretation, I will refer to Rashid
al-Ghannushi’s writings on the Tunisian woman. In his book The Muslim
Woman in Tunisia,63 he develops a critique of the submission of women to
men. Echoing Haddad and Bourguiba, he is critical of the conception of a
woman as a person lacking strength and autonomy. However, his focus on
the definition of the “ideal Muslim woman” differs in the sense that it is
formulated in an anti-imperialist tone. For Ghannushi, the market economy
and Westernisation had weakened women; they now submitted to a culture
of consumption that gave physical appearance too much significance in
their lives. For Ghannushi, Western colonisation as well as neo-colonialism
had destroyed traditional life, and with it the sense of honour in women –
a value that should be recovered. Against this new culture, he insisted on
the primacy of “traditional values”. The Islamist discourse hence inverted
Bourguiba’s dichotomy between the “modern” (associated with progress)
and the “traditional” (related to ignorance). Indeed, Bourguiba criticised
practices that he saw as “traditional” – that is, values and practices that
merely imitated past customs (taqlīd).
It is rarely noted that both the Bourguibian and Islamist visions rely
on the desire to define and mould a national personality. Ghannushi
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recognised the decline of religion and its institutions before independence,
and the necessity to reform them. In his view, Bourguiba dissolved (tamyī‘)
Islam,64 especially in his policies of reform toward the Zaytuna, the shari‘a,
the religious endowments and the status of women. While both agreed
that a shared community of sentiments was necessary to build a nation, the
Islamist conception did not accept the Bourguibian state’s claims to shaping
these “disciplines of the heart”.
Ghannushi was in agreement with Bourguiba, however, about the
condition of women in the twentieth century. According to Ghannushi,
the twentieth-century woman “had been deprived of her personality
(shakhsiyya) as a person entirely responsible”.65 “She had been deprived of
the light (nūr) of knowledge and Gnosticism (irfān).”66 “Decline (inḥiṭāṭ)
had touched her like it touched man, but worse.”67 In the same vein, Haddad
and Bourguiba had diagnosed Tunisian women as twice subjugated.
Bourguiba declared before and after independence that women were living
under the yoke of both colonialism and patriarchy.68 Echoing Haddad’s
Our Women, Ghannushi wrote in the 1970s: “She was not allowed to even
choose her husband. She was deprived even of her part of inheritance and to
decide what to do with her own property.”69 And, he added, “this was not,
at that time and in that place, because of the values of Islam.”70 Here again,
Islamist activist Ghannushi was in agreement with statesman Bourguiba’s
diagnosis: Islam was not the culprit. But, he said, the fact that the Tunisian
woman had progressed so far in education could not be attributed to the
Personal Status Code or to Bourguiba himself. Such progress would have
happened no matter what. “Nowadays women are educated and work in
all Arab countries,” he wrote. “This is thanks to the movement of religious
reform of the nineteenth century.”71
For Ghannushi, it seemed, reform could not be conceived or implemented
by the state, but came from the historical influence of new ideas. In this
way, Ghannushi erased Bourguiba from the history of religious and social
reform, whereas Bourguiba had tried to place himself in this historical
line of Muslim reformers, whom, except for Haddad, he often quoted. The
contention around the Personal Status Code, and more broadly Bourguiba’s
understanding of the role of women, was not so much a struggle between
two different visions of women’s role in the public arena as a competition
– and an unequal one at that – between two political actors struggling to
be part of the “reformist” legacy. Indeed, recognising the positive elements
in the new 1956 code, Ghannushi wrote a discreet footnote to his al-Mar’a
al-muslima fi tunis: “All is not bad in the Code of Personal Status. The great
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majority of its texts are a copy and sometimes a distortion of Shaykh Dj ‘ayyit’s
codification, after it was purged from its Islamic values and principles.”72
His reference to Shaykh Muhammad al-‘Aziz al-Dj ‘ayyit’s 1948 codification
of Tunisian law showed Ghannushi’s interest and desire to connect his
own ideas to those of earlier reformers. He also quoted, in reference to
the reform of the status of women, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad
‘Abduh, Hassan al-Banna and the two Tunisian shaykhs, al-Tahar and alFadhel Ben Achour. These names formed an eclectic group. The reference to
al-Fadhel Ben Achour – then in the service of the postcolonial Bourguibian
regime – may seem strange, but perhaps Ghannushi’s point was to refer to
the legacy of reformist ‘ulama’ that Bourguiba had submitted to the modern
state, rather than build a rigorous intellectual chain of legacy and influence.
For Ghannushi, the Personal Status Code went beyond the Bourguibian
policies and was part of a strategy to “de-Islamise” the country on the part of
the West: “It is indirect colonisation,” he wrote.73
Ghannushi believed that it was a mistake to “think that we only need
little changes such as longer dresses and the abandoning of lipstick to
become an Islamic society”.74 Islam, he wrote:
does not interact with women by talking to them about their dresses’
length or width, but rather, it is interested in the woman’s vision of
life and what this vision leads her towards. The aim is for her … to
look at life as … an opportunity to elevate the persons from the level
of the animal to the human level.75
Bourguiba and Ghannushi had different understandings of the veil, but
they shared a repertoire for talking about the Tunisian woman’s place in
society. What mattered for both of them, as well as for Haddad, was the
vision women had of the world that surrounded them. They were both
interested in women’s subjectivity and awareness: they were particularly
intent on linking female subjectivity with access to knowledge, morality
and responsibility, all in the name of “progress”. Women also had to be
integrated into the public arena. For Bourguiba, this path had to be taken
without the veil; for Ghannushi, the path could only be taken with the veil.
But for both of them, the destination was the same, especially in terms of
women’s education. Ghannushi wrote:
We have to differentiate between the question of the education of
women and the question of dress. To insist that the young woman (alfatāt) must show modesty (ḥishma) and virtue (‘iffa) in her dress does
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not mean depriving her of her legal right to learn all the sciences she
wants. Or has it been written that the Muslim young woman, unlike
all the other women, should not have access to knowledge without
letting go of the principles that make her national personality? Was
this imposed to the young Japanese and Chinese women? They have
reached the highest scientific level and retained at the same time
their national personalities. Why is it only the young Muslim woman
who should accept to erase her personality in exchange for obtaining
some knowledge?76
In this particular writing, the defence of the veil by Ghannushi does not
come as a “legal prescription” but as a defence of the national personality in
opposition to the West, exactly as in Bourguiba’s words in the 1929 “battle of
the veil”. One can recognise in this quotation the influence of Bourguibian
postcolonial vocabulary, interweaving “the discipline of the heart”, morality
and virtue with the primacy of a people’s personality. However, Ghannushi
also reproached Bourguiba for his Western influences and the erasing of
Islam that, in his view, the Personal Status Code caused.77 Knowing that
Islamic theological justifications were given by Bourguiba for the Personal
Status Code, he added: “If Islam was evoked, this was to prepare some of its
texts and modify them in order to use them to feed the masses so that they
swallow the bitter pill of the Western solutions.”78

Conclusion
What can we infer from the continuities between the postcolonial
state’s conception of veiling and that of the Islamist opposition? Both
conceptions sprang from the desire to form a new and in the end similar
“habitus” for Tunisians. Bourguiba’s intent was to mould the Tunisian
woman’s personality and behaviour into the image he had of the Tunisian
nation: a Muslim and Mediterranean entity anchored in European culture.
Bourguiba wanted to regulate the physical behaviour and body of Tunisian
women in combination with circumscribing the prerogatives of Islamic law.
This combination did not reflect a “liberal” conception of the body but an
authoritarian vision of the nation and of the subjectivity of its citizens as
“enlightened”, “reasonable” and “virtuous”. In addition, Islam had to play
a substantial part in the definition of this specific type of subjectivity. For
Islamists such as Ghannushi, Bourguiba’s conception imposed a deplorable
rupture in history. However, their evaluation of the postcolonial state’s
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policies was the product of their oppositional standing, rather than of
an entirely different conception of society. In fact, in Ghannushi’s idea
of the Muslim veiled Tunisian woman, the body was disciplined within
a representation of the nation that one could find in Zaytuna-educated
Haddad’s, as well as in President Bourguiba’s unveiled woman.
Veiling and unveiling were in fact two contrasting disciplines given to
women to fulfil the same end: that of an educated woman taking care of
her family, as well as integrated in the public arena. These political postures
opposing and in favour of the veil perhaps also defined each other in a
competition that reified the two positions as “Islamic” and “secularist”, and
in which women were seldom authorised to intervene. The first difference
between Ghannushi and Bourguiba was not their view on Islam, for both
referenced it as a “religion of life”, but their will or refusal to refer to the
West. Second – and as a direct consequence of their political roles –
Bourguiba made Islam a province of the state, whereas Ghannushi did not
accept the construction of such a monopoly, which made the state define
and administer the conduct of individual and collective piety. Ghannushi’s
refusal to accept this illiberal set of constraints on Islam could not prevent
him from speaking the language of the state itself on normative conduct, a
direct product of reformist thought and of the postcolonial state’s legal and
ideological new constructs.
These continuities between reformist thought, postcolonial conceptions
of Islam and Islamist oppositional discourses help underline the role played
by the modern postcolonial state (prior to the emergence of Islamist
movements) in developing and disseminating normative prescriptions and
body disciplines that also helped the state appropriate Islamic narratives and
domesticate religious institutions. These normative prescriptions were in
turn used by Islamist movements for their own political purposes. Whereas
states and Islamists are today in a relationship of political opposition and
competition, I argue that in order to explain the religious language of
Islamist movements, and more generally the mobilising power of Islam on
the political scene, one must turn to the shaping and use of the tradition of
Islam by the postcolonial state’s elite. This elite institutionalised Islam as a
political resource, thereby providing a foundation on which Islamists could
formulate their ideologies.
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Coming to Believe:
the (Elusive) Time of Conversion
Souleymane Bachir Diagne

William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience establishes a distinction
between two types or archetypes of conversion.1 Conversion being defined
“in general terms” as “the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto
divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and
consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon
religious realities”,2 two modalities of it are distinguished: on the one hand,
the “striking instantaneous” conversion “of which Saint Paul’s is the most
eminent” and the effect of which is that “a complete division is established in
the twinkling of an eye between the old life and the new”;3 and on the other
hand, the gradual conversion which is conscious and voluntary. Apparently,
then, the crisis conversion, unlike the gradual conversion, has its moment.
Thus, James gives the example of an Oxford graduate who converted “at
precisely three o’clock in the afternoon of a hot July day ( July 13, 1886),”4
experiencing that in that instant “his poor divided mind became unified for
good.”5 In the same way, there is the moment when Saint Augustine heard
“tolle lege” (“pick up and read!”); the moment when Saint Paul experienced
rapture on the road to Damascus; and the moment of Blaise Pascal’s nuit de
feu (night of fire) in 1654.
It would be natural to think that authenticity is on the side of that type
of conversion, while it would be assumed that there is too much preparation,
hesitation and even calculation in the gradual type of conversion; that there
is always in it something which sounds like Henri IV’s famous exclamation
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“Paris vaut bien une messe!” (“Paris is worth a mass!”) when he announced
his intention to convert to Catholicism in order to be accepted as the King
of France. Conversions that aim to solve problems of intermarriages, to take
a more banal example, would fall under the same category. As a psychologist,
James examined how sudden conversions could be understood as “uprushes
into the ordinary consciousness” of processes taking place in the subliminal
region of the mind, so that “what makes the difference between a sudden
and a gradual convert is not necessarily the presence of divine miracle in the
case of one and something less divine in that of the other, but rather a simple
psychological peculiarity, the fact, namely, that in the recipient of the more
instantaneous grace we have one of those Subjects who are in possession of a
large region in which mental work can go on subliminally …”6
I would like to push that statement further and examine, with regard to
conversion, the Sufi understanding that the experience of conversion is all
about the “ruse of God” (makr Allah) which transforms even the “wrong” or
unauthentic reasons for conversion – self-interested calculation, for example
– into the divine favour of faith. Such a notion of a “ruse” implies that the
distinction between gradual and critical conversion is to be relativised as
irrelevant, any critical transformation being always prepared by a gradual
process, while the gradual (maybe subliminal) development itself unfolds
through critical moments. As this chapter examines different cases or figures
of conversion, it raises the following interconnected questions: what is the
time of conversion? At what moment can we say that a person has now
entered a new belief system? What does conversion tell us about time?7
Allow me first to recall a story of conversion which impressed me when I
was a little boy of about six. My parents had been sent by the administration
of the Senegalese postal services, for which they both worked, to the
Casamance region of Senegal. At that time, just a few years after the country’s
independence, Casamance had an important population of recent converts
to Islam and Christianity, as well as followers of traditional African religions
(improperly called “animists”). The people who had a long ancient Islamic
tradition were generally civil servants from the North, like my parents. My
father, in particular, was born into a family of Islamic scholars. Like many
middle-class families, we had hired local people to help run the house, and
there was one young man, Alexis, whose main task was to take me to and
from school. On Thursdays and Saturdays he would also take me to the
Qur’anic school and wait for me to finish my classes and recite my verses
for the day so that he could walk me back home. Alexis had a Christian first
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name because the church was trying to convert his group, but in fact his
religion was an African endogenous belief system.
One day, people from his village saw Alexis waiting for me at the Qur’anic
school and reported to his parents that he had become a Muslim. His father
immediately sent a messenger with a letter written in red ink (my mother
still recalls that ominous detail) threatening him with all sorts of calamities
if the news of his conversion turned out to be true. Alexis was totally terrified
and asked my parents for permission to return to his village and clarify that
he was just my pedagogue in the Greek sense and not a student at the school.
He explained that he had to do this, because in his anger his father could in
fact make him fall ill or even die through mystical means. But then, before
he left, he told my parents that there was actually some truth to the story –
that he was attracted to the Islamic religion, especially, he added, since all
the bosses (les patrons) in the city of Ziguinchor, most of them northerners,
were Muslims: he wanted to become a “patron” too, one day. My parents
paid him his wages plus some extra money and explained, without insisting,
that in Islam, one does not believe that any power other than God’s could
actually kill you using magical forces as punishment for becoming a Muslim
convert. Many years later, when we were living in Dakar, Alexis came to see
my father and told him that since his parents had passed away, he could
now freely embrace Islam. My father had him proclaim the shahada. Let me
add here that this story is an individual and personal expression of a larger
sociological phenomenon, which is that of the rapid Islamisation of the
southern regions of Senegal, under the influence of northern populations,
whose Islamisation is many centuries more ancient. Obviously, Alexis’s case
of conversion was not only gradual but calculated.
I will now consider the early days of Islam in Mecca, before the hijra to
Medina. This was, of course, the time of the famous, historic conversions
of those who are known as the companions of the Prophet: Khadija, who
believed in her husband, the Prophet, even as he did not believe in himself;
Ali, who entered Islam as a child; Umar, who was convinced by reading the
Surah Ta Ha, and so on. But the narrative of conversion I will evoke is that of
Hamzah, the Prophet’s uncle. The story is famous. The tradition is that Abu
Jahl, one of those who showed the most hatred toward the Prophet, one
day abused him with the worst possible insults, while the Prophet simply
looked at him and said nothing. When Hamzah heard what happened and
the way in which his nephew had been treated, he is reported to have felt an
anger he had never experienced before; to have gone straight to Abu Jahl
and struck him hard with his bow (he had been out hunting), shouting:
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“Will you insult him now that I am of his religion, and now that I profess
what he professes?” That was quite a singular profession of faith, on the spur
of the moment, bursting out of anger and sounding like a dare.
Let me now compare Alexis’s long-delayed conversion to Hamzah’s
instantaneous conversion by asking the questions: what happened and when
did it happen? How did they come to believe? Considering the time frame,
one could say that Alexis gradually constructed his Islamic “belief ” as he
came to reflect on a religion he’d discovered to be the secret of the “bosses”,
and on the very atmosphere of the Qur’anic school. One might even
think that the miracle of the Qur’anic verses he was hearing, even though
of course he did not understand them, gradually operated on him in the
way Islamic traditions report: that they can lead many to think that there
is something magical in them. But then the idea that Alexis’s attraction to
Islam was not disinterested, that there was some calculation about the best
way of becoming a “boss”, could also mean that there was something flawed
and inauthentic in what drove him to “conversion”. Especially if we add that
the main reason for delaying the formal profession of faith was the most
anti-Islamic reason possible: conformity to the religion of the forefathers
and belief that what they worship could be in any way useful or harmful.
Many Qur’anic verses could be quoted. Suffice it to recall that what defines
the Abrahamic faith is precisely the break from the fathers’ tradition: “But
when they are told, ‘Follow what God has bestowed from on high,’ some
answer, ‘Nay! We shall follow [only] that which we found our forefathers
believing in and doing.’ Why, even if their forefathers did not use their
reason at all, and were devoid of guidance?”8 and also: “(Abraham) said:
‘Do you then worship, besides God, things that can neither be of any good
to you nor do you harm?’”9
Shall we then say that to have waited until the time when there could
be no objection from the family altered the nature of his conversion by
showing that in fact he did not understand at all what he was converting to?
But isn’t it natural that the meaning of Islam as a radical break from the ways
of the fathers could only be clear to him after he actually converted from
those ways and began to learn the belief system he was adopting? Are we
saying then that (true) conversion comes only after conversion? One could
perfectly imagine Alexis, many years later, thinking that he was lucky, or, in
religious terms, blessed, not to have died before formally converting, having
postponed his admission to the community of Muslims for so long. But if
indeed in retrospect he were to understand that “luck” as a “blessing” or a
“grace”, would he also think that God had already converted him before he
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had even thought of conversion? “I convert” is indeed a strange performative,
as in order for me to be able to say it, it means “I have already converted.”
Hamzah’s conversion could then be understood not as something
that happened instantaneously out of a burst of extreme anger, but as an
expression of an already present but deeply buried belief in the new message
and its promise of a new social and ethical order.10 What anger did then
was tear down the barriers that repressed the belief inside his unconscious.
It is the paradox of conversion that it cannot be assigned, as it seems to
take place at some uncertain moment situated at once before and after the
actual declaration of faith, or maybe at a time outside serial time, for which
“before” and “after” make no sense.
There is, I believe, no better account than Saint Augustine’s narrative
of the paradox of conversion as a spiritual event that seems to have always
already taken place before it actually happens, signalling therefore what
seems to be a time outside the serial time which constitutes one’s life.11 In
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s Le Différend (1983), we read an important passage
in paragraph 125, about Augustine and time: “The God of Augustine or the
Living Present of Husserl is presented as the name of the instance which
synthesizes the nows. But it is such by means of the sentences in which it is
presented, and the now of each of those sentences remains to be synthesized
with the others, in a new sentence. God is for later, ‘in a moment’; the Living
Present is to come. They only happen by not arriving. That is what Beckett
means. Time does not fail consciousness, it makes it fail itself.”12
“God is for later, ‘in a moment’.” That describes perfectly the Confessions
as a narrative of the deferral or the continuous postponement of a
conversion which, nevertheless, has somehow already happened. Augustine
himself explains that his life had been just such a continuous postponement,
comparing it to the state of the sleeper who always pleads for “just a minute”,
“one more minute”, “let me have a little longer”: “No one wants to be asleep
all the time,” he writes in Book VIII of Confessions, “and it is generally
agreed among sensible people that being awake is a better state, yet it often
happens that a person puts off the moment when he must shake himself
out of sleep because his limbs are heavy with a lassitude that pulls him
toward the more attractive alternative, even though he is already trying to
resist it and the hour for rising has come …”13 First there is the deferral of his
baptism. When he fell suddenly ill in his boyhood, baptism became a matter
of extreme urgency, and it is “with distress and faith” that he “earnestly
begged”, he recounts, “to be baptized into (…) Christ”.14 And, of course,
his mother, Saint Monica, “would have hastened to ensure that [he] was
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initiated into the saving sacraments”.15 But then he recovered and therefore,
as he explains, “[his] cleansing was deferred on the pretext that if [he] lived
[he] would inevitably soil himself again…”16 And as we know, soil himself
he did! But during all that time of deferral, his mother never ceased to see
things as going to an already accomplished divine plan. For example, while
Augustine’s father wanted him to study for vain worldly reasons, his mother
saw academic pursuits as “a considerable help toward [his] gaining [God]
eventually”.17 And for that reason she did not want him to be encumbered
with a wife, even though marriage could have been a way of securing a more
Christian life. Her words, as when she cautioned him against fornication,
especially against “adultery with any man’s wife”, were in fact the words
of God that never ceased to be sung “into his ears”,18 although he did not
recognise them as such at that stage. And when his mother felt desperate
because of the kind of life her son was living, God sent a vision to console
her and reassure her that where she was, her son would be too.19
Finally, when the time comes, Augustine is able to hear the Word of God,
even though it is not as direct and clear as when he heard it through his
mother or in his own readings. (He confesses that he preferred Cicero to the
Bible.) What distinguishes that moment? What makes it, in the words of
Saint Augustine, “the hour for rising”? Nothing, compared to more dramatic
moments in his life. Except that this time he is able to recognise it, as if he had
already lived it before and knew exactly what response was expected from him.
When a voice from a house (that of a boy or a girl, Augustine says) is heard
saying, “Pick it up and read,” he knows that he is the addressee and then he
knows exactly what to read and what that means. The only change that now
makes him able to convert – that is, to turn around who he is and what his
life is going to be – is that the time has come; that time which has always
been present or a presence in his life: even if he deferred acknowledging the
encounter with God’s Word addressed to him, that encounter is what was
leading him all along. One can say, in the language of the quotation from
Lyotard’s Le Différend, that the Confessions are the succession of “nows”
towards the Living Present that would synthesize them. But that Living
Present belongs to another order, and is not embarked on in the succession
of serial time. Hence the paradoxical formula of Saint Augustine: to search
for God is already to have found him. As he writes: “You were within me
but I was outside and it was there that I searched for you.” Blaise Pascal
will repeat the same fundamental truth of conversion in his Mystère de Jésus:
“console-toi tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m’avais trouvé.” To search for
God outside, while he is inside, is still to search. In that search there is no
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opposite or wrong direction. What is said in the language of space is in fact
meant to be understood in the language of time: I looked in serial time, in
the time of succession, while what I was looking for remained in a living –
that is eternal – Present.
Following the story of Augustine’s conversion and reflections on
memory, Book XI of the Confessions is devoted to the notions of “time”
and “eternity”, sometimes put into meaningless questions such as, “What
was God doing before he made heaven and earth?” His general response
to this kind of paradox about “time before time” is to acknowledge that
“you have precedence over the past by the loftiness of your ever-present
eternity, and you live beyond all the future, because future times are future,
but as soon as they have arrived they will be past, whereas you are ever the
same, and your years fail not”;20 trying to think of time in itself, without
spatialising it as the “movement of a body”21 or considering it as measurable
while it has no extension.22 The Book ends with the opposition between
“our time” and God’s eternity. The Confessions is a meditation on time and
on that opposition between the outside of postponement and the inside of
Presence. The time of conversion is eternity.
About the archetypal nature of Augustine’s conversion, Ann H. Hawkins
writes:
In the Confessions, as in many spiritual autobiographies that will
pattern themselves after it, life before conversion is perceived as
a kind of labyrinthine maze with numerous false passages and
wrong turnings, but one that eventually and inevitably culminates
in conversion. Accordingly the first nine books are the story of
Augustine’s personal life, of his spiritual wandering in the ‘distant
country’ that is the Earthly City. But in the last four books the quest
of pagan epic and Old Testament Scripture turns into the metaphor
of the Christian pilgrimage, the peregrinatio where the ‘true haven’ or
‘final resting-place’ is the City of God […] a reality not attainable in
this life. It is against this one eternal city that we are to see the many
secular cities – Thagaste, Carthage, Rome, even Milan – in the story
of Augustine’s spiritual quest.23
The Confessions does allow many different narratives of conversion to
“pattern themselves after it”. That is especially true, maybe unexpectedly,
of The Autobiography of Malcolm X. It is indeed full of “false passages and
wrong turnings”, especially the ones that “culminate in conversion”; the
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pilgrimage, the peregrinatio to the “true haven”, is just such a culmination: in
this case the City of God is Mecca, where Malcolm X found the peace that
eluded him all his life, peace with others beyond the division of humanity
into races, peace with himself beyond anger and hatred, and consequently
peace with his newly found God. That peace is the very meaning of Islam.
Again, the question here is when did Malcolm’s conversion take place?
When is the moment corresponding to his affirmation that “[he] found
Allah and the religion of Islam and it completely transformed [his] life”?24
Is it the first time he declared “I don’t eat pork”, having just received the
message from his brother Philbert that by giving up pork and cigarettes, he
would be shown how to get out of prison? He explains that later, after he
had “read and studied Islam a good deal” he came to realise that the decision
he thus made had been, without his being conscious of it, his “first preIslamic submission”.25 That is, he adds, the meaning of the Muslim teaching
about conversion, that “if you take one step toward Allah – Allah will take
two steps toward you.”26 But which of the many steps that he took in his
life was the first step on the path to conversion? Was it when his brother
Reginald visited him in prison and told him about what he considered “the
natural religion for the black man” which he called the “Nation of Islam”?
When he felt the urge to study, to read, to write and to debate? When he
prayed to Allah for his brother Reginald when he was suspended from the
Nation of Islam? When he met Elijah Muhammad? When he lost faith in
him? When he said to his sister Ella who had become what he himself calls
in his autobiography “orthodox Muslims”: “I want to make the pilgrimage
to Mecca”, thus “converting” again to mainstream Islam? When he started
chanting the words that all pilgrims repeat again and again during the
pilgrimage: “Here I come, O Lord! Here I come”? Or was it when, through
the pilgrimage and in particular at the station of Arafat, he discovered
the simple truth that had eluded him all his life, that “We are truly all the
same”?27
When he explains that the pilgrimage to Mecca had “forced him to
re-arrange much of [his] thought-patterns previously held” (and that is
the meaning of conversion) he seems to indicate that the true moment of
conversion happened then, but he also acknowledges that his “whole life
had been a chronology of – changes”.28 So again, we can see in Malcolm X’s
narrative of conversion the paradox of a life reconstructed after the fact as
getting closer, by deferral, to a presence that never ceased to be active in one’s
life.
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From these stories of conversion, I would like to draw two general
conclusions.
1.

2.

Conversion appears as an experience of non-serial time that may be
called the “living present” (Lyotard) or “duration” (Bergson). To say
it in the language of Blaise Pascal, beyond the order of the flesh and
beyond the order of the intellect, both under the domination of serial
time, it takes place in a third order, incommensurable to those two:
that of “charity”. As Pascal’s experience shows, in the move from one
order to another there exist both gradualness and crisis. His “night of
fire” was possible only when the path of the intellect met a dead end,
which is similar to what Ghazali describes in his own Confession. In
fact, if gradualism were not always part of conversion, there would be
no sense in Pascal’s enterprise of converting the “Libertines”.
It follows, then, that conversion is an act of God and not of the
subject, or that in and through every act of the subject God himself
acts. This defines the “ruse of God” of which the Islamic tradition
quoted by Malcolm X is an expression: “If you take one step toward
God – God will take two steps toward you.” In fact, even that
first step cannot be consciously taken as a voluntary step toward
God. Actually, anything could count as a first step; the paradox of
conversion being that its authenticity cannot be questioned. There
are no bad reasons for it, only good ones, but in retrospect: wanting
to become a boss, like Alexis; seeing it as a way of avenging an offence
(Hamzah); or accepting the pressure to declare one’s faith in a given
religion in order to marry the person you love. The Qur’anic word
taūbah (conversion) captures the notion that although conversion is
voluntary, its ultimate agent is God alone. “Accept our repentance,
You are the Acceptor of repentance, the Dispenser of Grace” is a
canonical translation of a prayer expressing conversion.29 Jacques
Berque, whose rendition of the Qur’an always keeps the original
meaning of words, translates the prayer as follows: “Repent in our
favour, You are prone to repent.”30 That when his creature converts, it
is God who converts (or repents) may be a strange translation. It is,
nevertheless, a true account of the paradox of conversion.
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The Shadow of Terror on Distant Muslims
Akeel Bilgrami

Everybody is obsessively talking and writing about religion these days.
Foundations fund its study more, perhaps, than any other subject in the
study of human society. In drawing rooms and dining rooms all over the
world people speak about religion as if they were all pundits. That in itself
is hardly surprising since religious practice of one kind or another, orthodox
and heterodox, established as well as populist, has shown no real decline,
despite the spread of modern science and technology to most of the distant
parts of the world. In fact, some of the most ardent practitioners of religion
live in the most technologically developed and modern societies in the
world. If Europe is something of an exception, the explanation that comes
most readily to mind reveals a lot about the recent history of the West.
But first, it should be said that some of the writing on religion (by
Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, to name just two recent authors)
that is most widely read and considered the most controversial is in fact
utterly irrelevant to the deep issues at stake. The prolific authors who scorn
the irrationality of such beliefs as those that the world was created in six
days a few thousand years ago have revived tired Victorian debates for our
time, without understanding that what religion means for most people has
very little to do with arcane beliefs of that kind. This is not to deny that
large numbers of people hold those beliefs. But what religion means for
the very people who might believe in such events goes much deeper than is
often countenanced by the authors of these books. If they were to study the
social and psychological issues at stake, they might deserve to be taken more
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seriously. Until then, their books are a waste of our time and a waste of their
great intelligence.
It is a plain fact that religion today (and perhaps at all times in history)
has been much more a matter of practice than of belief. It is true that
religious people have always claimed the importance of their beliefs, and we
know very well that they have persecuted those who did not share them. But
for the most part, the beliefs mattered because practices of various kinds,
which flowed from them or were tied to them, also mattered. What is more,
often beliefs were dogmatically pronounced even as practices substantially
changed without any corresponding articulation in revised beliefs. As a
result, considerable de facto secularity has been achieved in many parts
of the world, including within Islamic practice, without any formulated
acknowledgement of the secular at the level of doctrine.
In this respect, polls which report widespread religious rigidity are
misleading. If you were to wave a microphone at someone in Teheran and
ask, “Do you believe in the shari‘a?” he is very unlikely to say “No.” But if
you cast a studious glance at his life and see how his practices square with the
strict demands of the shari‘a, you will often find it quite distant from what
he has avowed when polled. The same is true if you wave a microphone at
someone in Nebraska and ask, “Do you believe in creationism?” The point
is not that the polls that ask these questions and get these answers record
nothing. The point is rather that they can’t always be taken at face value;
what they track is much more complicated than the conclusion registered
by polls: “X percentage of the population of such-and-such a place believes
that society should subscribe to the shari‘a (or believes that creationism is
a fact).” To put it differently, assent to such questions are “performatives”
rather than strict avowals of one’s doctrinal beliefs. Like all performatives,
they should be interpreted and diagnosed as expressing and revealing
something deeply felt, often inarticulate; something that is often at the level
of practice and personal aspiration and yearning rather than at the level of
surface propositional statement and assertion.
This descriptive distinction between religion as practice or way of life
(which is essentially fluid and malleable) and religion as belief or doctrine
(that, by contrast, can be susceptible to more rigidly codified and explicitly
pronounced subscription) is well worth exploring as it applies to many
regions of the world. Let me explore it briefly for the religion of my own
background, Islam, and for the part of the world from where I grew up,
before returning to more global political issues regarding religion.
Islam had travelled to India via trade from West Asia long before the
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emergence of the Sultanates, who are usually described as forming the
“Islamic period” of Indian history. Even when Islam arrived in the form of
conquest and Sultanate and then Mughal rule, it came via Persia, Central
Asia and Afghanistan. Through all this it acquired so many accretions of
local customs and culture that it bears little resemblance to the scriptural
and normative demands of the doctrine that is believed to mark the original
Islam of the Arabian lands. Historians and anthropologists have compared
the great continuity of Muslim practice and life with that of local Hindu
religious culture when it settled into its Indian surroundings.
In the midst of this livelier, slowly accreted and accumulated homegrown
religious culture, for centuries the formal, bookish elements of Islam were
often unknown to ordinary Muslims. These elements had to be recalled in
self-conscious ways and unusual circumstances. For the most part, everyday
life reflected the common syncretic culture that Muslims shared with
Hindus, and it flowered vividly in such aesthetic forms as the great “gharanas”
of Hindusthani music as well as in the distinctly twentieth-century culture
around Bombay cinema. In the balance between these two contrasting
elements – of form and root – the latter dominated the former through the
centuries and continues to do so today. However, it is made increasingly
precarious by developments of recent decades, and by some striking recent
events – of which 9/11 and its aftermath are the most momentous.
There is to begin with the relative poverty of Muslims in India ever
since the more landed and educated Muslims, fearing loss of estate and
discrimination in career opportunities in India, left for Pakistan during
Partition. For those who stayed, those fears have largely been realised.
There was also another major loss: that of their language, Urdu, indeed the
language of many Hindus in north India as well, which was given away as an
exclusive gift to Pakistan.
The Indian leaders, for all their avowed pluralism and secularism, were
unable to withstand the nationalistic pique of Hindu ideologues in their
own Indian National Congress party, who applied great pressure to have
Urdu dropped as a medium of instruction in the national and regional
school curricula. And in general, ever since the passing of Nehru, the
Congress party has tended to adopt the most debased and cynical strategy
that democracy allows – that of trying to win elections by appealing to the
majoritarian sentiment as opposed to minorities such as Muslims and Sikhs.
This strategy culminated in three hideous events: the pogrom against the
Sikhs after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the destruction of the mosque
at Ayodhya by Hindu political activists, and the slaughter of roughly two
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thousand Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. Ironically, the strategy had led
(until recently) to the repeated defeat of the Congress party at the hands
of a Hindu nationalist party which can play the majoritarian game much
more openly and brazenly than the Congress, with its hypocritical avowals
of secularism. Even when in power, as it has been in the last few years, the
Congress has not reasserted the secularism towards which Nehru had tried
(not always successfully) to steer it.
The Muslim “minority” in India, therefore, has had the ideological
potential to vex this growing Hindu majoritarian outlook in at least two
ways. First, it is open to perception as a minority descended from the
Muslim conquerors who ruled for centuries over a predominantly Hindu
people, and thus a good target for “historical” revenge. Second, it is open to
the perception of being a “residual” population, one that had the choice of
leaving for the newly created Muslim nation of Pakistan in 1947, but which
chose to stay, so it must now adapt in accordance with the culture of the
Hindu nation it opted for.
This ideological perception was once merely the vision of a fringe
labelled the “Hindu Right”, which was opposed to the secular tendencies of
the central leadership of the freedom movement and of post-Independent
India, most particularly of Gandhi and Nehru. It is now very much the vision
of the majoritarian Hindu ideology that pervaded the national government
at the centre for a substantial period until very recently, as well as in some
(but by no means all) of the states and regions in the country.
Even putting aside the dubious conceptual elements in these perceptions
(that is, the very idea of “historical” revenge, and the restriction of choice to
the options “Either go to a Muslim nation or stay in a Hindu one”) there are
plain historical facts that expose their falsity.
With regard to the first perception, there is the fact that most Muslims
today are not descendants of a conquering people, but Hindu converts;
and there is the fact that a number of the Muslim rulers of India showed
remarkable religious tolerance, comparable at least to the Muslim rule in
medieval Spain. With regard to the second, there is the fact of the helplessly
sedentary nature of the poor and labouring classes, which meant that
immigration over thousands of miles was not a serious option. There is
also the fact of the idealism of both this class and the much smaller – but
admittedly more mobile – educated middle class of Muslims, who believed
that a secular India was preferable to a nation created on the basis of religion.
But these are mere contemptible facts; and ideological perceptions, as we
know, are the products of a free social imagination.
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This ideological situation has made Indian Muslims deeply resentful and
defensive in their mentality. And this mentality is adversely affecting the
double movement I have mentioned of rooted quotidian syncretic diversity
and invocation of scriptural form and fundamentals. This mentality threatens
to tilt the balance in favour of the latter over the former. In a situation where
material life as well as self-respect is increasingly threatened by alarming
majoritarian tendencies in the polity, the absolutist doctrinal side of the
double movement is holding out promise of dignity and autonomy in the
name of Islam, especially among the young. The attractions are illusory,
of course: they are manifestly undemocratic; they are deeply reactionary
on issues of gender; and they are phobic of modernity in the extreme –
phobic even to a homegrown, non-Western path to modernity. They are
“reactionary” in every sense of the term, including that of reacting to feelings
of helplessness and defeat, and the seeming lack of viable alternatives to cope
with these feelings.
An example of reaction-formation is one response to the combination of
poverty, lack of career opportunities and loss of Urdu, which has been the
rise of the madrasa, which are religious schools peppered all over the country,
especially in northern India. Often financed by Saudi Arabian largesse, these
schools offer free education in Urdu and a place for boys from povertystricken families to live for free while they are trained according to strict
scriptural doctrine. To some extent, these schools provide a recruitment
ground for future careers in fundamentalist movements. (I say “some”
extent and mean it. The extent may well be highly exaggerated by a careless
journalistic class.) This is just one example, and all of it predictably leads to
a backlash from Hindu ideologues, and in turn defensiveness, surfacing in
aggressive reactions among Muslims.
I would like to say something about this defensive and reactive Muslim
mentality. What is most striking is that precisely this mentality is found all
over the Muslim world, even where Muslims are an overwhelming majority
– the only difference being that the reaction is of course not to Hindus,
but to American presence and dominance. I will not catalogue the familiar
(and dreary if it weren’t so palpable) litany of the wrongs of American
foreign policy in the Middle East, not to mention in Vietnam, East Timor,
Chile and various other parts of Latin America. From the overthrow of
a decent and humane leader like Mossadegh in Iran; to the support of
corrupt, elitist, and tyrannical leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and so on;
to the cynical arming and training of Muslim extremists in Afghanistan;
to the longstanding support for occupation by expansionist settlement in
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Palestinian territories; America – driven as always by corporate interests
– has bred resentment among non-elite sections of the population all over
Muslim lands.
That all of this follows a long history of colonial subjugation and
condescension by European powers, even after decolonisation, involves the
West as the target of such reaction. For some years now, this resentment
has taken on an explicitly religious, Islamist rhetoric – again because Islam
seems to provide an ideological peg of dignity and resistance upon which to
hang these resentments.
All this is familiar. Though perhaps what is less so is that initially, and
even until a very few years ago, specifically “anti-American” (or what are
sometimes called “anti-imperialist”) versions of Islamism were much
more prevalent in Iran than in client states such as Saudi Arabia; but as a
result of Al-Jazeera and other forms of communication made possible by
new technologies, Muslims even in Saudi Arabia who had hitherto been
uncritically “pro-American” in their sympathies have been exposed to some
of the political and economic realities in Arab nations, and have been able
to detach themselves from the cognitive clutch of the royal family and
elites. And some of the most volatile and restless among them have (again
as a result of the new communications technologies) been able to join with
similar anti-American groups in both neighbouring and far-flung lands,
from the caves of Afghanistan to cells in Hamburg, London and New Jersey.
The point of importance, however, is this: that this Islamist rhetoric is a
dangerous, brittle source of self-respect is obvious to most Muslims in these
countries, but there does not seem to be, even to them, any viable alternative.
This conflicted position of many Muslims should be crucial to any analysis
of our present time.
I think it can safely be said that as a matter of ubiquitous empirical fact
– whether in Mumbai or Cairo, Karachi or Tehran, Afghanistan or Saudi
Arabia, New Jersey or Bradford – most Muslims are not absolutists, and are
in fact deeply opposed to the absolutists in their midst. This is evident in the
fact that before 9/11, during elections, the “fundamentalist” parties failed to
gain power, whether in Iran or in Pakistan. Even those who did not oppose
the fundamentalists were too busy with their own affairs to be seduced by
absolutist fantasies about an Islamic revival.
Yet these ordinary Muslims, who form the overwhelming majority in
Muslim nations, have not had the confidence and courage to openly criticise
the absolutists, and this is because they, too, are affected by the defensive
mentality that pervades these regions. To them, to openly criticise seems
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to capitulate to Western habits and attitudes of arrogant domination, in
colonial history and even today. What would give them the confidence and
courage to criticise the absolutists in their midst? This question is of utmost
urgency in our time, and it should be on the mind of every humane and
sensitive American and European today.
What is perfectly obvious is that destroying impoverished nations such
as Afghanistan and Iraq is not going to help, nor is the constant portrayal of
the problem as Islam versus freedom and modernity. It is not freedom that
ordinary non-fundamentalist Muslims are against and it is not modernity
they want to shun; it is the naked, corporate-driven, geo-politically
motivated wrongs of American and Western dominance of their regions
which they oppose. If they stand by, silent and confused, as Islam is invoked
in grotesque distortions by the most detestable elements in their society as
the ultimate source of resistance against this domination, it behoves those
of us who have escaped these resentments and their causes to give them the
confidence to see their way out of this confusion.
To do so, we will have to call things as they are, evident to everyone
except some insular American and European citizens who are unaware
of the effects of their governments' actions in the world, and much more
culpably, the journalists who speak and write in the mainstream media as
well as mandarin intellectuals in universities. We will have to say that what
happened on 9/11 was an act of atrocious, senseless and unpardonable
cruelty. No effort to understand Muslim mentality, as my effort is, should
or could muffle this criticism. But we will also have to say that the bombing
of a parched and hungry nation like Afghanistan, of creating what seems
like almost permanent insurgent mayhem in Iraq – which was already
devastated by years of a cruel and immoral embargo – and then allowing
the destruction of Lebanon and now Gaza, are merely the last and among
the worst in a century filled with such immoral interventions. All of this can
be only the first step in addressing the deep historical and contemporary
sources of this defensive mentality.
We cannot forget that the confused Islamist rhetorical veneer, by which
this defensive mentality presents itself to the world, is a reactionary rhetoric
of the supposed pieties and glories of an Islamic past. But the hopes and
aspirations of ordinary Muslims who have succumbed to their rhetoric are the
existential hopes and aspirations for a future in which a radically politicised
Islam has no particular place or point. If we clearly see this dialectical
point, our own efforts need not fall into the confusion that the rhetoric
encourages, as some writers (Christopher Hitchens, Martin Amis, Hirst
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Ali, Irshad Manji, Michael Ignatieff, Niall Fergusson, Thomas Friedman,
and Andrew Sullivan, to name just a few) clearly have done when they write
widely read articles and books with titles such as “This is a Religious War”1
and The Trouble with Islam.2 With their shrill rhetoric, these writers, much
lauded in the mainstream Western press that shapes a great deal of public
opinion, are buying into the very confusion of those whom they oppose. In
so doing, they are letting down the millions of ordinary Muslims all over
the world who, in the end, are the only weapons America and Europe have
against their terrorist enemies.

Notes
1. Andrew Sullivan, “This is a Religious War”, The New York Times, 7 October 2001.
2. Irshad Manji, The Trouble with Islam: A Muslim’s Call for Reform in her Faith (United
States: St. Martin’s Press, 2004).

Citational Exegesis of the Qur’an:
Towards a Theoretical Framework
for the Construction of Meaning
in Classical Islamic Thought.
The Case of the Epistles of the Pure Brethren
(Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’)*
Omar Alí-de-Unzaga

… the example of the Qur’an has been especially
neglected, both by Muslim scholarship and
Orientalist erudition. Very few attempts have
been made to apply modern linguistic tools and
conceptualization to Qur’anic Discourse without
any concession to the theological vocabulary.
As for the literary approach, there is nothing
equivalent to N. Frye (The great code).
Mohammed Arkoun1

* This paper was commissioned especially for this Festschrift; it was not presented at the
workshop held at AKU-ISMC in October 2009. It was written as a tribute to Professor
Arkoun by a former student of his, highlighting a particular aspect of Professor Arkoun’s
work. Although it is not in the same vein as the other papers, we felt it appropriate to
include it in the Festschrift.
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Nobody would attempt to study Islamic culture
without starting with the Koran, or Hindu culture
without starting with the Vedas and Upanishads.
Northrop Frye 2
The Bible has been called the Great Code of Christian
culture [...]; this is true in at least a similar measure of
the Qur’an’s role in Islamic culture. Therefore it is not
surprising that the study of the Qur’an is not merely
one particular field of study besides others, but that
at the same time it fulfils the role of encyclopaedic
knowledge for the devout Muslim. To us it becomes
a source for the Muslim self-image.
Claude Gilliot3

I was Mohammed Arkoun’s student between 1994–6 at the newly
established Graduate Programme in Islamic Studies and Humanities at
the Institute of Ismaili Studies. Professor Arkoun opened up his students’
eyes to the possibility of exploring the subjects traditionally covered by
Islamic Studies in a new way and continuously invited us to apply the
tools developed by various disciplines to the study of the history, religion
and thought of predominantly Muslim societies (a long circumlocution to
avoid using the term “Islam” as an essentialised construct). This article is a
contribution to honour his memory by applying concepts from linguistics,
literary criticism, and philosophy of language to classical Arabic texts. It is
part of a larger project on the citations of the Qur’an and their philosophical
exegesis in the Epistles of the Pure Brethren (Rasā’il Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ ).

I. The Great Code
The two remarks used as heading quotes in the present chapter were both
made in connection with The Great Code, a book by the Canadian literary
critic Northrop Frye (d. 1991) on the influence of the Bible on Western
literature, art and creative imagination (the equivalent to Arkoun’s French
imaginaire) in general.4 Frye, an authority on the English Romantic poet
William Blake (d. 1827), both borrowed from, and was inspired by, Blake’s
memorable aphorism: ‘The Old & New Testaments are the Great Code of
Art.’5
Mohammed Arkoun lamented that neither traditional Muslim
scholarship nor those engaged in critical Islamic Studies have produced
anything comparable to Frye’s understanding of how a text or discourse
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turned into seminal text (in his case, the Bible, in our case the Qur’an) has
become an overwhelming referent, intrinsically woven into the intellectual
and literary output of a culture (in his case Anglo-Saxon literature, in our
case literature in Arabic but also Persian, Turkish, and so on). Frye himself
hinted to this (as seen in the heading quote).
Here I will take as a given premise that a culture or cultural network is
best seen in the intertextual relations that occur between the texts produced
in a socio-linguistic setting, an intertextuality that to a large extent revolves
around an axial text which is both the main source of intellectual and
creative inspiration, and the point to which all else relates in some way or
the other. Intertextuality, however, does not merely refer to formal literary
borrowings between texts but explains the dynamics of a whole socio-religiointellectual cultural sphere (classical Islamic thought) and its relation with
the texts that –with time – come to be seen as “foundational”.6 The culture,
then, perceives the text as its foundational text, although in reality the text
is shaped and reshaped by virtue of being read and re-created, so to speak,
by succeeding generations and in various contexts. In this regard, we can
speak of the re-creation of meaning, which is the result of a long history of
reception. This is also true of the Qur’an and Islamic culture. In this chapter,
I will explore how we can approach the intertextuality of Islamic literature
and thought vis-à-vis the Qur’an and the reshaping of its meanings, by
looking at the phenomenon of citational exegesis. Arkoun, naturally, also
expressed his dismay at the paucity of the application of the findings of the
social sciences (linguistics, semiotics and literary criticism in particular) to
the critical scholarship on Islamic thought. This chapter builds on two of
the most central ideas if Mohamed Arkoun’s thought: applied islamology,
on the one hand; and logocentricism on the other.
The work of the virtuoso poet Abū’l-‘Alā’ al-Ma‘arrī contains many traces
of an intimate thematic and structural intertextuality with the Qur’an.
This is especially true of his work al-Fuṣūl wa’l-ghayāt, a book now only
partially extant.7 Some accused him of attempting to imitate the Qur’an or
to surpass it;8 others, however, did not see such intention.9 Regardless of the
poet’s intention, what is interesting for our present purpose is that, due to
religious scruples and the theological dogma of i‘jāz or inimitability of the
Qur’an,10 Ma‘arrī’s critics failed to analyse this intertextuality from a literary
point of view as well as from a stance of intellectual neutrality. Indeed, the
poet is reported to have said about his book, when confronted about the
similarities of his work and the Qur’an:
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مل تصقله املحاريب أربعامئة سنة
lam taṣqulhu’l-maḥārīb arba‘a-mi’a sana
The miḥrabs have not polished it for four hundred years11
As we can see from this quote, attributed to Ma‘arrī, he was allegedly
commenting on the authority gained by the Qur’an over the centuries. This
was partially due to the Qur’an’s exposure to, and acceptance by, generations
and generations of minds for whom it was the ultimate source of authority
and truth.
It is desirable to undertake a project that allows us to enhance our
understanding of the construction of meaning in classical Islamic thought.
The present study is part of a project that intends to analyse the engagement
of authors in various fields of knowledge with the text of the Qur’an,
with regards to their citational borrowings in particular and with a view
to understand the exegesis implied in the citation processes. This must be
done in a manner that is free from the constraints of religious affiliation and
ideological persuasion that has dominated Islamic thought, traditionally
concerned about what is “orthodox” or “correct”, and also without the
Orientalist obsession with superficial origins of ideas, or what has been
termed “parallelomania”, although it could easily be termed “origin-mania”.12
The desideratum here is not to see how the Qur’an has influenced or coloured
later literature and thought, but to understand the processes through which
Muslim authors, in their attempt to understand the Qur’an, have actually
recreated its meanings (and continue to do so) generation after generation
and century after century, across all schools, approaches and disciplines by
citing from the Qur’an in their works.

II. Citational Exegesis
This chapter is an attempt to contribute to the construction of a theoretical
framework that aspires to facilitate the analysis of what can be termed
citational exegesis, a terms that refers to the insertion or “quotational
borrowing” of Qur’anic elements – verses, idioms, words, concepts, images
and figures – verbatim or by way of reminiscence or echoing of the Qur’an,
in works of classical Islamic thought. This citational process implies an
interpretation, a particular reading, of the text which is the result of the
process of transportation and adaptation that a textual element from the
Qur’an undergoes from its original setting to its new interpretive locus. It is
important to remark that here I am not referring to formal Qur’anic exegesis
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(tafsīr), nor even to explicit interpretations of particular Qur’anic motifs in
intellectual or literary works. By exegesis I mean the intellectual process that
allows authors to confer, attach or impose meaning onto a Qur’anic element
in the process of its quotation. The quotation, then, is a transposition of the
Qur’anic element into a new setting (which we will call the recipient text)
that inevitably results in the semantic transformation of both the recipient
text and in the interpretive reading of the Qur’an. Once a Qur’anic element
or textual unit is cited in another work with an implied meaning, this
immediately indicates that the way that element is understood when reading
it in the text of the Qur’an itself is coloured and limited by the meaning
implied in the citation.
Our case study here will be the Epistles of the Pure Brethren (Rasā’il
Ikhwān al-ṣafā’), a fourth/tenth-century work produced in Iraq.13 The
Epistles are an anonymous work, though presumably composed by a group
of thinkers based in Basra whose names are identified by Abū Ḥayyān alTawḥīdī (d. 414/1023).14 They comprise fifty-two treatises organised in four
parts: mathematics-logics, natural sciences, soul-related disciplines and
treatises on religion and divine law.15
To illustrate the point I wish to make about citational exegesis, we may
refer to the following cryptic expression of the Qur’an:16 wa ‘alayhā tis‘ata
‘ashara – over it are nineteen and the way it is interpreted in the Epistles. The
Qur’anic text is part of Sūrat al-Muddaththir, one of the very earliest suras to
be communicated by Muhammad to his fellow Meccans. In this sura, through
a powerful string of short verses mostly in rhyme (for the first part of the
verse) the voice of the communicator (presumably God) addresses a second
person singular (presumably Muhammad) who is described as shrouded in
a mantle and is exhorted to arise and preach. It then goes on to refer to those
who are successful but haughtily reject the revelation as “nothing but mortal
speech”. The verse then describes the terrible destiny of such people: they
will be roasted in “Saqar”, a mysterious word and place of which we are only
told two things: lā tubqī wa lā tadharu, lawwāḥatun li’l-bashari, wa ‘alayhā
tis‘ata ‘ashara – it spares not, neither leaves alone scorching the flesh; over it
are nineteen. After this obscure numerical reference, the text continues into
what seems to be a gloss verse,17 which contains a totally different internal
structure and feel. It is a self-referential commentary on the allusive and
metaphorical language of the Qur’an. The image (mathal) is explained: the
Fire (al-nār) is guarded by angels, whose number is a “trial” (fitna) for all,
believers and unbelievers alike. Due to this gloss verse, most commentators
interpreted the over it are nineteen verse as containing an ellipsis which should
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be understood as “nineteen angels”. However, when we read how this phrase
has been cited by the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ we find a different interpretation. In
Epistle 30, “On the Specificity of Pleasures and the Wisdom and Quiddity
of Life and Death”, the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ define Hell (jahannam) as “the world
of generation and decay” (‘ālam al-kawn wa’l-fasād) which corresponds to
the sublunar world, and Paradise (janna) as “the world of spirits and the
extent of heavens” (‘ālam al-arwāḥ wa sa‘at al-samāwāt).18 As a result, the
inhabitants of the former are the souls that are attached to animal bodies
that are affected by pain and aching; those of the latter are the angelic souls
that inhabit the world of the spheres. For the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ it is possible to
exit the lower world, given that jahannam (and they quote from a verse of
Qur’an which refers to the followers of Iblīs19) has seven gates (lahā sab‘atu
abwābin). They identify the seven gates with the seven planets (al-sab‘a alsayyāra, literally, the seven wandering [stars], the expression used to refer to
the visibly travelling heavenly bodies – Moon, Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars,
Jupiter and Saturn, as opposed to the fixed stars). The influence of the seven
planets on the affairs and beings of this world, in the astral philosophy of the
Ikhwan al-ṣafā’ manifests itself through their passing by the twelve zodiacal
signs, thus making in total nineteen.20 The point here is that it is only after
the Qur’anic verse on the “nineteen” is cited in this astral context, that it
is possible to read the Qur’an again in a new light: lā tubqī wa lā tadharu,
lawwāḥatun li’l-bashari, wa ‘alayhā tis‘ata ‘ashara – it spares not, neither
leaves alone scorching the flesh; over it are nineteen, would mean that the
earth is the place of suffering for the souls trapped into bodies and which are
under the influence of the seven planets and the twelve signs. The implied
exegesis of a citation has had an effect on the received meaning of the Qur’an
text and many readers would have understood the Qur’an differently after
reading the citation in the Epistles of the Ikhwān al-ṣafā’.
I will limit myself here to suggesting some lines of enquiry based on a
number of tools developed in recent decades in the fields of philosophy of
language, literary criticism and theories of meaning and pragmatics. It is not
possible here to provide material from a practical text analysis to contrast
such a theory.21 Neither is this the place to elaborate on the philological and
literary theory concepts elaborated in classical Arabic sources with regards
to the phenomenon of citation. I am referring to the classifications of
“quotational borrowings”, or unmarked, non-explicit citations – quotations
in poetry and prose literature and in intellectual production in general, of
poetic lines and later also of Qur’anic verses, hadiths, proverbs and aphorisms.
The main technical terms used were taḍmīn (embedded quotation) and
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iqtibās (umarked quotation), but also other terms whose positive or
negative connotations change according to the critics – tamaththul and
tamthīl (“citation”), ijtilāb and istilḥāq (“injection” and annexation of
familiar verses in new compositions), istizāda (“supplementation”), ḥusn altaḍmīn (“good quotation”), intiḥāl (“plagiarism”), di‘āma (“propping up”),
and iṣṭirāf (“expropriation” which implies claiming authorship), ihtidām
(“cannibalisation”, a substantial borrowing with only a few changes from the
original), iḥāla (“insinuation”), ishāra and talmīḥ (“allusion”), īrād al-mathal
(borrowing of part of a proverb), tasmīṭ, tawshīḥ, talmīḥ, talwīḥ (later terms
equivalent to taḍmīn), isti‘āna (borrowing a whole verse or more), īdā‘/rafw
(“padding”, borrowing less than a line), istishhād (“illustrative citation” of
poetry in prose), ḥall (“prosification”).22
It is worth nothing in this regard that classical Arabic literary theory,
sophisticated as it is, is insufficient and even inadequate to tackle the issue at
hand, the implicit citational exegesis of the Qur’an. By way of illustration we
can refer to Gustav E. Grunebaum’s mention of the 4–5th/10–11th century
Ash‘arī mutakallim and Mālikī jurisprudent Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. alṬayyib al-Baqillānī,23 “who disposes of a rich terminology with respect to
poetical figures and tropes” and yet “has no terms to designate the different
types of literary dependency with which he is constantly concerned in his
discussion of the uniqueness of the Koran”. 24

III. Citing the Qur’an: Quotation Formulas and their Exegetical
Rile. The Case of the Epistles of the Pure Brethren
(Rasā’īl Ikhwān al-ṣafā’)
The Qur’anic material present in the Epistles may be divided into three
types: echoes, mentions and quotations. The echoes are Qur’anic words or
phrases used in their original form or slightly modified in the text of the
Epistles without an explicit reference to their Qur’anic origin (for example,
“those firmly grounded in its knowledge” al-rāsikhūna fī ‘ilmihā, an echo
of a Qur’anic verse;25 the Encompassing Pedestal al-kursiyy al-wāsi‘ another
Qur’anic echo26). The most common example of Qur’anic echo in the
Epistles is the oft-repeated formula “Know, oh brother, may God support
you and us with a spirit [sent] from Him (…) I‘lam, yā akhī, ayyadaka’llāhu
wa iyyānā bi-rūḥin minhu” which is used as a header for the introduction of
new topics. This phrase derives from a Qur’anic verse27 in which the authors
of the Epistles could find the basis of their spiritual brotherhood as opposed
to blood or tribal kinship or partisanship.
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The mentions are references to particular subjects that are explicitly
indicated as part of the Qur’an (or any of the other revealed Books). These
mentions may be specified, followed by one or more Qur’anic verses, for
example, “(...) the pleasure of the drinks of paradise (ladhdhat sharāb aljinān), [which is] mentioned in the Qur’an”, is followed by a Qur’anic
verse28, or unspecified, in which no particular verse is given, for example “(...)
the scent and breath al-rawḥ wa’l-rayḥān, [which are] mentioned in the
Qur’an”29. Mentions can be quantified in three ways:
a) in a general way, in which the subject is identified as being mentioned
numerous times for example, “(...) and there are many verses in the Qur’an
with that meaning”30; b) in a particular way, with reference to particular sūras
of the Qur’an, for example, “(...) and He also mentioned the features of the
hypocrites (...) in many verses, especially in Sūrat al-Anfāl , Sūrat al-Tawba,
and Sūrat al-Aḥzāb”31 and c) in a numerical way, giving the number of verses
in which the subject appears for example, “(...) and God has mentioned His
promise to the believers in the Qur’an in about one thousand verses”32.
The quotations are the literal citations of whole verses or part of them
that are usually found following an idea or concept developed in the Epistles.
Whether they appear individually or as a series of verses joined together,
quotations are introduced, expanded, commented on, or even interpreted
by words or phrases placed both before and after the verses that will be
termed prefixed and suffixed formulas, as the following sections explain.

1. Prefixed Introductory Formulas
More than one fifth of quotations (319 or 22.8 per cent) are unmarked, that
is, they are introduced in the text with no textual indication that they are
citations from the Qur’an. The rest, that is, more than three quarters of all
quotations (1080 or 77.2 per cent) have prefixed introductory formulas,
which can be divided into five categories: simple citation formulas, allusion,
corroboration, deictic and direct speech formulas.
1.1 Simple Citation Formulas33
The quotations introduced by simple formulas are among the most common
in the Epistles. They consist of expressions of the type ‘kamā qāla [Allāh]’, or
kamā dhakara Allāh bi-qawlihi. Other variants include: wa qad qāla Allāh;
wa qāla; thumma qāla; wa kadhālika qāla; wa innamā qāla; wa qawluhu;
wa bi-qawlihi; wa ka-qawlihi; fa-hakadhā qawluhu; thumma yaqūlu’llāh;
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wa Allāh yaqūl; wa huwa yuqāl. Some are in the impersonal passive: wa
qīla; according to the type of verb used, they may imply mention (kamā /
wa dhakara Allāh [+/- bi-qawlihi / fa-qāla]; kamā dhakarahu Allāh; kamā
dhakara fa-qāla; wa qad dhakara Allāh dhālika fī’l-Qur’an al-Karīm idh
yaqūl); command (kamā amara Allāh bi-qawlihi; lammā amara Allāh bi’lta‘āwun ḥaythu qāl; wa amarahu bi’l-malāṭifa fa-qāla t.; … amara bi-jihādihi
fa-qāla Allāh); explanation (kamā bayyana Allāh); description (kamā waṣafa
Allāh) or promise (kamā wa‘ada Allāh [+/- bi-qawlihi]). Other less frequent
verbs are: warn (mā qad nabbahaka Allāh lahu wa dhakaraka iyyāhu biqawlihi; wa kamā nabbahanā Allāh wa qāl); summarise (wa’khtaṣara biqawlihi); stamp, finish (mā khatamahā bihi qawluhu).
The role of the particle kamā is often exegetical, though not in a straightforward manner, as can be seen in the following example: the Epistles argue
that every human being partakes from the “universal human soul” (al-nafs
al-kulliyya al-insāniyya), and conclude “as [God] mentions in his statement
(kamā dhakara bi-qawlihi) ‘your creation and your upraising are as but as a
single soul (wa mā khalqukum wa-lā ba‘thukum illā ka-nafsin wāḥida)’.”34
The particle kamā (and indeed other equivalent particles such as wa qad,
thumma, wa kadhālika, wa innamā, and so forth) has a double function:
it acts both as a link with the previous co-text and as introduction of the
Qur’anic verse, in such a way that the Qur’anic individual is equated to the
universal soul of Neoplatonist thought. The particularity of the Epistles
is that these formulas are not textually transparent (as one would expect
with the use of kamā), since they usually imply an interpretation of the
text. Another example of this can be found when the Epistles discuss the
universal force that gives life to all creatures.35 This force is said to have
penetrated all the upper spheres down to the centre of the earth and is
expected to return to the outer sphere (al-muḥīṭ), causing “the raising,
the ascension and the resurrection (ba‘th, nushūr, mi‘rāj, qiyāma) as God
mentions: ‘To Him the angels and the Spirit mount up in a day whereof
the measure is fifty thousand years (ya‘ruju’l-malā’ikatu wa’l-rūḥu ilayhi
fī yawmin kāna miqdāruhu khamsīna alfa sana)’.”36 Here, not only is this
obscure eschatological reference identified with the resurrection (which in
itself is already interpretative) but the angels and spirit are also equated with
a universal physical force.
Occasionally, the simple citation formula includes additional, appended
information which refers to the characters involved in the Qur’anic
narration. Thus, we find: a) references to the addressee, following a formula
of the type ‘wa qāla li-nabiyyihi.’ This addressee is usually Muḥammad, but
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it can also be other prophets like Moses, or other characters like Iblīs and the
angels; b) the speech of a Qur’anic character other than God, introduced by
formulas of the type “kamā qāla/ dhakara Allāh ḥikāyatan ‘an …”37 in which
the main speaker, God, “cites” or “relates” from (ḥikāyatan ‘an) the speech of
different characters such as the angels, the prophets, Iblīs, the jinn, Pharaoh,
other characters involved in Pharaoh’s story, and so on; c) the identification
(exegetical in character) of some of the Qur’anic speakers. For instance,
while discussing the spiritual force (quwwa rūḥāniyya) that upholds the
existence of the “inhabitants of the heavens and the earth”, the authors
say: “and [God] relates from them (wa qāla ḥikāyatan ‘anhum): ‘None of
us is there, but has a known station …(wa mā minnā illā lahu maqāmun
ma‘lūm)’.”38
1.2 Allusion Formulas
Allusion formulas follow the type “wa ilayhi ashāra bi-qawlihi” and are
highly representative of the exegesis practised in the Epistles, one based on
allusion, word-association and contextual interpretation. An example of
this is the discussion of the status of souls after death. Evil souls are potential
devils which become actual devils when they separate from the body and
begin to “whisper” (waswasa) and incite those souls still embodied to evil
acts. The authors add: “and it is to these souls that [God] alludes when He
says ‘from the evil of the sneaking whisperer who whispers in the hearts of
mankind [etc.] (min sharri’l-waswāsi’l-khannās, alladhī yuwaswisu fī ṣudūri’lnās)’.”39 Allusion formulas are also used to introduce an interpretation not
of a particular person or a name, but of a concept, with the formula “wa
ilā hādhā’l-ma‘nā ashāra bi-qawlihi”. For instance, the Epistles compare
the relation between the number one and the other numbers (units, tens,
hundreds and so forth) to the relation between the bringer of the religious
path (ṣāḥib al-sharī‘a) and the successive generations of people, who are
divided in a series of ranks till the day of resurrection, when “all of them
will become a single group (jumla wāḥida) as [God] mentioned with his
statement alluding to this concept: ‘Upon the day when the Spirit and the
angels stand in ranks they shall speak not (yawma yaqūmu’l-rūḥu wa’lmalā’ikatu ṣaffan lā yatakallamūn)’”40 and “‘We muster them so that We
leave not so much as one of them behind; and they shall be presented before
their Lord in ranks (wa ḥasharnāhum fa-lam nughādir minhum aḥad; wa
‘uriḍū ‘alā rabbika ṣaffā)’.”41 The basis for the allusion is the term ṣaffan (in
ranks), which the Epistles seem to interpret as meaning not only “ranks” but
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also “one group.” The term rūḥ is also interpreted as referring to the totality
of human souls, which, as was explained before, will return to their origin
as one single soul.
1.3 Corroboration Formulas
Corroboration formulas are those used by the authors of the Epistles to
present the verse as a proof of authority for what they have just said. These
formulas follow the types wa taṣdīq dhālika qawl Allāh, wa al-dalīl ‘alā
dhālika qawluhu, al-dalīl ‘alā ṣiḥḥat mā qulnā wa ḥaqīqat mā waṣafnā
qawlu’llāh, among others.42 For instance, the Epistles identify the Hell of
the revealed scriptures with the philosophical world of generation and
corruption (‘ālam al-kawn wa’l-fasād). In order to substantiate that belief,
they say: “and the proof (dalīl) of this is [God’s] statement: ‘depart unto the
triple-massing shadow!43 (ẓillin dhī thalāthi shu‘ab)’.”44 This verse has been
interpreted as referring to three columns of smoke rising from the fires of
Hell.45 However, the Pure Brethren see it as “an allusion (ishāra) to the souls
confined in bodies with length, breadth and depth, which are under in sublunar sphere.” This is an indication of how the Epistles bridge the obscurities
of revealed lexicon and philosophical concepts.
1.4 Deictic Formulas
Through these formulas, particular elements from the text of the Epistles
are related to Qur’anic words and verses in a process of identification.
They may contain relative pronouns (following the types ‘fa-hiya al-lātī
dhakarahā Allāhu bi-qawlihi’; ‘al-ladhīna dhammahum bi-qawlihi’),
personal pronouns (kamā madaḥahum Allāh) or regular nouns (wa
akhbara ‘an ahl al-jahāla fa-qāla). The words used in these formulas vary
from meanings of praise (al-ladhīna madaḥahum Allāh t. bi-qawlihi) to
reproval (al-ladhīna dhammahum rabb al-‘ālamīn bi-qawlihi), promise
(kamā wa‘ada Allāh dhālika bi-qawlihi), description (kamā waṣafahā Allāh;
wa qāla fī ṣifat ahl al-janna; kamā dhakara Allāh a.j. fī waṣf al-malā’ika)
and so on. Although this type of formula is the most likely to provide the
ground for interpretation and semantic expansion, only two examples are
mentioned here. In both cases, the Epistles easily identify Qur’anic elements
by applying a verse to a particular kind of person, concept or situation. For
instance, the authors exhort their reader: “be not of those who walk on
[the earth] and forsake and are neglectful of its signs (āyāt),”46 and proceed:

citational exegesis of the qur’an: …

179

“they are those about whom God says: ‘I made them not witnesses of the
creation of the heavens and earth, neither of the creation of themselves; I
would never take those who lead others astray to be My supporters’ (mā
ashhattuhum khalqa’l-samāwāti wa’l-arḍi wa-lā khalqa anfusihim wa mā
kuntu muttakhidha’l-muḍillīn ‘adudā).”47 On another occasion, we are told
that if humans nurture their soul, they can reach the highest human level,
which borders on the angelical condition, and come close to their Creator,
a reward for which there can be no description; the authors add: “as God
describes (waṣafa) when He says: ‘No soul knows what comfort is laid up
for them secretly, as a recompense for what they were doing’ (fa-lā ta‘lamu
nafsun mā ukhfiya lahum min qurrati a‘yunin jazā’a bi-mā kānū ya‘lamūn).
”48 In this latter case the Epistles interpret the soul’s ignorance of the reward
as the impossibility of describing it, since they themselves have identified
the reward as the ascension of a human being to the angelical level and
proximity to God.
1.5 Direct Speech Formulas
Finally, other quotations cite the words of different Qur’anic personae
and are introduced with formulas of direct speech, such as: alladhīna
yaqūlūna; ḥaythu qālū; wa qālū; wa min dhālika qawl al-mu’minīn; qawl
al-rabbāniyyīn; ḥīna qālū li-Qārūn; wa Iblīs (…) qāla; wa qāla Yūsuf; kamā
sa’ala Yūsuf al-ṣiddīq; wa kadhālika Ibrāhīm, and so on.

2. Suffixed Formulas
Some quotations are followed by suffixed formulas, which are mostly
exegetical as they consist of a single word or phrase such as ya‘nī, ay or wa
huwa, devices typical of paraphrastic tafsīr.49 To cite just one example of the
use of ya‘nī, let us consider the citation of the verse ‘ilayhi yaṣ‘adu’l-kalimu‘lṭayyibu wa’l-‘amalu’l-ṣāliḥu yarfa‘uhu’ (Unto Him good words ascend, and
the pious deed does He exalt).50 Five out of the six times this verse is quoted
the authors add: ya‘nī rūḥ al-mu’min (“that is, the spirit of the believer”).51
Thus, the Epistles interpret the ascension of good words to God as the
ascension of the soul to the world of the spirits (‘ālam al-arwāḥ) after its
separation from the body.52
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IV. The Art of Ignoring Qur’anic Citations
The Epistles were criticised by Abū Sulaymān al-Manṭiqī al-Sijistānī (d.
c. 375/985) and a certain Jarīrī for supposedly having attempted to mix
philosophy and revealed religion.53 My contention is that this is because of
the high number of Qur’anic citations in a work whose thought is engrained
in a Neoplatonic framework. There are more than 1,600 citations of the
Qur’an in the Epistles, not counting the many echoes and reminiscences
which do not count as actual citations. It is also my contention that while
some classical sources condemned the Epistles’ use and interpretation of the
Qur’an as unacceptable, most contemporary scholars have ignored their use
of the Qur’an as irrelevant and superfluous.54
One such scholar is Ian Netton, whose book Muslim Neoplatonists
(henceforth MN) was the only English monograph on the Epistles for a
long time since its first publication in 1982.55 Netton’s book has become an
important reference for students and scholars who approach the subject.
Until recently it remained “the standard short introduction in English to
the Brethren of Purity”.56 MN is commendable for its comprehensiveness
and clarity, for having redirected attention to the text itself, away from
discussions on the authorship, and for having identified and critically
analysed the main sources of the Epistles.57
However, MN presents a number of important limitations. By
considering that “the Rasā’il contain not only Greek, Judaeo-Christian,
and Qur’anic influences but also a variety of Persian, Indian, Buddhist,
Zoroastrian, and Manichean elements as well”58 Netton downgrades the
importance that the Qur’an has for the authors to a mere influence among
many. In fact, the section on “The Cloak of the Qur’an”59 occupies less than
two thirds of chapter 5 “Uses of Literature”, which also contains a section
on “Indian literature.” In addition, Netton’s approach to the use of the
Qur’an in the Epistles leads him to some questionable conclusions in two
regards: the “disguise” of “heterodox” positions with a Qur’anic “garb” or
“cloak,” and the issue of the authors’ “heterodoxy”. Netton’s approach may
be summarised as follows:

1. The Qur’an as a “Smoke-Screen”
Netton states that there is “nothing unusual” about using the Qur’an “to
document particular doctrines and concepts”, since “numerous Arab [sic]
authors have done likewise.”60 In the Epistles both “Qur’anic revelation
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and pagan dogma and philosophy have a place,” and therefore the Qur’an
should be seen as a “fertile source of inspiration and backing” for the authors
mainly Neoplatonic doctrine.61 According to Netton, however, the authors’
“relationship with Islam” was “uneasy to say the least.”62 As a result, in his
view, the “thoroughly Qur’anic substrate”, which Netton admits the Epistles
have,63 prevent them from being called “un-Islamic with no qualification.”64.
Next, Netton asserts that the authors accepted the Qur’an, but adds that
“they went far beyond” it. In Netton’s understanding, the authors used the
Qur’an as “an excellent smoke-screen for doctrines which were entirely
un-Qur’anic.”65 They attempted to “cloak” their “wilder Neoplatonic
heresies” from “hostile eyes” with “the Islamic orthodoxy of the [Qur’an]”
or, in other words, with a “liberal sprinkling of Qur’anic quotations.”66 In
order to disguise (“or at least, make less obvious to unfriendly eyes”) their
“Neoplatonism and eclectic toleration” the authors used an “external
cloak” “woven from the Qur’an.”67 Netton’s explanation as to why it was
“necessary” for the authors to cloak their doctrines “in an orthodox Islamic
garb” is that “their teaching may provoke unrest” and their safety would be
at risk.68 Finally, Netton says that the authors were successful in disguising
“some of the unorthodox implications of their philosophy.” To support
this claim, Netton presents the circulation of the Epistles “among orthodox
Muslims” as a proof.69

2. Orthodoxy70
Netton’s approach to what “orthodoxy” is, is clear: the Qur’an, he says, is
“the basic scriptural text of orthodox Islam.”71 He sees the Epistles operating
“basically from a framework of Qur’anic orthodoxy”72 but he asks the
question, “how Islamically orthodox are the Rasā’il?” Netton argues that
the Epistles “contain much that would have been unacceptable to Sunnī
Islam”,73 and that the authors’ tolerance and acceptance go “beyond the
limited standards of early Islam; if argued to their logical conclusion they
would result in heresy [sic] (bid‘a)”;74 similarly, “many of their beliefs were
entirely outside the pale of Islam” and, for instance, their concept of God
“differed radically from that of orthodox Islam”.75 The “single focus” that
inspired the authors’ acceptance of diverse sources, Netton believes, was
“the universal concept of purity, and not Islam.”76 He concludes that the
authors are “reluctant Muslims”77 but that they are “eager to maintain” an
“impression of orthodoxy”, as when they declare that their thought is “the
creed of our father Abraham”.78
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Netton’s arguments have remained unchallenged for several years,79 with
a notable exception:80 Salim Kemal has questioned Netton’s idea that the
authors included many Qur’anic quotations so that a superficial reading
would “fail to identify” non-Islamic elements. Instead, Kemal highlights the
importance of paying attention to the authors’ self-perception. As “doctors
of the soul” they started from the acceptance of the Qur’anic injunctions
and then attempted to show “the comprehensiveness of Islamic thought and
doctrine” by examining critically and incorporating “much of the apparently
non-Islamic cultural and philosophical alternatives”.81
To depict the tenth century, as Netton’s conclusions would suggest, in
terms of a static distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy misses the
complex realities of the time. The same view is held by other scholars, such
as Bosworth, who holds that the “religious or philosophical orthodoxy” of
the ikhwān al-ṣafā’ were “dubious in the eyes of the official spokesmen for
Islam,”82 a vague and misleading denomination that is left unidentified. An
important question is left unexplored: What happens when two or more
competing groups claim to be orthodox at the same time and the same place
with different dogmas?83
Netton’s approach can be visualised in the following diagram:

V. Theoretical Framework
In order to study the use of the Qur’an in the Epistles of the Pure Brethren,
I draw from a theoretical framework propounded by Arkoun in his study
of al-I‘lām bi-Manāqib al-Islām84 by Abū’l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī.85 In Arkoun’s
words, in order to “exploit a document related to the history of thought,
we must restore the relationship writing-text-reading in all its complexity.
[…] The relationship is further complicated by the fact that every author
has been a reader before, while the reader has not always been an author.”
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Arkoun’s approach to classical texts aims at a research that is “extended to
include analysis of the implicit information contained in any discourse,”
and strives to “become simultaneously aware of the content of a given
discourse as an act of knowing and of our situation, as readers, in relation
to that discourse.”86 With this in mind, our exegetical approach can be
differentiated from Netton’s with the following diagram.

Netton’s MN considers the authors of the Epistles fundamentally as
Neoplatonist syncretists and only secondarily as “reluctant Muslims”. In this
scheme, the Qur’an represents orthodoxy and Neoplatonism heterodoxy. The
combination of the two in the Epistles leads Netton to suggest that the authors
consciously concealed and embellished the “heterodox” character of their
work with a façade of Qur’anic quotations. However, this view disregards the
exegetical character of the Epistles, both as a writing and as a reading, that is,
as an exercise in which the authors are as much writers as they are readers (of
their sources). The Epistles-as-writing are a result of the Epistles-as-reading.
Similarly, the use of Qur’anic quotations are the result of the way the authors
interpreted them. Our approach is therefore fundamentally exegetical and
contends that the Qur’anic quotations are best analysed when attention is
paid to the implicit exegetical value of each use or quote.
Four concepts originating in the field of philosophy of language as well
as the disciplines of semantic linguistics and pragmatics can be applied
for our purposes.87 These concepts are (1) the importance of usage for the
meaning, and the role of the context and the co-text in the determination of
meaning; (2) the principle of cooperation and implicature; (3) the principle
of relevance; and (4) intertextuality and intratextuality. 88
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1. Determining Meaning: Use and Context
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein highlighted the
importance of analysing the use of words to understand their meaning.
Wittgenstein set himself to examine the “language-game,” an expression
used to refer to the whole consisting of language and the context into
which it is woven. He advised: “Let the use of the words teach you their
meaning.”89 In addition, he stated that “for a large class of cases – though
not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus:
the meaning of a word is its use in the language,”90 and that “meaning is the
use of the word.”91
This study retains Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use theory as well as the
idea that language fulfils a multiplicity of communicative functions, and
that those functions can be studied by paying attention to the actual uses
of language and by retracing the steps by which those uses are reached. In
Wittgenstein’s words: “one cannot guess the way a word functions. One
must look at its use and learn from that.”92
These ideas are tested here in order to analyse the use (or rather, uses) of
Qur’anic quotations in the Epistles. My contention is that the meaning that
each quote from the scriptures (in this case the Qur’an, though the same
is true of the Torah or the Gospels) has for the authors of the Epistles can
be determined if we examine the uses of that quote in the text as a whole.
Each quotation, each use of a Qur’anic verse in the Epistles, is embedded
in a co-text, an immediate and surrounding textual context. The extended
textual context or co-text are the Epistles as a whole, and the context of
situation is the intellectual and political moment in history in which
they were produced.93 The difficulties surrounding the exact historical
contextualisation of the Epistles oblige us to look closely at the co-texts
in which Qur’anic quotations are inserted. This perspective allows the
researcher to focus on the disambiguation role – that is the role played by
the co-text (in this case the Epistles) in the selection of one interpretation
among many possible ones.

2. The Principle of Cooperation; the Concept of Implicature
Another crucial concept is the “principle of cooperation” as defined by
philosopher Paul Grice. The participants in a conversation “cooperate”
in order to communicate, and expect the others to make the required
contributions in their exchange. For a speaking subject to mean something
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by a certain utterance, according to Grice, is for him to intend that such an
utterance has an effect on the audience “by means of the recognition of this
intention.”94
Moreover, the meaning of an utterance is said to include the proposition
expressed and what the proposition implies or “implicature,” in Grace’s
terminology.95 Therefore, in extrapolating these concepts to apply them to
textual analysis – such as that performed here on the Epistles – the reader
must assume that the authors are cooperative and therefore must make
implicatures about the text, especially about exegetical ones. Furthermore,
the reader must recognise the intention of the authors – in our case, in the
way and manner in which they quote from the Qur’an.

3. The Principle of Relevance
The pragmatic principle of relevance96 says that to communicate is to claim
an individual’s attention, which implies that the information communicated
is relevant. In order to “perceive” the relevance of an utterance, the hearer
must be able to supply some premises and derive contextual implications.97
When the hearer fails to do so, he is unable to see the intended relevance.

4. Intertextuality and Intratextuality
Intertextuality, a concept coined by linguist and psychoanalyst Julia
Kristeva,98 refers to the participation of both author and reader in a variety
of overlapping meanings with regard to the relationships between a given
text and other texts. A more recent term, intratextuality, refers to the
relationships that exist between parts of a text (or between the parts and the
whole)99 that contribute to the understanding of the text.

VI. How Context Determines Meaning
In the relationship between meaning and context, three levels must be
considered: text (for example a verse), co-text (the surrounding text, which
may include other verses too), and context (which may be textual, for
example, the Epistles, or situational, for example, the intellectual and sociopolitical conditions in which the work appeared).
A text is marked by connectedness, that is, cohesion in form (through
certain devices) and coherence in content, and by relevance to the participants
in the communicative process (authors-readers). Taking Netton’s smoke
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screen theory to its logical consequences, the Epistles would appear to be a
non-cohesive text, a text that can be read without the Qur’anic quotations
without much modification (as in Bausani’s summary). In these readings,
the quotations are regarded as not more than intrusions, or as a seal used
to authenticate and sanctify certain ideas. In this way, the relevance of the
quotations is considered to be minimal.
However, the intertextual character of the work is clear, since the
reader of the Epistles is repeatedly referred to the Qur’an. Similarly, an
intratextual approach is essential when one considers that a vast number
of verses are quoted several times in different places in the Epistles. Each
use is determined by the different contexts and the surrounding co-text.
Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, in order to understand the total meaning given
to a particular verse by the authors we must look for the sum of its uses,
which will be found in how and where they are quoted.
The contention of this study is that the Qur’anic quotations provide
cohesion to the Epistles. Each Qur’anic verse quoted is, in linguistic terms, a
text-unit and each quotation represents a transfer of context, as can be seen
in the following diagram.

In the Epistles, Qur’anic quotations are normally introduced after an idea
is developed. An introductory formula usually precedes the verses, though
this is not always the case. The meaning given to the verse by the authors
is intimately linked to the surrounding (mainly preceding) co-text. Often,
it is possible to read the text backwards (the quotations first and then the
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preceding paragraph) in such a way that the text seems to be an explanation,
that is a tafsīr, of the verses quoted.100 Thus, the quotation of a verse in a
particular context (or rather co-text) often implies an interpretation of the
verse. In other words, the meaning of the verse and that of the context that
surrounds it are intimately linked. They cannot be separated because they
were conceived as different expressions of the same truths.
Therefore, in order to “uncover” this contextual interpretation, we must:
1.
2.

3.

Identify the text-units that have undergone a transfer of context, the
Qur’anic verses quoted in the Epistles.
Classify the co-textual relationship with each verse and determine:
whether there is a) an explicit expansion of its meaning (by way of
prefixed or suffixed formulas or other exegetical comments), or b) an
implicit expansion (this happens in most cases).
Detect the role of the context in order to understand the meaning
assigned to the verses by the authors (contextual exegesis).

In addition, it would be useful to carry out a comparative study with other
exegetical works (such as formal, traditionalist commentaries of the Qur’an,
or Sufi commentaries) to check the uniqueness or similarities of the use
and interpretation of the Qur’anic material in the Epistles. However, this is
outside the scope of this study.
To address the issue of the combination of philosophy and scripture we
may ask whether the Qur’an is in fact the authors’ doctrinal starting point
and whether consequently they embrace philosophical ideas that agree
with their Qur’anic interpretation, or rather (and this would be Netton’s
position) whether their main purpose is to establish philosophical concepts
and then to find solace in discovering coincidences in the Qur’an. This study
has proposed that the answer lies in neither one nor the other approach.
Instead, we find the answer in what can be described as the hermeneutics of
correspondence or harmonising exegesis.
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Routledge, 1998), vol. 4, pp. 685-688; and “Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’,” in Julie Scott Meisami
and Paul Starkey (eds) Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature (London: Routledge, 1998),
pp. 391-392.
57. As Madelung has pointed out in his review of the book, published in New Blackfriars
65, no. 764 (February, 1984), pp. 86-87, Netton “is primarily concerned with the
ultimate sources and only secondarily with the channels and immediate sources
through which their ideas may have reached the authors.” This leaves a gap in the
contextualisation of the work.
58. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, p. 88.
59. Ibid., p. 78-89. In fact this section consists of little more than a catalogue of Qur’ānic
references to prophets.
60. Ibid, p. 82. As Netton adds, the Epistles differ from other works in their conception of
the Torah and the Gospel as on a par with the Qur’ān.
61. Ibid, p. 41.
62. Ibid, p. 107.
63. Ibid, p. 108.
64. Ibid, p. 107. The emphasis is from the original.
65. Ibid, p. 79.
66. Ibid, p. 89.
67. Ibid, p. 79.
68. Ibid, p. 78.
69. Ibid, p. 78. Netton is probably thinking of Tawḥīdī’s and Sijistānī’s access to the work,
but forgets their (and later) condemnations.
70. It is not clear what exactly is meant by “orthodoxy” in MN, since the term is
left undefined. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with the problems
surrounding the use of this term. Suffice it to mention three notable contributions

192

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

81.
82.

83.

84.

85.

the construction of belief

on this subject: Alexander Knysh, “‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘Heresy’ in Medieval Islam: An
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6ii (1995), pp. 262-265.
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Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought (London: Saqi Books,
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‘Āmirī as one of the “people of old and new” who had “attempted this trick”, by which
he means combining religion and philosophy, but ultimately “gave up their purpose
disappointedly and fell flat on their faces unsuccessfully”; see Tawḥīdī, Kitāb al-Imtā‘,
vol. 2, p. 15. Jarīrī also mentions among such people Abū Zayd al-Balkhī and Abū
Tammām al-Nīsābūrī (4th/10th c.).
Arkoun, Logocentrisme, Studia Islamica 35 (1972), p. 6; reproduced in Arkoun, Essais,
p. 86; English tr. in Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, p. 170.
The relatively recently discipline of Pragmatics is the study of the relation between
the structure of a semiotic system (notably language) and its usage in context. Along
with semantics, it forms part of the general theory of meaning. See Stephen Levinson,
Pragmatics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and Steven Davis (ed.),
Pragmatics. A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Philosophische Untersuchungen
(Parallel German and English Texts), tr. Gertrude E.M. Anscombe; ed. Rush Rhees
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1953); John Langshaw Austin, How to do Things with Words
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Wilson, Relevance, Communication and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 2nd ed.
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H. Paul Grice, “Meaning,” Philosophical Review 66 (1957), p. 384; repr. in Grice,
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H. Paul Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds),
Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 43 ff.; repr.
in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, p. 24ff.
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(such as that the match is on the same day and at the same time as the lecture, that the
second person might prefer football to the topic of the lecture, that he/she intends to
watch the match and that the reply might be a “no”). On the principle of relevance see
Mary M. Talbot, “Relevance,” in Jacob L. Mey (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics
(Amsterdam and Oxford: Elsevier, 1998), pp. 775–778.
Julia Kristeva, La rèvolution du language poetique (Paris: Seouil, 1974), English tr. by
Margaret Waller as Revolution in Poetic Language (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1984).
In Alison Sharrock’s words, “how parts relate to parts, wholes, and holes”: Alison
Sharrock and Helen Morales, Intratextuality: Greek and Roman Textual Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 5.
See, for example. Epistle 43 “On the Way to God”, Rasā’il, vol. 3, pp. 5–9.

Afterword
Mohammed Arkoun Replies and Comments
It is always a rich experience to listen to Professor van Ess. Whenever I read
or hear him I am reminded of the wonderful expression, bihâr al-anwâr
(“oceans of light”). However, I missed one strand of enlightenment in those
which he presented to us today. This is the idea of legitimacy. Legitimacy
is the basis for power as well as authority. Discourses in the spheres of
politics, philosophy or theology are instances of a regime for truth. As I
heard Professor van Ess speak, I kept asking myself whether he came across
an explicit or implicit presence of claims to legitimacy in the materials he
has researched. Even more importantly, I am curious about the Arabic word
that might express the idea. This is important because of the danger of
anachronism to which I am always opposed.
Take for example the famous formula, La Hukma illa li-Allah (there
is no power but God’s). There is in this at least the pretence, if not more,
of legitimacy. It is linked to the notion of the true religion which, as we
know, is an ancient concept. St Augustine is one of the earliest voices on
this topic for Catholics, constructing the idea of true religion employing
a philosophical (Platonic) basis, and a basis for what was later to become
theology. Again, there is the Dutch thinker, Grotius. He also had an
enormous influence, through the idea of a true religion, in the development
of a notion of legitimacy. True religion, in turn, enabled political legitimacy.
For political legitimacy fails to exist if it is not founded on a regime of truth
which is accepted, by agreement, to be a truth.
The Qur’an employs the concept, din-al-haq, precisely in this way. The
disputes mentioned in Professor van Ess’s paper would appear in a new light
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if they were to be seen as part of a search for legitimacy, which I missed in
the paper.
My interest in this all-important topic has its basis in what we find today.
As we know, none of the states in the Muslim world today, which I call
party states (a single party state) which emerged after the Second World
War, can pretend to any legitimacy whatever. The absence of legitimacy is
the most serious factor in the Muslim world today, because where there is no
legitimacy there is no legality. People are conscious of its absence, and they
see how the states cynically manipulate the show of political legitimacy, let
alone the regime of truth. This is the reason why I am interested to see how
the notion worked, or was manipulated, in the whole history of Islam and
religion.
In Stephen Humphrey’s paper the concept in need of clarification is that
of authenticity. Today we are obliged to distinguish between two kinds of
authenticity, reflecting two kinds of history. There is the history practised in
the tradition of the nineteenth century which took the form of philological
criticism of texts. And there is the other branch of history, historical
psychology, which still remains neglected.
What counts as authentic in historical psychology is very different from
what authenticity represents in traditional academic history. In the latter,
anachronisms have no place. But believers in a faith typically indulge in
anachronisms. When critical history insists on its own criteria of truth or
authenticity as the face of what believers take to be authentic, when historians
challenge the anachronisms which religious belief is constructed from, the
result is a total failure of communication. The believer will not understand
the critique of anachronism. Where there is no mutual understanding there
can be no conversation.
Belief belongs to the sphere of psychology. A believer’s speech is
determined by emotion. He does not employ the tools of criticism that we
do when we study history or take care to report something with accuracy.
A personal example is in order here. When, at an early age, I was a
secondary school teacher, in a lycée near Algiers, I used to assume the idea
of divine authenticity of the Qur’an. Afterwards I wrote an article on this
concept which I presented in a festschrift to my teacher in philosophy when
I was in Oran. My teacher challenged this idea, asking: how can God, who
defines himself as invisible, eternal and mysterious, be considered to speak?
That was when I first recognised the problematic character of the idea. I had
simply assumed, like all Muslims, that God speaks. I recognised this belief as
a mental obstacle in myself. It is still a prevalent belief.
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That is why historical psychology is extremely important. There is the
problem, of course, that we do not have access now to the people whose
traditions have been reported in the texts we study as historians. All these
texts, and the oral traditions quoted in them are, as Humphreys indicates,
unreliable. But then there is this other kind of history, where we may use these
texts to reconstruct the psychology of the societies concerned. Although the
texts may not be taken as authentic representations of history, they are also
authentic in that they express the spontaneous experience of the people.
This text is of continued relevance today. Nowadays all Muslim discourses
are a tissue of contradictions. It is no use simply opposing scientific history
to these. It is more important to relate to Muslims today at the level of
psychology. The Muslim world reflects a fait accompli at the end of a
whole history of Islamic thought. From the earliest time Islamic discourse,
represented in texts like those which Humphreys has discussed, was
mythical rather than historical. Today, Islam is totally cut off from any kind
of historical reasoning whatsoever. That is why it is impossible to engage in
the kind of discussion we are having today in Cairo or Algiers or Pakistan. If
you attempt to do so you will find people reacting very emotionally, making
it impossible for you to continue.
Your only option therefore is to converse at the level of the psychology
of your interlocutors. This way you may hope to bring people pedagogically
to a realisation that when you read the sira (the biography of the Prophet
Muhammad) for example, you have before you a text which has a linguistically
mythical structure, rather than historical inquiry. When Muslims read the
sira they are throughout in the mode of devotion. It is nothing else but
devotion. In this mode there is no place for thinking, analysing or discussing
anything with reference to our modern understanding of authenticity. This
is very clear when you consider, as I constantly find, that in Arabic there is
no word for anachronism up to now. This shows that the people do not have
an idea or need of this reality, this methodology of an open mind.
Still, it may happen that by starting in terms of psychology, which is
the foundation of all belief, you may be able to bring them ultimately to
appreciate critical history, which is what we exclusively do in schools or
universities. This is the approach I practise with my students. I start out by
introducing them to this distinction between two levels of authenticity. I try
to apply this to the Qur’an and the other texts which have been a basis for
the construction of belief over so many centuries. In general I find that the
students are very uncomfortable with this new idea at first. But after a year
or so, they become receptive and enthusiastic.
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What I have just said about the idea of history is also true of the idea of
reason. It seems to me that the paper by Stefan Wild is based on the postulate
that all the social actors he refers to, from Muhammad Abduh to Pope
Benedict, are using reason. It is a common assumption that all discourses,
whether religious, historical, political or theological, are founded on reason.
But this assumption does not hold.
What is neglected when we appeal to reason is imaginaire: l’imaginaire
social, and l’imaginaire religieux. The psychological reality of social life and
of religious life is not reason. It is emotion. We make a big mistake when we
take religious postulates to be postulates of reason. But religious discourse
is built out of l’imaginaire, and l’imaginaire is always aligned to emotion
rather than rational thought.
This was true of many discourses in the past. It is also true of the
ideological discourses of today. The majority of discourses in the West
today are dominated by emotion. I am reminded at this point of a recent
book by Dominique Moisi called The Geopolitics of Emotion. This is a great
idea, because it helps to free us from the assumption that we always argue
rationally, that reason is free and autonomous. We tend, in the name of
reason, to want to dominate and silence l’imaginaire. Reason in this sense
has a dominating role, alienated from emotions. The attempt to ignore
l’imaginaire never works, not even in learned conferences such as now.
This dialectic is linked to another one I have been insisting on for a long
time now. This is the “thought of ” and the “unthought”. In the first instance
there are sociological concepts rather than philosophical or intellectual ones
(these are secondary). There is a strong dialectic between these. Moreover,
it keeps varying. Reason is full of vicissitudes. What we take to be a single,
unproblematic reason is in fact an ever-changing reason, governed by
changing epistemes. Every epistemic framework contains the un-thinkable,
and together dictates the shape and operation of reason in every phase of
history.
The eighteenth century in Europe saw the breakdown of all traditional
epistemes. The sequel to this is a new, emerging reason. But even in Europe
the ancient epistemes have by no means disappeared.
The type of reason prevailing in the first century of the Muslim era has
nothing in comparison with our episteme today. Similarly, classical Islamic
reason, what we find in the debate between al-Ghazzali and Averroes, has
nothing in common with what is invoked in Muslim discourse today.
In fact, the episteme of contemporary Muslim societies lies outside any
kind of possible reference whatsoever and I find it impossible to define it, to
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distinguish any criteria governing it. If you look at Muhammad Shahrur’s
pronouncements, for example, you will see that they are simply assertions,
and have nothing to do with either emotion or critical reason. When
contemporary Muslims invoke the dawla (“state”), this does not refer to
anything. Still, we report in our scholarly writings what Muslims “think”
of dawla. In fact it is more correct to say that contemporary Muslims “talk”
rather than “think”. They deliver discourses, but are not aware that this is
really all that they do. This, as a fact, remains unthought.
In Bachir Diagne we have a philosopher, with a philosophical
presentation. This is fact to rejoice in, having a philosopher among us. Now,
like mystics, philosophers enjoy a privilege, which consists of a certain
freedom with words. We could apply to philosophy what Lévi-Strauss
said about myth, that it is an ideological palace built out of the rubble of a
people’s social discourse. This freedom is a privilege of philosophers – the
freedom to make beautiful constructions.
However, the topic on which Professor Diagne has spoken is conversion.
This has aspects which make it necessary for us to think beyond philosophy.
I always think that conversion, which occurs out of a subjective decision,
carries risks. The person who converts is unable to see these risks because he
acts out of an inner impulse to change the frame of his sense of belonging
– to change his identity. This entails risks which are out of reach of the
subject’s mind.
When you convert, you do so on the basis of an idea of truth. But, as a
convert, you do not have a mastery or control over this idea. We all know
how dangerous the concept of the true religion is. That is why, no matter
what reasons you invoke in personal conversion, they remain subjective, and
are linked to very specific, personal circumstances. Conversion is inevitably
a personal adventure whose implications are not under the convert’s
conscious mastery.
I appreciate the fact that Professor Diagne discussed four specific
individuals. This is a way of focussing on the aspect of personality, and giving
a clearer idea about the actual processes involved in conversion. Even more
pleasing to me is his reference to St Augustine. About St Augustine I must
say that I have a deeply personal relation to him – I don’t know how else to
put it. I read Augustine’s Confessions when I was at the lycée, learning Latin
from my Jesuit teachers. The process of converting to something which feels
to be more full of truth than in your current state is described wonderfully
in this book.
Even more exciting was my discovery, through my teachers, that
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Augustine was an Algerian! This is, of course, to talk anachronistically, but
I hope the sense behind it will be clear. I emphasise this because I find it
most intolerable that a mind like Augustine’s has been obliterated from the
record in the very place in which he lived and taught. He belongs to the same
territory which I call mine, so I have a right, in a certain sense, to demand
his presence in this region of ours. If only the period of the achievements
of Roman culture and civilisation and of the church had been preserved
and made present in the history of what we call the Maghreb! We can only
imagine what a rich presence this would be. It has been obliterated, however.
All this is because of the concept of the true religion.
There is an example in this of how history is constructed. Because of this,
we have been deprived, in what we today call “Algeria”, of an intellectually
very rich part of its heritage. This is why I prefer to call the whole region
North Africa rather than the Maghreb. For, in using the latter term, we
reinforce the exclusion of this part of the history, so as to give it an exclusively
Arabic and Muslim identity.
Finally, with regard to Professor Diagne’s paper, I would plead with
him to listen to the voice of history while he exercises the freedom which
philosophy gives. Professor Diagne talked about tawbah. Of course, the word
does have the religious meaning he mentions. But we must not forget that
the same word occurs in Sura 9 in the Qur’an, in the so-called ayâtu-s-saif
(the “verse of the sword”). There, tawbah signifies unconditional surrender.
Read in context and, in linguistic terms, synchronically, it means just this:
surrender without conditions, because this is the long-awaited true religion.
The lesson to be learned is that philosophy should not ignore history.
It is a wonderful subject, but if in the process, one ignores history one ends
up putting up ideological palaces. The decoration on these palaces becomes
illusory. It disguises the truth – the historical, linguistic truth; the truth in
the context in which words are used.
The context which Malika Zeghal’s paper presents is of Bourguiba.
Bourguiba is a case study in its own right. It illustrates the situation of party
states in the whole Muslim world in modern times. Bourguiba exemplifies
the model of the third French republic, a model in which education was
provided free, by the state, and was founded on the principle of laicism.
Laicism is more extreme than secularism. Bourguiba was completely under
the influence of this model. However, his decisions reflected political
strategy rather than his convictions as an intellectual in the image of the
third French republic. This is true of the entire North Africa where, even
though the French ruled for more than a century, there was no legacy of
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statecraft. This is what accounts for the condition of these states. Contrary
to what many assume, it has nothing to do with Islam.
We must not assume, to start with, that Islam was the single or alldetermining force in the traditions of the North African zone. My own
background is a case in point. I come from the Kabyle tribe in Algeria.
Where I grew up we never heard what we nowadays call the shahada. We did
not have Islamic law or courts. We had none of the components of so-called
“Islam”. We were truly a part of the African continent, with animist beliefs
and practices. Where, in such a society, can one find a general “Islam”? Of
course, the situation was different in Morocco or Tunisia, where there was
the existence of the Universities of Qarawiyyin and Zaytuna. But, again,
what kind of “Islam” shall we say existed there?
The lived Islam, the living Islam on the ground at the start of the Muslim
period, was totally cut off from whatever we know of the Islamic tradition
of the classical age, the formative period. From this Islam there was no link
to the modern age. Consider Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, for instance, whose life
was contemporaneous with that of Immanuel Kant. Kant was a major figure
(among others of course) who radically changed the idea of human reason
but was ignorant of this kind of thinking. Not only that, he did not even
have the horizons of mind of someone like Ibn Hanbal in the eighth century.
Men like him were, in a sense, religious humanists who were open to all the
knowledge available at the time.
Clearly, there was no way to build a sound system of modernity on the
basis of the Islam of the early moments or out of the existing traditions.
Today, people call for a revival of Islam. But what Islam is there to the
revived? There is no intellectual Islam that can serve us in today’s world by
being revived.
The problem is not to do with Islam alone. It is also to do with modernity,
which bears the aspect of its historical alliance with colonialism. Modernity
has not risen as yet to a universal level of thought. Modernity has produced
intellectual tools which have still a contribution to make. What is regrettable
about it is its hegemonic aspect. This we must combat.
The dual problem of Islam and modernity is well illustrated in the history
of modern Turkey. Mustapha Kemal was a courageous leader who dared to
make a leap, but his lacked foundation in a culture that could support a new
beginning. The two traditions available were, on one hand, an Islam which
had no means for the construction of a modern state, and on the other hand,
a modernity which was based in solidarity with colonial systems.
The historical situation has affected the entire Muslim world. However, it
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has never been properly analysed and understood. The generation at the time
when the countries concerned became independent needed to understand
this, but there were no teachers or scholars who could fulfil this task. The
case remains exactly the same today. There are no educated teachers in our
schools who can explain what I call the inverse temporalities in the history
of Islam on one hand and of Europe on the other. Islam completely lost the
theology, philosophy and aspects of humanism which had contributed to
its glorious classical past, whereas Europe embarked on the Renaissance
without discontinuity, and with cultural energy and enthusiasm at its hand.
The result of all this is a total split in the Mediterranean region between
the North and the South. This in itself is not properly understood in the socalled Muslim countries of the region, which continued to exist in a state of
what I call “institutionalised ignorance” of the historical processes affecting
them.
In Ursula Günter’s paper what pleases me most is that it brings out
the problems inherent in the word “Islam”. This word is used loosely and
everywhere. It is a portmanteau word that I have wanted to be rid of. Yet it is
impossible, even in scholarship, to do without it. It becomes a real obstacle
to thinking and to realising the complexity it hides.
There is a real need for a more conceptualised language for such
complexities, including in Western societies where the idea of secularisation
is more complex than it appears. The concept of religion is similarly complex,
hiding the difference between a religious expression of the self and religion
as ideology.
Lack of a sophisticated conceptualisation of these words and ideas has
huge effects – for example, in the classroom where the teacher who has
not been made aware in his training to their complexity refers to Islam,
Christianity, and so on, in straightforward terms.

I would like to preface my final remarks to this symposium by expressing
my joy and my gratitude to everyone who is united, in a shared intellectual
solidarity, in the search for a common intellectual and conceptual ground
for scholars, visitors and artists in the face of the issues germane to Islam as
a religion, Islam as a culture and, lately, Islam as a historical force which has
today upset an established equilibrium, whatever its rights and wrongs, to
generate a challenge based on violence. This is not a violence issuing from
within Islamic history, or Islamic doctrines. It is in part a violence arising
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from rivalry between Islam as a religion and Christianity as a religion. But
there is also a lot more to it than this.
We cannot begin to understand this unless we get used to the idea of the
geo-historical space of the Mediterranean, an idea that has concerned me for
many years now. I say “geo-historical” rather than “geo-political”, because the
latter limits us to a short-term perspective, dating from the Second World
War – a period in which there has been one war after another, recapitulating
all the problems that we have been discussing, with no resolution in sight.
On the other side there is modernity which replaces earlier forms
of authority, justified by political theologies (as opposed to political
philosophies). In this, furthermore, there is a double axis, one going back
to the origin of the monotheistic religions, the other to the Greeks. This
double heritage still determines our struggle.
The Mediterranean space is the area where these two historical, doctrinal
axis have unfolded and given rise to a violence which, to be sure, we cannot
simply blame on either religion or modernity. But they have played their
part in this violence. Both monotheistic religion at one time and modernity
held up a promise for us – a promise to elevate the human mind, to liberate
it from ignorance and violence, and to produce culture.
I am not one of those who say that modernity has entirely failed in its
promise. Undoubtedly, it brought new possibilities and new visions of the
human condition. We cannot think or progress today, or develop a culture
of peace without making use of the tools of modernity. But as historians we
have to face up to its failures as well as achievements. Having done this, we
must look forward to the future.
In doing so, we have to realise that we cannot continue thinking of this
space by dividing it, as we once did, in separate theological streams. Each
community built its theological vision of revelation and of the human
condition in mutual exclusion of each other, each claiming to be the true
religion. Even now, as is the case in divinity schools or departments of
theology, we continue to think in terms of separate theological systems,
with its implicit mutual exclusions. Political theology continues to influence
us. Its historical effects are still with us, and neither the religions nor the
democratic political regimes of today are able to break free from this history.
The Mediterranean space saw the two religions of Christianity and
Islam spread from there to all over the world, crossing cultural, ethnic and
political frontiers. With their expansion came the spread of Greek thought
and the Roman concepts of law and the republic. In every society influenced
by Islam or Christianity there is at least some consciousness of this legacy,
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though more so in Christianity because there has been a more continuous
interface there, while in Islam the contact with Greek thought was more
tenuous, because Muslim jurists and theologians rejected it as alien (alUlum al-Dakhila) representing the intrusion of a foreign mentality. It was in
this belief that Ibn Qutayba wrote his main work attacking Aristotle, whom
the Arab philosophers called the First Teacher (al-mu’allim al-awwal).
This old controversy refers us back to the remarks of Pope Benedict
mentioned earlier in this conference. Although he spoke rhetorically,
quoting a text which he ought not to have quoted, there is a partial truth in
what he said because of this denunciation of philosophy in classical Islam.
The upshot of this is a complex and problematic situation, an incomplete
modernity and a so-called Islam of which it is hard to make sense. That is why,
in my view, we have to make a clean break with all this talk about Islam and
about religion and develop a new vocabulary for a new conceptualisation of
the situation in which we are today.
Failure to do this is what is keeping us back today. The way the Qur’an is
taken as an absolute authority, is the way any inquiry is stopped well before
it can produce results. You are forbidden from taking the Qur’an as anything
but sacred. But, what one forgets is that this text or discourse that we call the
Qur’an was made sacred, and is made sacred, through a historical and social
process. If you truly understand this, you would stop using the Qur’an as a
constant reference as is done today. You would go beyond what I call the
official closed corpus. Only then will we have the chance to initiate a new
conceptualisation.
This will not be a religious conceptualisation, referring to Islam or
Christianity, and so on. What I have in mind is an anthropological vision in
which all sacralised scriptures of every religion are opened up to a common
inquiry. To close the texts to inquiry, to sacralise them, has enormous
consequences. This is true of history, but it is equally true today. That is why
I was disappointed by President Obama’s citations from the Qur’an in his
speech at Cairo. To speak as he did is to reproduce the Muslim discourse
of today, which is a demagogic way of talking about issues, where the issues
get hidden rather than openly confronted. Today there is an urgent need
to speak about the Qur’an in real terms. The Qur’an cannot function
productively as a text of constant reference unless its status as knowledge is
properly established.
This is why I have called one of my studies, “the cognitive status of
revelation”. My aim is to use a method of analysis that may apply equally to
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all works which are sanctified through historical, social, political processes
and turned into texts with a holy or divine attribution.
In the current controversies which surround Muslim beliefs and practices
in the West today we find the Qur’an cited on all sides to justify this or that
position. I am constantly asked by certain government ministers in France
to clarify what the verses say, exactly, on these controversial positions.
My response is always the same. I say to them “My dear sir, in asking this
question, in this way, you are only reinforcing the dogmatic discourse of
Muslim ideologies. Like them, you are treating the text as an obligatory
source of reference before examining the basis of its authority. Let us first
clarify this status, and only then see what it says.”
In other words, we need to put aside all theological discourse about the
Qur’an, all exegeses of the text, so as to start with the question of the linguistic
and epistemological status of the discourse. This is not to disregard belief,
but to understand it in a new context, beyond the frontiers of theology.
Failure to carry out this task is responsible for the situation in Muslim
societies which I describe as living on fictions. In fact, this is a wider problem,
from which even democratic societies in Europe and America are not
exempt. Even there we find manipulations leading to crises of legitimacy.
In support of this point I only have to refer to the misinformation spread
by George Bush and Tony Blair, in the very democratic societies they led, to
wage the war in Iraq which had no legitimacy whatsoever.
Legitimacy, or the lack of it, is an attribute of knowledge as well. The
kind of beliefs propagated in Muslim societies since the rise of the modern
states are purely ideological. The discourse in the ever-increasing numbers
of mosques built in these countries is, without exception, ideological. There
is a whole spate of books nowadays by sociologists or political scientists in
the West talking about fundamentalism. But this present-minded approach
sheds no light on the real issue, which requires long-term, historical
analysis with the right tools. There is a difference between fundamental
and foundational. This also needs to be explained. The fiction that the very
“voice of God” speaks in the Qur’an and the Hadith, and that these are to
be the basis of the Sharia, which is to be seen as divine law, was constructed
long ago, and was maintained by special mechanisms over a long period
leading to today.
It was in history that what we call “belief ” and the “word of God” was
created. Today, this belief is propagated, without any change, in madrasas
(religious schools). To be sure, in the West as well the vocabulary of
“transcendence”, “God”, “revelation” and so on, has an on-going existence.
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I do not say that this vocabulary should be forgotten. It is what has formed
our history. But this vocabulary, as it remains, will not help us tackle the
serious problems of today – like how we might handle the phenomenon of
religion in French schools, which is a big, serious, politically urgent issue in
France today.
In the Muslim world, what I call the fiction of Islam, which is disconnected
from the realities of history or today, has been aggravated by the failure of
modernity. In speaking of Algeria during the period I was growing up – for
example, in the 1950s – I mentioned that “Islam” was a label which did not
correspond to any reality – linguistic, ethnographic or cultural. But scholars,
who should know better, continue to speak of the Islamic or Muslim world
as if “Islam”, never properly defined, is a reality of this world. At the time of
independence the people of this region hoped to benefit from the culture
and products of modernity. But the party-states that came into being
betrayed their hopes, and now, in the interests of identity and legitimacy,
what is offered is the fiction of a return of an imaginary Medina promoted
by the ulama, in alliance with party-states. This fiction has no connection
whatsoever with history or with the needed modernity.
What role does a scholar have in this situation? I reject the stance of
Orientalists who do their research on texts, working in Western universities,
with no interest or involvement, through their scholarship, with the
problems of knowledge and education in the relevant societies. It is as
a means to this involvement that I have proposed the concept of applied
Islamology, on the model of what is called applied anthropology. I believe
that a scholar who studies a people must give them something in return for
his privilege. This is the principle, combining scholarship with engagement,
which has guided all my work.
Mohammed Arkoun
Lecture delivered at Aga Khan University Institute
for the Study of Muslim Civilisations,
London, October 2009

Mohammed Arkoun:
A Passionate Critic
Mohammed Arkoun (1928–2010) was an outstanding scholar of Islamic
history. A Berber by birth, he grew up in Algeria, witnessing both French
rule and its nationalist aftermath. This experience led him to a radical and
critical revaluation of the role that religious and Islamic concepts as well as
ideas of modernity have played in ideological struggles between and within
so-called “Islamic” and “Western” societies in historical and contemporary
times.
He pursued these investigations by drawing on the theoretical resources
of modern social sciences, especially linguistics, anthropology and semiology
applying these to materials of Islamic traditions in novel and telling ways.
He developed these methods during a long career in research and teaching at
the University of Sorbonne in Paris. A series of publications on varied topics
reflected his developing thinking on these issues. They ranged from the
“humanist” thinker during the fourth century of Islam, al-Miskawayhi, to
the Qur’an, on which he published a set of semiological readings, reflecting
a highly original approach to this fundamental text for Muslims. The way
this text has been understood and deployed in Muslim history excited his
lifelong critical acumen, and he returned to it, time and again in his lecturing
and publishing career.
Despite the academic and theoretical basis of his career, Arkoun was
never content to work solely within academic confines. He longed to
make a difference to Muslim cultures at large. This led him to a passionate
engagement with Muslim institutions of learning and the arts with creative
ambitions and possibilities. He contributed energetically, in an intellectual
capacity, to the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, and to the Institute of
Ismaili Studies in London, of whose Board of Governors (headed by His

208

the construction of belief

Highness the Aga Khan) he was a member until his death. Arkoun valued
the opportunities he had for these and other such contributions beyond
the academia as part of what he called “Applied Islamology”, an endeavour
in which he aimed at uniting his theoretical and practical concerns and
interests.
Equally dissenting from traditionalism in Islamic theology as well as
Orientalist scholarship and modernist trends in contemporary Islam, his
was a highly original and individual voice in a field which is of undeniably
increasing importance today.
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